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”First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate 
of interest…. Secondly. That at this rate these advances should 
be made on all good banking securities, and as largely as the 
public ask for them. The reason is plain. The object is to stay 
alarm….” (Bagehot, 1873, on how Bank of England should avert a banking crisis) 
“Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When 
the crisis occurs the action taken depends on the ideas that are 
lying around.” (Milton Friedman, University of Chicago, 1982)
“Fairness demands the end of a system that privatises gains but 
socialises losses.” (Mark Carney, Bank of England, 2013)
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Introduction1
The quotes above illustrate how authorities, be it the central bank or other 
institutions, at different times have stated principles on how the context of banks 
should be ready to help avert banking crises. Banks need support since they have 
not done very well at times, or maybe too well in the eyes of context actors. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that banks, throughout history, will pay 
attention to what arguments best justify their existence and their maintenance 
of their “good name”. Most banks have long histories of survival in adverse 
conditions and of surfing on good tides. At the same time the recent crisis has 
demonstrated that many banks (and government agencies) failed to see what was 
coming and take appropriate action. In fact my starting assumption in the work 
on this essay has been that most failures in this crisis can be labelled managerial 
failures, ethical as well as instrumental. Over time I grew convinced that it is 
more complicated than that. It is not that bank managers do not make grave 
mistakes, they certainly do, but it is also that the contexts in which banks have 
to find their model of survival and prosperity there are also wills and strategies 
at play. The context is not a passive generator of data to be used for forecasting, 
it is rather an active player, who, to the extent that it finds it worthwhile to pay 
any attention to banks, will assert power to make banks employ a “logic of 
appropriateness”. That concept (the logic of appropriateness) was introduced 
by March & Olsen (1984, 2009) into organizational discourse in the form of 
“new institutionalism” deals with the simple but fundamental question: “What 
should a person like me do in a situation like this?” That question is not only 
about “who am I? (a person like me)” but also “what kind of situation is this?” 
(the context), and “What actions are possible?”(do). The normative factors at 
play at a given time and place must be discerned and acted upon for the person 
in question to do the appropriate thing, not only the person’s self-interest but 
also socially sanctioned values contained in the dominating ideology. Of course 
the person can rebel, but this is done better with appropriate knowledge of the 
values that are celebrated here at this time.
By bringing the influence from the context in view we also bring in the concept 
of power. We need not dwell on the huge literature on power – the traditional 
definition; Power is exerted when a person A induces another person, B, to do 
what B would not otherwise do. If we think about banks as being immersed in 
a sea of societal and other values while employing a logic of appropriateness, we 
will want to look upon banks and their action in different times with different 
dominating world views to discern what values might have played a role (as 
good arguments for action) at different times. We cannot observe the rendition 
1 The author is grateful for constructive critique in the seminars of the Bank Management 
program of the GRI. Special thanks to Roy Liff for comment on the final draft and to Henric 
Karlsson and Lise-Lotte Walter for their work in editing the manuscript for printing.
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of arguments directly, of course, but we can map a sequence of different world 
views (ideologies) in history and lay out the biographies of selected (prominent) 
banks in parallel. By such an exercise I hope to see what kind of power the 
context asserted at the time. This is interesting because now, in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, the appropriate level of regulation is at the very centre of 
the debate. From the assertion by neoliberals, that regulation can only introduce 
more inefficiency, to socialist views that ownership by the State of system critical 
banks would further stability. These views and arguments are based in value 
systems that are largely incompatible – they fail to persuade each other – can 
history make us any wiser?
Therefore my project is to lay out some of the major ideologies in history 
and place some prominent banks along the time line to see if anything can be 
discovered concerning the interaction between banks and their value contexts. I 
have chosen Scholasticism (around 400 to 1600 AD), Mercantilism (the 1600s), 
Liberalism (1700 – 1900), Neoliberalism (1900 until today). I could have paid 
more attention to the apex of state prominence in the form of the welfare state 
in the West and the socialist states in the East, but since banks played a more 
modest role then (in this time of maximum regulation) I have saved work and 
effort by skipping over those periods. I also pay relatively little attention to 
Liberalism since those days provided an abundance of opportunities for banks 
(regulation beyond what the Law said was not on the agenda). For banks I have 
chosen Medici of Florence, Fugger of Augsburg, Baring of London, and Royal 
Bank of Scotland of Edinburgh. They were among the most prominent of 
their times, but also went bankrupt (or were dismantled in other ways) as their 
activities came out of step with what others considered to be appropriate.
Figure 1:
This essay is written against a background belief that banks are important agents 
in the building of societies. This is because they the function of  (re-)allocation of 
financial resources to and from “real” actors in that society. Therefore they need 
to be attentive to the values and the appropriate reasons for doing things that 
are valid in that society. The allocation function of banks is mainly driven by the 
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arbitrage opportunities that offer themselves – if there is a profit in transferring 
money from one place to another, it will be done. Transferring money in time 
(giving loans) involves the risk of not being paid back (credit loss), which makes 
judgment of character and property an integral part of banking.  This was done 
on an individual level under the guidance of church pronouncements on what is 
appropriate. When the pre-modern state was being established during the 1600s, 
the 30 years’ war being a devastating expression of different princes’ striving to 
gain control of territory large enough to carry the burden of an expanded state 
administration, banks had to orient their judgments differently. Now the state 
was an expression of a more permanent, bureaucratic power that had to be 
included in all strategies. 
Mercantilism, consequently, has come to represent the concern with the 
flows, in and out of the country, of money and precious metals. Banks and other 
actors had to make deals with the state for privileges and protection. All in the 
service of the balance of payment and the maintenance of a strong state.
With modernity came science and technology, which offered almost endless 
opportunities for investment. Britain, having stayed out of much of the war-
making in Europe, could take a giant leap forward on the basis of its dominance 
at sea and technology. Let the entrepreneurs free! was the slogan presented most 
persuasively by Adam Smith. Mercantilism was just an expression of organized 
interests. Now the free choice of strategies to be pursued would make everybody 
better off. Pareto showed that, if actors in the market are left free to chose, an 
equilibrium will be reached. An equilibrium that is (“Pareto”) optimal, meaning 
that no market participant can improve his/her lot. Liberalism provided a golden 
age for most banks, especially if you were located in London, where deal making 
on financial matters was easy. With many actors there were markets for many 
types of financial instruments with capacity to accommodate large projects.
However, the industrial society created by these large projects, also generated 
differentiation in standards of living. Socialism gained footholds in many 
communities arguing for different principles of resource allocation and justice. 
Liberalism and socialism, left and right, became the value depositories from 
which debaters found their arguments. Power again came to the forefront as 
states stumbled into two World Wars as political leaders sought domination to 
be able to change the world in their utopian direction. Banks had to virtually 
close down business during the two wars and struggled in the des-organization 
of society in between them. But neoliberalism, an amalgamation of scientific and 
social values, articulated its ideas of the free market with state oversight to the 
extent that it came to dominate the debate from the 1980s and onwards. Banks 
had to find their ways under the auspices of de-regulation. Many failed in 2008.
So much for the larger picture, but how does it work? How do I connect the 
larger picture to the details of the world view developments, and the calamities 
of individual banks? I have chosen the sociological theory “Corporatism” 
(e.g., Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) to depict how the centre of gravity of good 
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arguments for regulation of society move as events are interpreted and acted 
upon. Such moves provide space for new configurations of values and their 
related arguments that can be labelled “mercantilism” or “neoliberalism” etc. 
Under those labels there is variety in concepts and linkages giving rise to debates 
on how the world should be understood and dealt with. These debates use 
words combined into narratives intended to impose the right way of thinking 
on people. The communication we engage in all the time has organizing effects 
(Cooren, 2000). A promise is a promise because we interpret it as such under the 
circumstances it is given. A narrative is a story with a purpose (to reveal a certain 
value or promote a certain attitude). The authors of biographies of banks have 
purposes that guide their accounts. Economic historians have methodological 
training to avoid bias, but total fidelity to what really happened is an illusion that 
can never be reached. We have to be satisfied with what respected professionals 
tell us – even if we were present ourselves at the time of the events, we would not 
understand much! So one should be careful not to draw too extensive conclusions 
from narratives about the life of banks in relation to the ways of understanding 
the world dominating the general debate at the time. What we can see is an 
increasing space for strategic choice and an increasing complexity over time. 
Can we understand banks today and for the future with the historical insights 
that this exercise might give? My answer is probably! We can see that some old 
values/good arguments remain in our vocabulary today as sediments of the old 
world views, others have been replaced by new inventions. The “weakness of 
the will“ (akrasia) of Aristotle is perhaps being replaced by “phishing for phools” 
(Akerlof & Shiller, 2015). ”Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”. We must 
never stop searching for a better understanding. That is what justifies this effort.
In most societies the intercourse between individuals, e.g., buyers and sellers, 
is regulated in texts and conventions as part of the social compact. A fair price 
has been defined as the price, which men of character (vir constans) can agree on. 
This is how it was in Aristotle, Roman Law, and Scholaticism. Vir constans is 
a person who is not easily intimidated. Part of the definition of a fair price was 
that the will of either party should not be unduly weakened (akrasia). Akrasia 
(=weakness of the will) could be caused by threat/fear, ignorance and need, and 
it should not be exploited to your own advantage. It was, to take an example, 
seen as taking such advantage of the other’s need if you charged interest when 
granting a loan for an essential acquisition. Ursury is still a sin in some religions. 
But now we refer to “the market” as an impersonal, self-regulating mechanism 
that produces “fair prices” every day.
Today actors within the finance sector take advantage of the other’s weakness 
by, e.g., shorting, - selling something for later delivery at a certain price while 
expecting the price to fall so that the delivery can be accomplished by buying for 
delivery at a later date when prices have gone down. Predatory finance earns lots 
of money by exploiting the weakness of others. That would have been a deadly 
sin some 1000 years ago, even if other kinds of “one-up-manship” certainly were 
GRI-rapport 2016:2
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not unknown. How did we get from there to where we are now? In what sense 
can this be looked upon as progress?
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1. Preliminaries
1.1. Theoretical orientation
The justification for taking this long term view on the relation between banks 
and their contexts is the suspicion that banks, becoming an evermore important 
part of society, relate to society discursively. What is right and proper behaviour 
as the parties engage each other as lender and borrower must be regulated in 
a set of rules stemming from conceptions of what is required for a person (or 
organization) to uphold the status as member of society, and what it means to be 
a person of good character. Changes in these conceptions will occur as society 
adapts to events, new ideas, or overextension of resources. The need for change 
will be recorded in texts testifying to current concerns, and in this connection 
the current practices may be described and justified.
The assumption that banking is a dynamic activity adapting to its significant 
environment implies that there may be different ways of understanding the world 
and of legitimizing change. Before embarking on the planned historical journey 
through a very small part of what might be considered relevant texts we need 
a tool to help us select what might be relevant. Unavoidably the selection will 
be biased since it will tend to be based on references in the text under scrutiny, 
to help steer attention I have chosen to rely on traditional corporatist views 
as presented by, for example, Streeck & Schmitter (1985). What is of interest 
here is the values and arguments enshrined in the State, Market, Community 
conceptions (organized interests have been present all the time (guilds, unions, 
church) but are assumed to base their arguments in the dimensions of the 
triangular discursive space:
Figure 2: 
State represents a view that society should be regulated on the basis of rules 
equally applied (via juris prudence) to all by an unbiased, transparent hierarchy 
manned by civil servants promoted on merit. State solves problems by the rule 
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of law. Stability stems from predictability.
Market represents a view where progress is driven by free competition among 
creative actors, where rewards go to the successful. Problems are solved by 
competition. Stability stems from self-regulated market equilibria.
Community represents a view where society is built on spontaneous solidarity 
(care for the other), respect for the individual, for science and professionalism. 
Problems are solved via free debate where the best arguments persuade. Stability 
is won through best practices.
In any world-view there are ingredients of all three aspects. For example, 
adherents to the Market view recognize the need for state intervention to 
reallocate resources to those who are unable to compete (children, the old, 
sick etc,) and to a minimal state organization (police, army, courts etc). What 
the triangle can help us with is to provide a map of the weight of the three 
dimensions, for a given society at a certain time, in the form of a location in 
that space.  It is also possible to visualise how that location can be pushed in 
different directions by events and ideological debate. A war will generate a need 
for more regulation and stricter hierarchical discipline. Scientific progress will 
help promote a more liberal view of individual action.
The impact of arguments based in these dimensions of worldviews will 
depend on their persuasive power to capture the attention of others (we are 
thinking of collective sense making here – you persuade others) and change their 
configuration of values. Given the current configuration, and the situation, this 
impact may be enhanced if the logic of the argument is appropriate. In scientific 
discourse we like to embed our arguments in one and only one logic (analytic 
deduction) and dismiss other logics as irrational. In social situations, on the 
other hand, where people view events and ideas from different perspectives, we 
should expect several logics to be at play. The success of an argument depends 
on its ability to persuade the receivers of the statement (normally the sender will 
already be persuaded). Here are a few kinds of logic:
Logic of discovery – we “see” something new (things) against a background of 
what we already know. It is the contrast that makes us notice. A measure that deviates 
from what is normal, or an alien object that is moved into the foreground, will 
make/help us see a need for change. Here it is the new fact that has persuasive power. 
Logic of justification – we argue our case, when it comes to showing that a 
solution is “good”, by referring to values that are legitimate in the context where the 
discourse takes place. Here it is value alignment that makes the argument persuasive. 
Logic of ideology – we argue for change in priorities or configuration of value 
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structures by using rhetorical devices (Burke, 1950/1969) like metaphors (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980) to “show” (rather than “prove”) the benefits of change. Merton 
(1949/1968, “strain theory”) argued that the demand for ideology production 
increases in crisis (complexity and contradiction).
The working hypothesis is that we can see shifts, or, over longer time periods, 
or rather “drift” in conceptions of current context that will initiate change in the 
manner banking is conducted. Here the particular context that is constituted by 
dominating world-views is in focus. Obviously, reading old texts or texts about 
old texts will not deliver enough detail to pinpoint direct causes of the then 
current change, but ex post it is possible to discern that a change has taken place. 
By the same token it is not possible to prove cause-effect relations. My purpose 
is to show that there are indications that world-views should be reckoned with 
when we discuss banking practices (and the effect of theories on such practices).
Before immersing ourselves in the historical records of banks and their 
contexts it is necessary to say something about banks and their changing nature 
and also what it is that will drive banks to enter new areas of activity. I believe 
that it is an extended conception of arbitrage that will help in sensitising us to 
banks’ adaptive measures to changing contexts.
1.2. What is a bank anyway?
The distinguishing character of banks is the fact that money is the input, the 
output as well as the measure of success. In “normal” firms something is 
produced (e.g., horse shoes, or consulting services) and offered to clients, who 
pay money in return. Then the difference between inflow and outflow of money 
is a good measure of how well they are doing. For banks things are different. 
The assets are promises by others to pay sometimes in the future. You give 
money to somebody else and you have an asset. The flows of money are more 
complex. After many years of interviewing in big and small banks we have yet to 
come across any bank manager who believes that the Cash Flow Statement of a 
bank according to international standards contains any useful information at all. 
There are even strong indications (Torfason, 2014) that banks create money out 
of thin air. Part of the explanation for this is that banks have different kinds of 
relations and dependencies on their contexts.
Primitive forms of banking, long before Christ, have been discovered by 
archaeologists. One example is the Code of Hammurabi from about 1700 BC, 
which refers to regulation of banking. 
The obvious prerequisites for banking are stable economic relations, monetary 
economy, record-keeping, and structure. The stability of economic relations is 
manifested in the lender having access, e.g., by court, to the borrower to demand 
his money back, otherwise trade on credit could not take place. It is also a matter 
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of money taking a significant part of the payment of goods and services. It is easy 
to imagine how the emergence of coins (copper or silver and gold) would speed 
up the rate of transactions since storage of goods from barter activity would be 
quite cumbersome. Record-keeping is necessary to keep track of a large number of 
transactions, which are required for a bank to be “professional”.  The structures 
that allow the formation of institutions can be of many kinds, but they have the 
function in common that they will provide a forum for settling contested claims. 
This latter function also provides a basis for regulation. (I will try to add the 
predominant worldview as a determining factor as to what banking becomes.)
In the old age, like Babylonia around Hammurabi’s time (2000 BC), it was 
customary to deposit wealth at temples, being the centre around which society 
organized, for safe keeping. Families engaging in banking activity are recorded 
from Mesopotamia several hundred years BC. Xenophon is on record (in his 
“On Revenue” from the 350s BC) to have suggested banking in something like 
a joint-stock form.
It seems like banking flourishes when there are many of them around, creating 
financial centres, like Athens, Corinth and Patras a hundred years BC. Banking 
in the Roman Empire, however, did not develop much due to the Romans’ 
preference for cash. Furthermore the dominant religions disliked banking. Jews 
were not allowed to charge interest for loans to other Jews. Christian churches 
forbade the charging of interest on loans (ursury), and the same goes for Islam, 
even trade in promissory notes is forbidden. The key was that you are not 
allowed to increase your capital with no services provided. Lending your surplus 
money to someone in need is charitable. Giving it all away will save your soul 
(Brown, 2015). 
1.3. The changing nature of arbitrage
Arbitrage has driven trade (together with greed) since the beginning of time. 
The discovery of a discrepancy between the price of something here and the 
price there entices tradesmen to move the goods from here to there with profit. 
Wikipedia knows what arbitrage is: 
“In economics and finance, arbitrage (US /ˈɑrbɨtrɑːʒ/, UK /ˈɑrbɨtrɪdʒ/, 
UK /ˌɑrbɨtrˈɑːʒ/) is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference 
between two or more markets: striking a combination of matching deals 
that capitalize upon the imbalance, the profit being the difference between 
the market prices. When used by academics, an arbitrage is a transaction 
that involves no negative cash flow at any probabilistic or temporal state 
and a positive cash flow in at least one state; in simple terms, it is the 
possibility of a risk-free profit after transaction costs. For instance, an 
arbitrage is present when there is the opportunity to instantaneously buy 
low and sell high.” (capiche?)
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Michael Lewis (2015) thinks this “instantaneously” has to do with technology. 
His first mention of it in “Flash Boys” (p. 65) is when he introduces one of the 
heroes in his tale of High Frequency Trading, Ronan, who helped banks and 
others to build faster systems:
“He was struck, over and over again, by how little the traders he helped 
understood of the technology they were using. ’They’d say. ‘Aha! I saw it – 
it’s so fast! And I’d say ‘ Look I am happy you like our product. But there’s 
no fucking way you saw anything.’ And they’re like ‘I saw it!’ And I’m like 
‘It’s three milliseconds – it’s fifty times faster than the blink of an eye’
He was also keenly aware that he had only the faintest idea of the reason 
for this incredible new lust for speed. He heard a lot of loose talk about 
“arbitrage,” but what, exactly, was being arbitraged, and why did it need 
to be done so fast. ‘I felt like a getaway driver’ he said, “Each time it was 
like ‘Drive faster! Drive faster!’…………The two biggest high-frequency 
trading firms, Citadel and Getco, were easily the smartest. Some of the 
prop shops were smart. The big banks, at least for now, were all slow.” 
(This was 2007)
The meaning of “arbitrage” has changed from the ingenious invention of 
transporting gold by way of written promissory notes like the Medicis and 
other banks did 500 years ago, to the current “lust” for speed. First it was the 
realization that you could buy cheap in one place and sell dear in another. All 
you had to do was to find a way to transport the goods safely between A and 
B. This is the spatial aspect of arbitrage that drives trade. The temporal aspect, 
which Lewis (2015) illustrates so well, has to do with the ability to do it faster 
than the others. This is achieved by, e.g., algorithm trading, and builds on fast 
cables and fast computers. The easiest phenomenon to understand here is “front 
running”. This trick presupposes the presence of several stock exchanges (or 
equivalents), some of them in the form of “dark pools”  - facilities set up by, 
e.g., investment banks to allow clients to post financial instruments for sale (or 
buy) without the transaction being registered, and therefore without effects on 
prices). “Front running” means to snap up a posted order, find a matching one, 
and do a transaction before any of the two parties (buyer and seller) has noticed 
anything. This can only be done if you have equipment with superior speed 
(and brilliant programmers). This front running, one should note, is completely 
risk free. We just have to wait for the counter measures to appear. The Lewis 
(2015) story is about a group of people who set up their own exchange where 
transactions are slowed down to make front running impossible and thereby 
ensure fair trading. 
The 500 years covered by the history of banks (even if it is uncertain where 
to place the beginning) seems to be the history of evolving arbitrage, from the 
spatial aspect driving banking’s related trade, to today’s “lust for speed” stressing 
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the temporal aspects of arbitrage.  I will try to illustrate this journey into a spatio-
temporal conception of arbitrage by contrasting the dominating world-views of 
the time with the fate of prominent banks. 
1.4. A quick tour of the world views that set the stage for banking
Before I go into the literature on worldviews and biographies of banks with all 
their details and complexity I feel there is a need for a quick overview indicating 
what the reader can expect.
It seems like the driving force behind the flourishing of banks in several 
Italian cities was increased volume of trade over longer distance. In the opposite 
direction of the flow of goods there is a flow of payment. This payment flow 
generates a risk, even when buyer and seller trust each other, since it is attractive 
for robbers and pirates. The invention of “bill of sales” (a piece of paper saying 
that, e.g., on the presentation of this bill at the Medici office in Florence I will 
pay X florins) makes payments less accessible to outsiders. Furthermore, if the 
Medici office should happen to be out of the required cash at the moment a 
clerk could be sent across the piazza to cash the bill with another house on the 
good name of Medici. In this way several banks in the proximity could generate a 
money market. This would typically happen at trading centres where merchants 
had varying cash balances as ships come and go. The first banks of any substance 
would be related to trade – merchant banks – built on personal relations and 
the banker’s good name. The world view supporting this kind of banking was 
explicated over a very long period by the scholastics (Langholm, 1998).
As long as the early banks kept to financing trade they prospered on the basis 
of their “good name”. 
As capital accumulated bankers became interesting partners to 
princes – all wars were (and still are?) conducted on credit. This 
adds a new kind of risk illustrated by the old saying in Ecclesiasticus2  
(Quoted from Ehrenberg 1928): ”Noli foenerari fortiori te, quod si foeneravis, 
quasi perditum habe” (Lend not to him who is mightier than thou; or if thou 
lendest, look upon thy loan as lost). The borrowing prince was a bad credit risk; 
if he won his war he would come back for more for the next campaign, if he lost 
there would be little left for the creditor. This problem bankers usually solved 
by acquiring the right to certain future money flows, like the income from the 
copper mines of Tirol for 5 years. In this way the Fugger family, stemming from 
textile trade, also became miners with interests as far away as Central America 
(16th century).
2 The Book of Ecclesiasticus, also known as the Wisdom of Sirach is a second century BC writ-
ing by a Jewish scribe named Shimon ben Yeshua ben Eliezer ben Sira who was from the City 
of Jerusalem.
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But princes die and successors might not honour debts. This started to 
change from the 30 years’ war, a very complex war as to its origins as well as 
allegiances. Historians nowadays tend to agree that what supported the ghastly 
war for so long3 was the efforts of many princes to form a proper (pre-modern) 
State that was efficient enough to collect taxes and customs payment, provide 
stability, and administrative competence to regulate business in its territory. 
Here the catastrophic decline in British wool business due to the success of the 
new cotton based cloth (Calico) produced a very deep recession played a role. 
It needed to be explained. Money was flowing out of the country, not least, it 
was thought, by the machinations of a merchant conspiracy, and this had to be 
countered by state regulation (like the Navigation Act) to manage the Balance 
of Trade. The ideas were developed in a very intensive debate in pamphlets and 
brochures easily produced in large numbers now that Gutenberg’s printing press 
came into general use. The first task – if you wanted to apply the general solution 
of importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods - the British 
thought, was to break the Dutch dominance of the seas. This was accomplished 
in a series of wars over the 17th century as the Dutch were exhausted by their war 
of liberation with Spain. 
The ideas about how important it was to manage the Balance of Trade have 
been summed under the label “Mercantilism” (Magnusson, 1999). Now the 
merchant banks had strong incentives to move office to London as “Britannia 
ruled the waves” and imperial trade was the order of the day, bringing raw material 
for emerging industries flowed in from the colonies and exporting manufactured 
goods at better prices. Banks needed not only to have their trading partners in 
place, but also the partnership and protection of the state. London was the right 
place to be.
With dominance of the sea free trade was again an attractive conception. 
Economists coming before Adam Smith (1776) developed parts of the doctrine, 
but Smith integrated it most elegantly. Praising the blessings of free trade, free 
competition and market solutions without the state meddling in the business of 
merchants and industrialists. The individual’s striving to “improve his lot” by use 
of his abilities to “truck and barter” would generate a better life for all. Liberalism 
created a background for the “golden age” of merchant banks (Banks, 1999) that 
lasted up to the First World War. Baring Bank moved to London. The advantage of 
location in London improved with the advent of the telegraph (across the Atlantic). 
Now it was no longer a central part of the strategy to warehouse goods in Liverpool. 
Baring Bank could focus on merchant banking, and the odd loan to governments in 
a more selective business strategy. There was an overflow of opportunities and less 
than 100 employees in all. The bank had to be selective and develop its strength.
3 In 1962 citizens of Hessen responded to a survey concerning the most devastating events 
for Germany ranking the 30 Years’ War as the worst, before the two World Wars (Ericson 
Wolke(Wolke et al, 2006, p.9)
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Europe was devastated after the First World War, not least the losing side. 
For them it was necessary to invent a new state, after the imperial regime had lost 
credibility, Preussen as well as Austria. Socialism had gained adherents as laissez-
faire liberalism was seen as failing in providing for all citizens. Proletarization 
was a consequence of un-checked capitalism in the eyes of many. It also set the 
stage for socialism arguing for a state to serve the people (rather than trade) 
regulating life in according to the dictum “from everybody according to his 
ability, to everybody according to his need”.4
The struggle between versions of Liberalism (individual freedom) and 
versions of socialism (distributive justice by state regulation) characterised the 
first half of the 20th century with a centre of gravitation in Austria trying to 
build an (German) Austria on the ruins of the lost First World War. Here the 
modernist view of science grew strong (logical empiricism) and inspired rational 
constitutionalism (the rule of law). The debate of the proper organization of 
society was brutally interrupted by different versions of radical nationalist 
socialist (bolsheviks, national socialists, fascists). Many scholars and intellectuals 
fled Vienna for England and the USA (like Hayek, Popper, Schumpeter, 
Drucker, Wittgenstein…) persuading followers like Friedman to continue the 
struggle for individual freedom in the form of neoliberalism. Banks adapted, 
supported lobby organisations, and we ended up with de-regulation, drastic 
reorganization and growth of banks, and a devastating financial crisis (driven 
by Greed?). This was not what anyone wanted. How could things go so wrong 
for banks, again and again? How can we understand this? What is the relation 
between theory/ideology and practices that effect our life? Big question that 
could not be answered in a mere essay!
Liberals argued that it was the interventionist state (look what had happened 
before and during the war!) that was to blame. Street demonstrations were 
common with confrontation between believers. At the same time academic 
research had spectacular success. Modernism was breaking through. Scientific 
methods should be used in designing work processes and investment in new 
industries with new opportunities now that railways were established. America 
was the land of opportunity, even if the centre of finance was in London. In 
Vienna the design of a new Austrian state for the German part of the population 
was on the agenda. Unified Science with a strict mix of logic (analysis) and facts 
(empiricism) won adherents (logical empiricism) as religion and superstition 
were to be kept out of the state. All hopes for the future good society were 
quashed by emerging nationalism with different orientation in Italy, Russia, 
and Germany, fired on by the global recession and the Second World War 
4 The phrase has been attributed to Etienne-Gabriel Morelly (Code of Nature, 1755), but 
was popularised by Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program, 1851). (Again we see a reference 
to “Natural Law” (rules that can be deduced from the Bible’s “Golden Rule”) in economic-
political debate).
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experience. Between the wars arguably the most noticed event (for economists) 
was the debate between Keynes and Friedman on the role of the state and the 
priority of unemployment as a target for economic policy. Welfare states would 
lean towards Keynes, and free marketers toward Friedman.
The centre of the ideological struggle for the primacy of free markets was 
the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), a grouping gathered by the Austrian Friedrich 
von Hayek (1944) in a small Swiss village in 1948 to discuss policy issues for 
economies in the post war period. Milton Friedman (1962) was a founding 
member. Membership in MPS is by invitation only and it holds its meetings 
annually to this day. Hayek and later Friedman came to be the most prominent 
activists for the freedom of markets. The neoliberal economists never said much 
about the role of the state (except that it must intervene against those who cheat 
in defiance of the rules of fair competition), but it is a distinguishing mark of 
neoliberalism that the state is supposed to serve the interests of the free market 
for the good of everybody (Mirowski, 2013). This last argument for free markets 
– that everybody benefits by wealth “seeping down” – has been questioned 
by Piketty (2014). According to him wealth seems to be “seeping up”. His 
conclusions have been challenged due to methodological issues. The same fate 
has happened to Friedman’s seminal work (with Anna Schwartz, 1963) on the 
relation between inflation/business cycle and money supply, but, in the case of 
Friedman, the money supply policies he recommended were quietly abandoned 
by US authorities as the 2008 crisis approached, much depending on the fact 
that it was increasingly difficult to know what the money supply was. Banks 
seemed to create money out of thin air (Minsky 1992). Banks certainly have 
changed their role in society very rapidly after de-regulation in the 1980s and the 
crisis that followed in 2008, with new demands for regulation as a consequence. 
This chapter introduced the idea of ideological influence on banking practices 
by way of “corporativism” where the centre of gravity of what constitutes 
good arguments for problem solutions is pushed in the direction of “State”, 
“Market” and “Community” by events, and discourse on values. The goodness 
of arguments and solutions will be influenced by how well they are aligned with 
the current worldview. I will try to interpret how the period of a particular world 
view tended to push “the centre of gravity”.
It was argued that banks are different from most other organizations in that 
money is the input, output as well as the measure of success. This is assumed to 
mean that they will be quite dependent on their external relations, and, thus, eager to 
observe and interpret their contexts. They will change with their changing contexts.
It was further assumed that arbitrage, the driver of deal making and trade, 
has changed over time. From a situation when arbitrage offered itself in space 
(moving things from a low-price location to a high-price one) it has also come 
to include time (doing things faster), which brings technology to centre stage.
Finally, a short account of the historical developments under study in this 
essay was given in order to provide a foretaste of what will come next.
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2. Greed, arbitrage, and decency in action
Now the review of history through the looking glass provided by writers on 
historical events, worldviews, practices, and conceptions of citizenship begins. 
The ambition can only be to hint at patterns that may help us to understand 
the background to our current bewilderment concerning the finance sector of 
society. I assume that there will be fractions of earlier practices embedded in our 
current ones. Like sediments they provide the foundation for our building of 
better structures to serve human endeavours.
2.1. Greed – the original sin! 
For economists greed is equal to our striving to improve our lot and therefore 
Adam Smith (1776) was right to base his argument for free trade on the effect it 
has on our activities (truck and barter) towards doing what we are good at and 
satisfy the rest of our needs in the market. Thereby we all benefit, we find our 
place in life, and investment is allocated to the most productive projects. Good 
for us! And the banks serve as intermediaries balancing the deposits of those 
who have more than they need at the moment, with loans to those who have 
the best ideas, but lack the funds to realize them. Good for us! So long as the 
bureaucrats of the State do not regulate by putting their own priorities before 
our greed it will work too. The State, controlled as it is by vested interests like 
lobbies, unions, politicians and other do-gooders, cannot take in all the necessary 
information and do all the calculations to find solutions. Better leave it to the 
Market, Hayek and Friedman said, because then greed is at its best.
But from the beginning greed was part of Original Sin, and it was assumed 
to be bad for your afterlife. Jesus told the rich man that the only way to get to 
heaven was to give all his riches to the poor. That rich man must have been 
greedy in the first place to amass his wealth. So our conception of greed must 
have changed for the better? First it was a deadly sin that would bring you to 
Hell on short notice as we learned from the Scholastics. Purgatory was just a way 
station that sorted some of the worst sinners out. The rest had a troublesome 
road ahead with daemons lurking in the bushes. Saints could help, and the 
prayers of others, if you had given generously to the church (earlier it was a 
matter of giving directly to the poor, later you could give to the church and the 
rest would be taken care of). Lending money against interest (ursury) was very 
bad. In this respect the vast cash flow into the Vatican was a problem for the 
Pope. He had to engage that money in other business than finance. Mining and 
trade could be done in partnership with tradesmen. Financing war against the 
heathens (e.g., crusades) was also a worthy cause. The end of Scholasticism came 
toward the end of the 16th century as the Salamanca school argued that interest 
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is in fact a measure of how much the lender had to forego by lending the money 
to a particular person. In that way the “market” came in to “depersonalize” the 
fair price, which was previously a negotiated price between individuals. With this 
“depersonalization” the sinfulness of finance started to wash off, so much the 
more as large scale war was conducted on credit. The fortunes of banks shifted 
and their strategies had to be adapted accordingly.
In trying to understand I will start from the age old conception of greed as 
a deadly sin, which we will pay for in the afterlife, just as a background for the 
scholastics, who were in the business of teaching people how to conduct their 
life in order to secure a safe journey to heaven. They were preoccupied with the 
moral conduct of the individual, and their influence started to fade (at least as far 
as business goes) as the scholastics managed to “depersonalize” fair prices and 
interest on loans and make them “market” phenomena.
It seems like greed was looked upon as an “original sin” from the beginning 
of commentary about proper conduct. It was after you got rich that you needed 
direction. It was how you can get to Heaven that became the problem then. 
You have to give all your riches to the poor if you accomplish something that 
is as difficult as getting a camel through the needle’s eye. The after life was the 
problem and family could help the soul along by prayer and alms. Gifts to the 
growing Christian church could mobilize the saints to help it along. It is different 
today!
 Today, post crisis, a new sense of greed as sin has emerged. We have just to 
contemplate our conversations with the “financial advisors” inhabiting our banks 
or other intermediaries. Those advisors claim to be able to guide us through the 
jungle of financial products provided that we answer – honestly – a few questions 
that will give a measure of our “risk appetite”, and based on that the advisors will 
give us the right advice (and collect their bonus for good salesmanship). In the 
process we have signed a piece of paper with a number of paragraphs protecting 
the adviser from any complaint. The system rewards risk-taking by employees 
who manage other people’s money, but protects them from sharing the loss 
when gambles turn bad has come a long way. With each crisis regulators, driven 
on by public uproar, initiate stronger rules (like the Frank-Dodd act of the USA). 
But at the same time the financial industry mobilizes lobby forces to slow down 
implementation. It is a good sign, perhaps, that Goldman Sachs closed down 
its “high frequency stock market trading” when the practice was exposed (e.g., 
by Michael Lewis 2014). But it was only after the exposure that Goldman acted, 
even if it had its governance system.
One of the responses to the critique against big banks that caused the crisis 
by their reckless risk-taking prior to the crisis, was to produce ethical codes. 
Brummer (2015, p. 285) points out that writing such texts is the easiest thing – 
they tend to look much like the one constructed by Enron prior to its world 
famous demise – living up to it is the difficult part: 
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“In 2009 the Goldman Sachs code of business conduct and ethics lauded 
‘integrity and honesty’ as being ‘at the heart of our business’. The shrewdest 
business on Wall Street added the caveat that ‘from time to time the firm 
may waive certain provisions of this code.’ A year later, in 2010, Goldman 
Sachs was fined $ 550 million by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
for misleading clients.”
Does it all start with Smith’s (1776) premise of people wanting to “improve their 
lot” through “truck and barter” – probably not – or does it have ancient origins? 
Was it the neoliberal economists like Hayek and Friedman that made religion out 
of greed as part of their argument for how a proper society should be designed? 
Or has it to do with “the ransom of the soul” (Brown, 2015)? It seems the value 
of greed has changed considerably over time. The current idea of the value of 
greed – famously promoted (in May 1986) by (later) convicted criminal Ivan 
Boesky in a speech given at University of California Berkeley Business School: 
“Greed is all right, by the way, I want you to know that I think greed is healthy. 
You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.” (This speech inspired the 
1987 film “Wall Street”) – has had a short and disastrous life. Mankind (as we 
understand it) has always looked differently upon the phenomenon: Thomas ab 
Aquinas (1225-1274) wrote “Greed is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, 
in as much as man condemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.” 
Those who repent their sins (their greed) and seek forgiveness will not get away 
with it easily, however. Dante (in Purgatory) claims that they were bound and 
laid face down on the ground. It is obvious that the consequences of greed has 
occupied people’s mind for many centuries. Greed is, according to the Webster’s 
College Dictionary (2010) “excessive or rapacious desire esp. for wealth and 
possessions”. We have to start from the beginning.
2.2. An overview of wealth and the afterlife during the first 
centuries AD (Brown 2015)
It seems like the early Christians saw a distinct link between money/wealth and 
the afterlife. First there was the dominant idea that martyrs will come instantly 
into the presence of God. Death and afterlife for the ordinary Christian was of 
little concern in the 250s AD – and there was not very many of them (Cyprian, 
the bishop of Carthage, a small congregation wrote early texts at about 250). 
Tertullian wrote even earlier that after death the souls of the dead live in limbo 
in wait for Resurrection and the Last Judgment. This view of souls in waiting 
soon lost currency in Western Christianity. Now the words of Jesus to the Rich 
Young Man “If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to 
the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven” came into focus. But that big, 
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heroic gesture was not always required, small gifts, alms, would do. The hope 
was that the Creator would reward mercy with mercy. The living can prepare the 
way to Heaven by alms. By intercessory prayer the living could also smooth the 
way for their dead loved ones. Almsgiving became a standard part of funerals. 
Furthermore, as the catacombs of San Sebastian (south of Rome) show, there 
were facilities close by the tombs for having a meal – refrigerium – with the dead. 
From the third century Christianity gained in importance with the conversion 
of Constantine (in 312). This meant that, with him, there were rich Christians in 
the community and the poor came more into focus (while the martyrdom was 
more or less forgotten as a portal to heaven). With this there was also a sense of 
difference between souls. Some were on a fast track to Heaven. Augustine (422) 
introduced doubt again in Enchiridon, written like a handbook for Christian 
laymen. When faced with the questions about to which extent different rituals 
“worked” his answer was “God only knows”, but in trying to sort things out 
he would distinguish between the valde boni (altogether good), who could be 
assumed to reach heaven with no difficulty, and the valde mali (altogether bad), 
who were destined for hell). This left the middle group (non valdes), which 
Augustine said could be helped by prayers and offerings provided that they had 
qualified by living a reasonably good life. Now the church was taking a dominant 
role in Roman society, a church of non valdes. This middle group needed guidance 
from the scholastics.
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3. Scholasticism – 
guiding individuals to proper use of their free will
Langholm (1998) has sifted through the Middle Ages literature where scholars 
debate the free will of economic actors participating in exchange of goods and 
services, including loans, and its limitations. He shows how the scholars taught 
the official doctrine of the Catholic Church by drawing heavily on the heritage of 
classical antiquity (Aristotle). The topic in focus was the free will. Sin is voluntary, 
and scholastic advice aimed to fend off the weakening of that will (“akrasia”). 
Langholm (1998) introduces his topic by referring to Weber’s (1968/1925) 
treatment of power in the general sense (“Macht”) and in its particular sense 
(“Herrschaft”), domination. Domination comes in many forms. Langholm 
points to two limiting cases in Weber’s development of this topic: Domination 
by virtue of a constellation of interests (particularly monopoly), and domination 
by virtue of authority (power to command, duty to obey). 
He argues that Weber is such a good introducer to the topic because of his 
insistence on putting the concepts “free” and “will” in quotation marks. Those 
concepts are always relative. It is easy to accept the claim that economic actors 
in effective markets should be “free” and act “voluntarily”, but what does that 
mean in practical terms? When is the deviation from the norm large enough to 
render an exchange or a contract invalid?
The free will can be weakened in several aspects. When it is weakened in one 
of the parties of a transaction the deal is not fair and thus not valid. Weakness 
of the will (Greek: akrasia) is at the very centre since Aristotle. It can be caused 
by threat/fear, ignorance, or need. It is inappropriate to exploit somebody’s need 
for one’s own advantage. This is the reasoning behind the claim that ursury 
(charging interest when lending money) is not permissible. One should not take 
advantage of a needy person’s lack of money for essentials of life. When it comes 
to threat/fear it is necessary to establish how much intimidation a person should 
withstand. The Greek and Roman law set the norm by referring to “a man of 
character” (“vir constans”). If it is reasonable that a “man of character” would 
not succumb to the actual threat the complaining party has no case. One should 
also remember that in those days one was pretty tolerant toward power and 
threat. There was a principle that is present again and again in the literature 
on business transactions from ancient times up to, possibly, Hobbes, namely 
that also “forced will is free will”. This principle stems from Aristotle and his 
example of the captain of a ship in storm who throws cargo over board to save 
the ship. Was that act voluntary? Yes it was! The example of the captain and the 
jettisoned cargo, so much used in the literature, is an illustration of the enormous 
influence of Aristotle over a very long period. The purpose with this illustration, 
it should be noted, is to show how a compelling force (the storm) combines with 
a free will (the captain’s decision to jettison cargo) to form “mixed acts” (where 
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“forced will is will”). This argument was also used by the early liberal economists 
to promote the ideology of “laissez faire”.
We should note that only citizens could take their case to court in Rome. 
The slaves and other un-free men had no rights – not to speak of women. 
Furthermore if the deviation from the just price (on which well informed men 
of free will could agree as sellers and buyers) is less than 50 percent (plus or 
minus) there is also no case. 
Ignorance also needs to be judged whether it is reasonable as an argument. 
The Romans recognized that the parties in a deal may have different negotiating 
skills (accounted for by the margin of error around the “just price” mentioned 
above).
We can see in accounts, like Langholm’s (1998), for the ideas of a fair deal 
that greed was taken more or less for granted. Focus was on the fairness of a 
deal between two persons and its regulation. The fairness had to do with ethical 
deliberations of the involved parties, as individuals. Things started to change with 
the Scholastics, but the discourse on business still was a matter of the sinfulness 
of unfair deals. The general problem was rather what the greedy person should 
do when he became rich (give direct to the poor, later via the church, to expiate 
his sins).
For St. Augustine the free will was the cause of sin, there is simply no way to 
sin except voluntarily. Again, then, what sins may be forgiven because they are 
involuntary? Only those caused by ignorance? Forced will is will.
Against the background of Artistotle, Roman law, and St Augustine, the 
scholastics with their centre in Paris prepared the way for modern economics 
via mercantilism in their preoccupation with moral instruction of Christians. 
The argument against ursury followed several lines:
• The ursurer sells time (time belongs to God)
• The ownership of the money passes to the borrower and any gain from 
the loan thus belongs to him (taking ursury is therefore robbery).
• Money is consumed in use and therefore has no value separate from its 
use
• Money is sterile, i.e., it is a fungible, and therefore has no value beyond 
its substance.
The argument that the borrower pays interest voluntarily is dismissed on the 
basis that the borrower is under compulsion via his need. The question whether 
it was also a sin to pay ursury came up also in relation to commercial capital. It 
seems like most authors argued that if the borrower had no other financing of 
trade and had no other source of income it was permissible to borrow trade 
capital against interest. 
The scholastic doctrine concerning ursury started to brake down in the 16th 
century with the argument of the Salamancan scholars, first Molina and later de 
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Lugo, who argued that what the lender sacrifices by lending the money is what he 
could have earned by investing it otherwise – i.e., interest is a (opportunity) cost. 
The latter (de Lugo) stressed that the most important aspect was that contracts 
must be kept whatever the terms. Thereby he foreshadowed Thomas Hobbes, 
the staunch anti-Aristotelian. Dealing with the justice of contracts required an 
authority that could hear the arguments – a Sovereign arbiter – the state.
Concerning the idea of a just price the scholastics had to fight a drawn-out war 
against a new approach of the opposition from the late 13th century (Langholm, 
1998, Chapter 5 and 6). This new approach stressed ownership (“Anyone is the 
moderator and arbiter of his own thing” (quoted from Emperor Constantine’s 
ordinance) combined with the maxim “A thing is worth as much as it can be 
sold for”. Together these maxims eliminate “morality” from the discussion (and 
thereby the idea of “just price”) and, at the same time, they legitimize the use of 
economic power. Henry of Ghent lead the way by arguing that the solution here 
was to rewrite the maxim’s substituting “can” (be sold for) in stead of  “ought 
to” and others added various general conditions characterizing a fair price like, 
”maintained equality between buyer and seller”, “just and reasonable”, “without 
fraud” etc. But it was still unjust to exploit the “need” of an individual. Gradually 
the market was introduced as “the common need” (indigentia communis) of those 
who can exchange with each other. Langholm (1998, p. 86ff) discusses this 
gradual establishment of the market as the reference point by giving accounts of 
current controversies concerning the “common estimate” of the market and how 
it should be understood. The market price in a market that functions normally is 
uncontroversial, but what about the often overlooked situation when conditions 
are not normal? Speculation, price discrimination, collusion and monopoly are 
conditions that are taken up here.
Speculation in foodstuff is generally rejected (albeit the prudent man who 
gather reserves for emergencies, may sell surplus at the market price), but 
otherwise various forms of lawful exchange were condoned. The catchword for 
illegal exchange came to be “inducing dearth”, which was not acceptable. Price 
discrimination, for instance in the form of charging visitors more than villagers 
was prohibited in a capitulary by Carloman, King of the West Franks, in 884, and 
this was subject to scholastic comment. In time there was a distinction between 
necessities and luxuries. The latter kind was seen to be worth whatever the seller 
could extort from the buyer (short of fraud and force).
The scholastic literature on monopoly rested on two pillars; the story (in 
Politics by Aristotle) about the philosopher Thales, who was expelled from 
Syracuse for renting all olive presses from Miletus and Chois to let them out at 
a large profit when the season arrived. This was for a while interpreted as the 
philosopher wanting to show that philosophers could also become businessmen 
if they wanted to, but Albert the Great argued that what Thales did was harmful 
to society. That is why monopolies were prohibited by law (Emperor Zeno’s 
decree from 483). In time the school of Salamanca modified the ruling on just 
Sten Jönsson
Banks and their world view contexts
29
price, in the words of Soto, to “A thing is worth as much as it can be sold for in 
the absence of monopoly, fraud and deceit.”
The consequence of these developments was the reestablishment of the 
principle that the owner can dispose of his property at will and the primacy 
of the principle that justice is based on contracts being kept (whatever their 
content). This meant that the scholastic paradigm was in effect undermined. 
Taking the “common estimate” as the measure of a just price meant that the 
just price had been “depersonalized”. Now the abstract phenomena of supply 
and demand were in focus rather than the subjective responsibility of persons 
(as sellers or buyers). 
There was, we must remind us, an undercurrent of viewing exchange as 
something of mutual benefit through the scholastic literature, Scotus goes as far 
as emphasising that there is an element of mutual gift between the parties. Prices 
may vary on the basis of what the parties agree to. Still there was the problem 
of compulsion, exploitation of need, and deceit on both sides that may limit 
the justice of an exchange.  The discussion on the just price and the weakening 
of the will went on until arguments - similar to the ones Lugo presented later 
- on ursury emerged with Cajetan’s commentary on Aquinas. Cajetan argued 
that the dilemma of compulsion can only be resolved by distinguishing between 
“causa”, i.e., the motivation that prompts a person to agreement, and “modus”, 
i.e., the circumstances under which the exchange comes about (auction, through 
middlemen). A person who offers to sell something must expect to get a lower 
price than the person who is approached by somebody with an offer. The just 
price should be based in “modus” rather than in “causa”. This allows for a wider 
range of variation in prices (It seemingly brings “arbitrage” into play.) Cajetan’s 
reasoning won support, not least in the Salamanca school. This represents a 
further step toward “de-personalization” of economic ethics (Langholm, 1998, 
p.116).
After devoting a chapter to the price of labour (wages), which is generally 
accepted to be different than the price of goods, because the person seeking 
employment is at a disadvantage, Langholm arrives at the antithesis of 
scholasticism in the form of Hobbes’ argument.
Hobbes antithesis
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) provided the argument for “possessive 
individualism” even if he did not intend to. There are many interpretations of 
the Hobbes oevre, among them the Taylor- Warrender thesis (cf Murray, 1997). 
The debate on the proper interpretation is still on. Langholm (1998) brings out 
a reading that ties in with the development of classical economics:
In the pre-societal condition of Nature – everybody’s war against everybody 
- the individual is guided by one feeling, fear. In such a situation reason compels 
the individual to seek peace. The key then is to keep, always, covenant (contract) 
- to build peace by being trustworthy. Justice becomes the keeping of contract 
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(The individual is bound by contract, only the Sovereign can release him from 
it). As the “social contract” is established the Sovereign authority (the state) 
may enact any law it pleases and decide on any quarrel between members. The 
problem, then, is what is the relation between Natural Law (derived by the 
individual from The Golden Rule, and reason) and the regulation by Sovereign 
Law? It is after all the duty of all members to obey the Sovereign Law. When 
the individual is free to pursue gain by contract, that pursuit will sometimes 
conflict with Natural Law. Hobbes solves this by distinguishing between Justice 
(according to Law) and Charity (according to conscience). Charity is the duty 
to participate in distribution of gain/profit to the poor. But charity cannot, by 
definition, be regulated by Sovereign Law. It is associated with a function or 
activity, like almsgiving. It is the virtue by which we share our surpluses. If the 
Law compels us to give it is no longer charity.
Hobbes thus “stripped justice of all relationship with economic contracts” 
(Langholm, 1998, p. 156) and thereby cleared the way for classic economics. 
When the market is closed there is only charity.
Summary of Scholasticism and what it means for banking
Scholasticism was preoccupied, as far as economic thought goes, with the 
regulation of self-interested exercise of bargaining power. Their theoretical 
basis was Natural Law defined by, e.g., Gratian “that which is contained in the 
Scriptures and the Gospels, by which anyone is commanded to do to others 
what he would have done to himself….” (Langholm, 1998, p. 162). The Natural 
Law gives rise to certain rights, which were articulated rather late especially by 
members of the Salamanca school, like Francisco Suárez, to mean two different 
things: the right to claim (or moral power), e.g., wage for labour, and the right 
to property. The idea of property rights points forward to John Locke (1632 – 
1704), who, in his Two Treatises of Government (1963) argues that the purpose 
of government is to preserve property. Langholm points out that Locke’s 
argument is not so much a matter of protecting the weak against the strong but 
rather protecting the latter against interference from the government. But this 
was in response to Mercantilism, which will be dealt with later on. First consider 
what banking would be under the regime of scholasticism:
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Figure 3:
Banking under scholasticism is relational. The primary asset is the banker’s good 
name. Banking consisted of a set of individual deals. Transactions are always 
between individuals, who are under the Devine obligation not to exploit akrasia 
by using Threat, Ignorance and Need. The morality of individuals, governed by 
their Free Will, was upheld for a very long time as Christianity grew stronger, 
and the Church came to take a dominating part (but it also did some lucrative 
deals with banks). Risks stemmed from robbery and piracy, but also increasingly 
from princes. Medici and Fugger are examples.
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4. The most prominent banks – watched by the 
scholastics
Banks, recognizable to us as such, really came after scholasticism. That is from 
the 17th century, when Bank of England 1694, Bank of Scotland 1695, and 
in 1656 “Palmstruchska Banken”, the Bank of Sweden to be, were founded. 
Those “central banks” were set up, mainly, to serve the state. Earlier banks were 
sideshows for merchant families mainly involved in trade. The word ”banks” 
referred to the so-called public benches of charitable institutions, which arose in 
Naples in the 16th century and onwards. Notable here, in Naples, is a pawn shop 
”Tour of Mercy” founded in 1539, which claimed to lend without interest and 
which opened a case of deposits in 1584, recognized by the viceroy of Naples 
that same year. The ban on ursury was strong and relatively strictly enforced. 
You had to be clever, and engaged in trade to earn money from banking.
4.1. Medici
“The rise and decline of the Medici Bank”, by de Roover (1963), is a classic in 
business history and is focused on and based in archival work. The institutional 
background (e.g. usury, the money-changers guild, catasto (income return for 
taxation)), the antecedents to the starting of the bank, the glorious days of Medici 
under Cosimo’s directorship, and the organization of the bank are described. 
This first section is followed by a description of the money market of the times 
(bills of exchange), the Medici as Merchants (alum and iron), and as industrialists 
(wool and silk), and as bankers to the Pope. Three chapters are devoted to the 
different branches throughout Italy and Europe. A final chapter tells the story 
of the decline of the Medici bank.
Institutional background
From the Crusades to the Great Discoveries Italy was the dominant economic 
power in the western world. Merchants were the middlemen of spices from 
the Levant, silk, cloth, wool. Banking prospered with trade since the transfer 
of payment for goods best was accomplished through bills of exchange 
(transporting money over land or sea was risky).  In bank-dense Florence and 
some other centres there even was a market for those financial instruments. 
The Italians were good at organizing business in partnerships (the Medici bank 
was organized as a holding company), they had double entry book-keeping, 
and introduced what could be seen as insurance for marine transports. They 
developed a body of mercantile law. The Florentine were global businesses 
with as many as 90 employees in branches across Europe. The Medici bank is 
remarkable because of its good archive; up to 1450 there is an unbroken series of 
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account books (confidential ledgers). After 1450 the material is largely business 
correspondence. The Medicis are known for their role in art and politics as well. 
As a matter of fact it seems like their politics was the cause of the decline of the 
bank.
The institutional background to consider is the problem that the Church 
forbade the taking of interest (ursury). The banks solved this by focusing 
the business on Bills of Exchange (sometimes “dry”, i.e., without any goods 
transaction behind it). Fees were included and profit from differences in 
exchange prices of currencies (The Florin was higher valued in relation to the 
pound in Florence than it was in London). A permanent problem throughout 
was the unbalanced trade (from Italy to Northern Europe, plus the flow of 
payments to the Vatican).
As bankers The Medici had to be members of the Money-changers’ Guild, 
but de Roover notes that the regulatory power of the Guild was rather limited 
and it did not interfere much in daily business.
There was a direct tax in Florence based on individual tax returns (catasto), 
which incentivized against overvaluation of assets.
The global firm of the 15th century
The Medici bank, like many of its competitors, had branches in many centres 
of commerce across Europa. From a modest beginning in Italy (branches in 
Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice) in the early 1400s it expanded to 13 businesses 
in 1450 (branches in Ancona, Avignon, Basel, Bruges, London (subordinated 
to Bruges), Florence, Geneva, Pisa, Rome, Venice, and in addition wool 
shops 1 and 2, and a silk shop in Florence). The executive managers of the 
different branches were usually co-owners, and their duties were regulated in 
detail in management contracts for up to 5 years (which could be terminated 
by the principals (maggiori) at any time). It was quite common that the branch 
managers had a share in profits (and losses) that was substantially larger than 
their ownership share. A “factor” was a manager who was authorized to enter 
binding deals for the firm. It was not the signature alone, but the whole text of 
a Bill of Exchange, that had to be written in the factor’s hand to make it valid. 
A factor could be promoted to partner (invest his own money in the branch) 
and employees were groomed by being sent to different branches to learn the 
business. Employment was closely monitored by the principals and was largely 
based on family and trust. The legendary Cosimo was not sentimental about 
dismissing non-performing managers, but his successors seem to have been too 
tolerant for the good of the firm, which contributed to the fall of the bank. 
In cities where Medici had no branch of their own they did business through 
representatives or silent partnerships.
The Rome branch was somewhat different from the other branches in that 
it was run without capital. This was a result of the flow of funds in this century, 
inward toward the pope, and of the fact that members of the Vatican court 
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deposited money with the bank (against other remuneration than interest, of 
course). 
As mentioned the instrument on which most of the banking business was 
built was the bill of exchange. The basic value of this financial instrument was 
that it was a much safer way of transporting payments across Europe (land or 
sea). For this to function smoothly there had to be a money market that could 
liquidate such instruments (and provide for some trade credit). The power of the 
Italian banks in Europe came from this money market effect – there were several 
dozens of banks in Florence at the time. The Hansa League had, according to de 
Roover (1963), a much clumsier and slower way of dealing with payments and 
could not compete in Western Europe (except, perhaps, in London).
Trade was the very reason for doing banking business. As mentioned, Medici 
had two wool shops and one silk shop during most of its lifetime. One could 
see that good management made a difference by comparing the two wool shops 
in Florence. The best wool was imported from Britain, which was difficult 
business since the King of England would control the trade and collect custom 
fees (or borrow money on the promise for the lender to collect fees during a 
certain period). The Medicis also had trade in materials like alum, which was 
used to clean wool. However, contracts with the pope to secure monopoly in 
providing alum (sometimes threatened by the Turks) did not work out so well. 
Political games were frequent around trade. The most dramatic, and one reason 
for the decline of the bank, was the ill-conceived strategies of its representative 
in Brügge, Portinari (who had intrigued his way to the top there). The issue of 
appointing Portinari to manager in Brügge came up in 1464, the year Cosimo 
died. The contract with him was written by Piero (Cosimo’s elder son) in 
1465. Both of them hesitated because they considered Pontiari too reckless in 
business. Once installed he ventured into projects like buying the rights to the 
toll on wool at Gravelines (bordering on the English enclave of Calais) hoping to 
collect on all import to the Low Countries now that the Duke of Burgundy had 
banned all English cloth from his dominions. Unfortunately he did not include 
English counter measures in his calculations. Volumes were much to small to 
justify the deal. Furthermore he persuaded the Medici to buy two Burgundian 
galleys, which constituted surplus material from the Burgundian fleet now that 
the crusade against the Turks did not materialise due to the death of the pope 
(Pius II). Those galleys were costly and difficult to fill with cargo both ways as 
required for profitability. Brügge and its relation to London became a constant 
problem to the maggiori, even if its money market worked due to the presence 
of other Italian banks.
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The decline
During Cosimo’s reign the Medici policy was to avoid lending money to princes5, 
or to the court (the state as it were) because princes often had no intention of 
repaying. Still Cosimo was not foreign to use his financial resources politically. 
He even avoided a death sentence by bribes, but was expelled from Florence 
in 1433, when his enemy Rinaldo degli Albizzi had him arrested and argued for 
execution – only to be called back a year later. Florence was involved in complex 
and shifting alliances and wars at the time (Machiavelli, 2010).
When Cosimo died in 1464 the Medici bank was already past its prime. His 
older son Piero had been trained in politics rather than banking. Machiavelli 
(2010) claims that Piero caused discontent and many business failures by calling 
many outstanding loans. De Roover (1963) points out that the truth of the 
matter was that Piero, when assuming the role of principal, initiated an audit to 
see what state the business was in, and that this audit revealed that the bank was 
in poor condition. He therefore took steps to close down the Venice branch 
that was unprofitable, and he sent Tani to try to solve the London problem 
by negotiating a deal with Edward IV. He also ordered the Milan branch to 
reduce its loans to the Sforza court. Still de Roover maintains that it is doubtful 
whether the retrenchment of the Medici bank was the cause of “the epidemic 
of bankruptcies which broke out in Florence shortly after Cosimo’s death” (p. 
359). It was rather that many of the firms that went bankrupt had business 
commitments in the Levant, which were cut off with the war between Venice 
and the Sultan between 1463 and 1479. 
There was more to come. Piero died already in 1469, and was succeeded 
by his sons Lorenzo and Giuliano, 21 and 18 years of age, who necessarily 
became dependent of their father’s advisors. Lorenzo soon developed into a 
gifted politician, but was not interested in banking. He relied completely on 
Francesco Sassetti, a long term employee, who became the real manager at the 
headquarters. Due to Sassetti’s policy of allowing branch managers too much 
room for extravagant manoeuvres the “maggiori” lost control of the Medici 
group and mismanagement in some branches was allowed to go on for too long. 
The Brügge branch and Portinari has been mentioned above (his brother Pigello 
was not much better as manager in Milan as he got entangled in ever increasing 
loans to the Sforza court). The other cause of decline was the Lyon debacle of 
Lionetto de’ Rossi. 
Up to 1463 the leading trade fair for merchants had been Geneva, but that 
year the French king Louis XI issued a decree that exempted all merchants that 
came to Lyon from toll. This turned out to be an effective incentive. Medici’s 
Geneva branch moved to Lyon in 1466 to be where the business was. The name 
5 Possibly under the influence of the saying from Ecclesiasticus (Quoted from Ehrenberg 
1928): ”Noli foenerari fortiori te, quod si foeneravis, quasi perditum habe” (Lend not to him 
who is mightier than thou; or if thou lendest, look upon thy loan as lost).
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of the branch became Francesco Sassetti & Co (although the Medici provided 
66 percent of the capital). At first the Lyons branch was successful, but soon 
the first branch manager was expelled from France (for supporting enemies 
of the King). The second managers died within a year, and the third manager, 
appointed in 1470, was the infamous Lionetto de’ Rossi, who had been a factor 
with the branch (first in Geneva and then in Lyon) since 1453. The first sign of 
problem appeared in 1476 when headquarters complained that the balance sheet 
submitted by Rossi was “too full of slow debtors and stocks of merchandise”. 
An intervention from Leonardo made Lionetto promise to mend his ways, but 
soon, by 1480, the balance sheet showed a loss and Medici’s agent in Montpellier 
(Lorenzo Spinelli) was sent to investigate. Rossi did not like Spinelli’s spying on 
him. In 1482 Rossi sent two balance sheets, one to Sassetti and one to Lorenzo 
(this one with lots of explaining text). Rossi claimed that business had picked up 
and the future looked bright. He had managed to collect a lot of bad debts and 
build reserves. The letter to Lorenzo contained a number of accusations against 
Sassetti. The real problem was that Rossi had come into the habit of drawing on 
the Rome branch for payments but fail to remit promptly. Rome complained 
but matters soured when that branch refused to honour a draft by a French 
merchant on the Lyon branch. Another set of accounts sent in 1484 claimed that 
the Lyon branch was now free of bad debts and generated a profit. Spinelli was 
sent to investigate again and found Rossi “out of his senses”. Lorenzo, trying 
to mediate, called Rossi to Florence for a conference. Rossi took his time to set 
out on the trip. When he arrived, months after being called, he was put in the 
debtors’ jail. An audit of the books showed manipulation and a frightening loss. 
Spinelli was persuaded to take over and clear things up, which was a formidable 
task since “the maggiori” were slow to provide fresh capital at the same time as 
they insisted on reducing debt. Turnaround by entrenchment is not an easy task. 
Sassetti, who had a(-n arrogant) son at the Lyon branch, promised to stay on as 
manager at headquarters until the mess was cleared up. He visited the branch 
from May 1488 and found improvement and helped restore confidence. His 
departure back to Florence was delayed for different reasons. A new management 
contract was set up in February 1489, but Sassetti died soon after his return, in 
March 1490. Soon Lorenzo de Medici also died and the entire Lyon branch was 
expelled from France as a result of new hostilities between the French king and 
Florence. After the failure of war efforts by the king, Spinelli and staff returned 
to Lyon, but were unable to run a profitable business without capital.
The fate of the Lyon branch illustrates how accounting fraud undermines 
trust and how difficult it is to re-establish trust by the new regime when there is 
insufficient capital infusion. 
Lorenzo Medici devoted his energy to try to save the bank from 1478 until 
1494 when the Medici rule of the City of Florence was overthrown and all the 
Medici property seized. Giovanni Tornabuoni and his son were charged with 
continuing to run the bank but without capital it soon perished.
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It should be mentioned, to illustrate business conditions of the time, that 
the Pazzi bank, probably the second largest bank in Florence, saw what trouble 
the Medici bank was in. Was it heading toward bankruptcy or did it need a 
push? The Pazzi conspiracy was based in the idea that by toppling the bank one 
could also remove the Medicis from political power. There was an attempt to 
assassinate the two Medici brothers (Lorenzo and Giuliano) in a church in April 
1478. Giuliano was murdered but Lorenzo escaped with his life… It might be 
claimed that politics as well as lack of internal loyalty killed the Medici bank. It 
simply was unable to uphold all its relations to keep its good name.
Learning from Medici
The Medici bank was run on trust and good book-keeping with trusted branches 
given much leeway during the growth period under Cosimo. Growth was 
incentivized by the agents’ participation in the capital of the branch, and profit 
sharing contracts. Cosimo was a strong-willed and watchful “maggiore”. He had 
a co-manager (Benci) who matched him in diligence. Lorenzo de Medici had a 
co-manager too (Sassetti), but did not pay much attention to banking during the 
first decade of his reign. When the centre was weakened (and local contexts got 
more dynamic) local risk-taking by branches brought the bank down (cheating 
in accounting delayed corrections). 
A key to success for Cosimo seems to have been his careful selection of 
trusted branch managers and a watchful central eye on branch performance. The 
decline was driven by local agents immersion in local political opportunism. The 
control system (with its incentives for local growth) could not work “control at 
a distance” under the emerging circumstances as agents betrayed trust.
The lack of loyalty of some branch managers (Portinari and de’Rossi committed 
accounting fraud) combined with their increasing delight in granting favours to 
princes, made the bank vulnerable to declines in business that followed from the 
war between Venice and the Sultan.
4.2. Fugger
The successor to Medici as, arguably, the most prominent bank in Europe, 
seems to have been Fugger of Augsburg. This family had a different business 
model from the very start in that it quite early focused on lending to kings and 
governments, extracting in return interests in mining and farming, primarily 
from the Habsburg family of kings and princes. The Fugger banking business 
was dismantled after a drawn out decline at the end of the Thirty Years War 
(ending with the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648).
Ehrenberg (1928) finds it necessary to give an account of the different kinds 
of credits that existed in order to give a proper view of the fortunes of the Fugger 
family and its problems, chiefly stemming from their strong commitment to 
support the Habsburgs and their wars. It is necessary to gain some insight into 
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the intricacies of public debt (nowadays known as  ”sovereign” debt) to see 
how Fugger got entangled. A special creditworthiness attached to the free cities 
at the time, since citizens could be called upon to pay if the city failed. At the 
other end of the scale were princes, who, with their longing for glory and war, 
usually never intended to pay back. Instead they had a tendency to threaten that 
if the creditor did not extend further credit the existing credit would be lost, or 
in other ways (“forced loans”). A contract was set up with the creditor to receive 
payment via the income from estates, mines, tax collection over a certain period. 
The problem with this “farming out” of income streams was that the creditor 
often did not know to what extent they had already been mortgaged. One had 
to try to maintain the goodwill of the prince so that one’s contract could receive 
preferential treatment (“senior debt”, as it were) if cash happens to be scarce at 
the time of maturity. And one had to be well informed about developments at 
the court.
It was the wars - particularly the payment of soldiers, who would ransack the 
place where they happened to be when contracted pay failed or go over to the 
other side – that drained the princes’ coffers. No prince could afford to keep 
permanent forces of any size, so mercenary solders were hired periodically. This 
made princes rather desperate for cash at times. Cities and their guilds were 
common targets for extracting cash for war. Merchants were known to have 
streams of cash flowing in and out of their business. They also knew how to use 
financial instruments to lay their hands on cash in places like Antwerp or Brügge. 
Guilds were stable organizations to deal with. Merchants primarily had their 
good name as a primary sign of creditworthiness. The Church with its steady 
cash flow, and its preaching against ursury, was a frequent business partner to 
merchants, making deals that contained great many synonyms for interest.
The Fugger house was brought down by committing too much of its resources 
to sovereign debt. Ehrenberg (1928) gives a short version of all the complexities 
of the greatest bank of the 16th century:
The first Fugger, Hans, came to Augsburg in 1367. He was a weaver, but also 
did some trading. Soon after his arrival the Guilds of Augsburg obtained a share 
of the management of the city. The two most prominent guilds, the weavers 
and the merchants, prospered from this. Hans also did well and left his two 
sons, Jakob and Andreas, in a good position. Jakob was already Master of the 
Weavers’ Guild when Hans died, although he had given up weaving. Fugger trade 
was, like that of other Augsburg merchants, oriented toward Venice (spices, silk 
and woollen materials). Andreas did even better, marrying into and old family 
to start his own branch of the family, Fugger vom Reh, which prospered and 
expanded into links with the Netherlands and Leipzig. The Fugger vom Reh 
soon lost heavily on bad debts, sunk further in respect, and had, in time, to seek 
employment with their cousins, the Fugger of the Lilies. The more modest son, 
Jakob, married the daughter of the Master of the Augsburg Mint. He managed to 
fend off the imminent bankruptcy of his father-in-law by guaranteeing the debt. 
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The father-in-law then went on to become Master of Mint again, now in Hall. 
Thereby Jakob found connections with the Tyrol mining industry. Jakob’s son, 
Jakob II, was sent for training to merchant in Venice, already at the age of 14 
(even though he had first been intended for the church). He conducted business 
together with his two surviving uncles, and reached an agreement that their 
male heirs and descendants should leave property in common in the business in 
order to keep the business intact, but that daughters should be given money in 
dowries. This principle was adhered to as long as the Fugger house prospered. 
It was given up after the house had suffered losses on bad debts in connection 
with the war of Schmalkalden (1546-47). Even if Ulrich Fugger had a successful 
business deal with the Emperor (Fredrick III) to provide silk and clothing for 
his son Maximilian as he went to Trier to negotiate a marriage in 1473, it was 
Jakob II who set the Fugger house on course to success in 1487. He lent money 
to the Archduke of Tyrol against security in Tyrol silver mines. A still larger 
loan the next year established Fugger in the mining business. Copper was added 
in a similar manner, and syndicates were formed to control the copper market 
in Venice, and shipping organized via Danzig to Antwerp. As the Archduke of 
Tyrol handed over the government of Tyrol to Maximilian I in 1490, the stage 
was set for intensified financial relations between the Hapsburgs and the Fugger 
house. This relation developed over the years and consisted chiefly in Fugger 
giving loans to the Habsburg princes and Emperors against security in farmland, 
mines, and cash flows. This, of course, provided opportunities for trade, which 
was the main occupation of the house. 
The relation between the King Maximilian I and the merchants in Augsburg 
were quite strained at times, and the King considered resorting to “forced loans” 
but negotiations lead to a large (voluntary) loan, most of it carried by Fugger. 
The situation grew evermore complicated as the merchants (and some cities) 
were targeted for credits again and again. They often had to borrow themselves 
to muster the cash required. Fugger also served as an intermediary for English 
subsidies to Maximilian.
Fugger had complex business with the Vatican, as well. The branch in Rome 
served several “princes of the church” with contracts carefully avoiding the 
word “interest”. For instance they helped the new Archbishop of Brandenburg, 
Albrecht, with a loan to pay the Vatican for his appointment.
The most complex business at this time (1517), no doubt, was supporting 
the election of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor. Charles was heir to three 
dynasties, Habsburg (Austria), Valois-Burgundy (Burgundian Netherlands and 
Franche-Comté), and Trastámara (Castile and Aragon). To win the election a 
large number of electors needed to be persuaded by money transfers, which 
drained the cash from Fugger, who had built a strong relation with Charles, via 
transfers from Antwerp to Madrid. With Charles V, as King of Spain the strain 
on the finances of Fugger continued as Charles had difficulties to extract money 
taxing the Spanish people to repay loans. Furthermore, the counter-reformation 
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(to combat the proliferation of Protestantism; Luther had nailed his theses in 
1517) was managed from Spain as Loyola launched his Jesuit mission to re-
conquer the souls of Europe. Possibly, the worst consequence of the election, 
however, was that Charles gained a strong enemy in his, then, competitor for the 
post, King Francis of France. The complexity of the Fugger business is already 
overwhelming.
Jacob Fugger died in 1526 after having run the company since 1511, and 
nominated Anton as his successor in his will. Anton adopted a cautious policy 
the first few years. But as the threats from the Turks as well as the war with 
France ebbed and flowed the Fugger house found itself drawn into financing the 
Emperor’s wars again. In the 1530s the capital of the Fugger house stagnated. The 
period of the war of Schmalkalden (1546-47) turned out to become the turning 
point for Fugger. In 1546 the Emperor decided to make war on the Protestants 
and mobilized money for the purpose. The Protestants were defeated but the 
continued resistance from them could not be supressed by force and in 1555 
the Peace of Augsburg officially recognize Protestantism as a legitimate religion. 
In the meantime Fugger had, faithful to the Emperor, provided finance to the 
Catholic side. This upset other merchants in Augsburg, who were on the side of 
the Schmalkaldian League (the protestants). At this time (1547) letters show that 
Anton seriously considered giving up the Fugger business. Anton Fugger, in low 
spirits and poor health, had found that none of his nephews was willing to take 
over, so it was agreed to liquidate it all. This was not easy however; Anton says in 
his will (Ehrenberg, 1928, p. 104): “On account of long wars, matters have gone 
right heavily, so that not only are we unable to bring our own business to an 
end and collect the monies owing to us, but we have been constrained, in order 
to serve the Emperor and the King, to make fresh loans, ourselves borrowing 
money and getting into debt.”
Charles V, was in financial trouble again, and had turned to Fugger in his 
desperate need. Fugger used the Antwerp money market to raise money to save 
Charles, further increasing already impaired debt. In October 1555, Charles 
handed over the Netherlands to his son Philip including untenable finances. Again 
Fugger house had to advance further loans through its agent Matthew Oertel, and 
took over guarantees. In 1557 the Antwerp office went into crisis as King Philip 
ordered payments on government debt to be stopped. Oertel pleaded with the 
King pointing to all the years of faithful service. This came to nothing. Fugger’s 
decline started to accelerate. In 1560 Anton Fugger died leaving the business to 
Hans Jakob and his three sons. Quarrel between the heirs, and mismanagement, did 
not help. The Spanish debt refused to come down. All that could be accomplished 
through three state bankruptcies for Spain was a moratorium and promises of 
future payments (in view of the great services to the King). Still other business 
continued up to the middle of the 17th century. What remained then was large 
areas of farmland that had been devastated during the 30 years’ war.
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Learning from Fugger
It is difficult to understand how the Fugger house became so entrapped in 
(financially) unhappy relations with princes, especially the Hapsburgs. How did 
it all begin? Why did they not stop? The decline of Fugger happened during the 
period building up to the 30 years’ war. Researchers still disagree about the causes 
of that war (Steensgaard 1969/70, Braudel 1978). At the time when it is generally 
said to have started, in 1618 with the “defenetering” (throwing them out of the 
window of the Hradschin castle – miraculously they survived landing in a dung 
heap) of diplomats in Prague, there had already been dispersed wars and conflicts 
for several decades, as princes and dukes tried to position themselves to gain from 
the conflict. The Fugger house lived through the prelude to this most devastating 
of wars6 and they must have seen what was coming, devoted as they were to 
serve the Emperor. Steensgaard (1969/70) proposes that this war was driven by a 
process of building a State on many hands in parallel. Harrison (2014) discusses the 
formation of the “pre-modern state”. The old feudal system, with allegiance to the 
Prince in return for protection, was giving way, over a century, to an administrative 
state with a bureaucracy effective enough to collect revenues from taxes and tolls, 
to support a much more costly state (including standing armies). As creditor in 
this complex context you needed to bet on the right horse. It was the merchants 
who could provide credit against contracted concessions, like the right to collect 
revenues from the silver mines in Tyrol, for a number of years. Credit for trade 
concessions from the state was under development as a strategy for merchant 
houses. But giving credit to Princes still had the attached risk of credit loss. There 
was little in terms of safety nets except good relations. (Like Hobbes described; in 
the State of Nature - everybody’s fight against everybody - the right strategy is to 
seek peace in terms of good relations). 
We can also see that beside the already existing money market in Florence, where 
Bills of Exchange could be liquidated, a new market had emerged in Antwerp during 
Fugger time, and in Brügge. Again this was generated by the presence of Italian 
bank agents. But the good name of the Fugger house also was its curse as it was 
driven into deeper trouble by its good name. Instead of serving as intermediary to 
the money market Fugger had to take loans on its own books and then lend to the 
Hapsburgs. The Fugger had the good name that princes did not. One is reminded 
of the words in the Book of Ecclesiasticus mentioned above on p 3 about not 
lending money to someone “mightier than thou”. Now the (pre-modern) state was 
emerging as a significant actor and Fugger did not have the creative power to invent 
a less risky role as intermediary to the money markets. With the State beginning to 
be seen as the “manager” of the nation the flow of money and precious metals in 
and out of the country would become an urgent topic.
6 In 1962 citizens of Hessen responded to a survey concerning the most devastating events for 
Germany ranking the 30 Years’ War as the worst, before the two World Wars (Wolke et al, 
2006, p.9)
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5. Mercantilism – the origins of political economy 
and, consequently, of economic policy
Magnusson (1999) is focused on how mercantilism and its ideas were coloured 
by historical events and how explanations to the then current economic plights 
gradually paved the way for understanding the economy as a system that could 
be subjected to interventions by governments to enhance performance. 
Magnusson (1999) points out that what we call “mercantilism” really is a 
series of somewhat related policy debates contained in a very large number of 
pamphlets and brochures - Schumpeter (1973) called the writers collectively 
as “government consultants” - that started with the severe economic crisis of 
England in 1620. 
The problem then was that “the old drapery” (broadcloth, made from wool) 
produced and exported by England, was overtaken and virtually wiped out by a 
lighter cloth “the new drapery” (calico, made from cotton) provided by Holland. 
It was a devastating blow to the economy. Unemployment in this dominating 
industry grew very rapidly. Investigative commissions were established and a 
vast literature on the causes and remedies emerged. 
First it was a lack of money that was seen as the cause – the East India 
Company exported a lot of money and precious metals, didn’t they. Later a 
balance of trade discourse emerged. There was also a debate on the employment 
effects of trade.
Magnusson (1999, see also 1994) argues that these debates produced a 
common language (“langue”), even if the different authors presented different 
arguments (“parole”), rather than a conceptually homogeneous worldview. The 
label “mercantilism” marks the “langue” of economic policy in Europe during 
the period from the dissolution of the medieval guild and trade organization 
to the time of the laissez-faire doctrine. Later writers, like Adam Smith (1776), 
are keen to portrait the “mercantilists” as irrational believers in regulation and 
sovereign power, but it seems more rational to look upon them as pragmatists 
trying to device solutions to the problems of the day. Most of the arguments 
used by Adam Smith had already been presented by other authors. It was 
the combination of arguments that rendered Smith’s text on trade forceful – 
Magnusson even points out that it is doubtful whether Smith was a free-trader at 
all. He supported the Navigation Act (the 1651 Parliamentary Act that ruled that 
all imported goods (including fish) had to be brought by English ships). It was 
the Dutch that were in focus of the debate, they were capturing all the fish in the 
North Sea, and they had built a trading empire. Holland was described by one of 
the writers (Mun, 1655) as the warehouse of “many places of Christianity” with 
some envy. How could they build such riches without manufacturing anything? 
One should remember that from 1652 (the year after the Navigation Act, and 
a few years after the peace treaty of Westphalia) until 1713 England was more 
Sten Jönsson
Banks and their world view contexts
43
or less constantly at war (three times with Holland, twice with France, twice 
with Spain), which may explain the intensity and diversity of arguments. Still 
Mercantilism is an important steppingstone for the development of classical 
economics and banking. Some of the arguments were recycled in the debates in 
the 1930s around Keynes’ proposals.
Heckscher (1931), in his magnum opus, described mercantilism as just 
another phase in the development of economic policy. It had little to do with 
the economic realities of the time. As before it was a matter of strengthening 
the power of the state to interfere with economic development. What was new 
was the means used to further this goal. He made the will to control visible 
(in opposition to the self-regulation argued by liberals). Viner (1937) tried to 
understand mercantilism from the perspective of modern theories in the trade 
area. He comes out in support of Adam Smith’s presentation of mercantilism 
as regulation being the result of lobby from special interests. Schumpeter (1954) 
argues along the same lines. Mercantilism can only be understood as rational 
if seen as promotion of special interests. Keynes (1936) pointed out that early 
economists -those active in the time of mercantilism - have been mistreated by 
the classical school. What we should learn from mercantilism is that an upsurge 
under laissez-faire will be broken by inadequate new investment (that is why the 
state has to interfere to uphold employment).
Magnusson (1999) brings out some of the strands in this colourful tapestry: 
An early actor was Gerard de Malynes, a “monetarist”, who argued that the 
cause of the troubles was the unfair exchange rate, caused by a conspiracy of 
foreign bankers and currency traders. By forcing the rate down they made it 
necessary for British merchants to sell their wares prematurely at low prices in 
foreign markets since they had to pay their bills of trade. The solution was strong 
regulation to uphold a par pro pari exchange rate (exchange only in accordance 
with our money’s real, inherent value).  Thomas Mun was another contributor, 
and director of the East India Company from 1615. His company had been 
accused of exporting money from the country and that this was the cause of 
the depression. Besides defending the East India Company (it generated many 
jobs in Britain) Mun argued that a nation must export more than it imports. 
This, in turn, will generate money flows, which, if we use it for further trade, will 
increase the capital assets of society. The state needs to promote the export of 
manufactured goods and the import of raw material. He is especially aggressive 
toward the Dutch dominance of the fish trade. 
This articulated the “balance of trade”–aspect of mercantilism. Similar 
debates appeared in other countries with slight variations. Germany (many 
small states) established a inward-looking view (Reichs-kameralismus), which 
focused on order, administration and proper book-keeping. France, finally at 
peace after a long period of domestic warfare, was in a re-building phase with a 
stronger “dirigist” state, with Colbert as a leading figure, first oriented toward 
self-sufficiency, and later toward expansion of trade. Spain with its large inflow 
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of precious metals from Latin America had already under the period of the 
Salamanca school (scholastics) pondered the effects of this inflow of money 
on economic development (de Azplueceta). Focus came to be on the design of 
the tax system and how to promote the establishment of manufacturing, which, 
obviously, required investment in fixed assets with longer planning horizons. In 
sum the mercantilist discourse delivered (Magnusson, 1999, p. 115f):
• the belief that the monetary flow between countries was determined by 
real economic forces, i.e., the balance of payment
• the belief that the market mechanism was the dominating factor in this 
process
• the belief that the Christian moral order (scholasticism), or ethics, had 
little to do with this
• the view that the economy is s system of forces
• and the view that the economic world should be subject of systematic 
study
One might add that it also comes through that the participants in the debate 
were in favour of certain economic policies to promote the welfare of their 
nation. The state had now been established as a legitimate player and the beliefs 
listed above provided a basis for economic policy formation. Merchant banks 
gained importance in the mercantilist era, but they were under scrutiny, and they 
now had a complex of relations and investment opportunities to attend to beside 
trade. They needed strategies for trade and state. The problem was that banks 
were rather small in terms of personnel to implement strategies and vulnerable 
to withdrawals of capital in connection with death duties etc. It was merchant 
houses that had the head start in the modern era.
Figure 4.
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5.1. The glory and decline of merchant banks
Banks (1999) treats the rise of the modern British Financial era from medieval 
times to the demise of the merchant banks as a distinct category at the turn 
of the 20th century. For each period Banks (199) gives an overview of the 
economic development and how this engendered new features in the merchant 
bank industry and for each of the major banks. I have chosen Baring as the 
representative one. 
The chapters deal with different periods of Britain’s modern financial era; the 
emergence of the banks from 1800 – 1874, the Glory years before the wars, the 
disruptions of the two wars, the changes after the Second World War and the 
consolidation of the City in the 1980s, and finally the end of merchant banks 
during the 1990s.
Dawn
Banking in England started in the wake of William the Conqueror’s occupation. 
Jews established business in Cheapside (City). Since they were not allowed to 
engage in trade or manufacture and had no legal status, they took up money 
changing, and provided Norman kings with funds for wars. Defaults on such 
loans were rather common so high interest charges were required. This lead 
to conflict, ending in expulsion of Jews in 1290. The void was soon filled by 
the Lombards (Italians, merchants and bankers, from Florence and other 
cities). The Lombards introduced their experience of bills of exchange. By the 
16th century the Italian banking houses declined and their financial activities 
were taken up by merchants, brokers, scriveners and goldsmiths; merchants 
trading and providing credit by bills of exchange, brokers lent money against 
valuables placed in safekeeping, scriveners were clerical intermediaries who set 
up contracts and provided advice, discounted payment orders, and traded in 
gold, goldsmiths established in jewellery and became important financiers taking 
deposits and re-lending deposits. Goldsmiths’ deposit notes developed into a 
kind of bank notes. The goldsmiths’ business was greatly promoted by the raid 
on the Royal Mint (a safe deposit, people thought) by king Charles I in 1640 
where he removed 200.000 pounds in bullion. 
From the middle of the 16th century joint stock companies appeared. They 
issued shares to merchants and gentry against promises of participation in capital 
gains and dividends. Such shares changed hands informally via brokers (who 
“transact business for merchants”), and jobbers (who quote two-way prices 
for their own accounts of stocks). The first recorded ‘stock jobbers’ appear 
in 1688. One place where these middlemen met to conduct business was the 
Royal Exchange, but there were other locales, not least Jonathon’s coffee house. 
Another coffee house was Lloyds, which became a centre for exchange of shipping 
information and later (from 1771) developed into an insurance business with 
members/underwriters retaining unlimited personal responsibility for losses. 
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Despite some progress London was still, at the beginning of the 18th century, a 
second rate financial centre after places like Amsterdam and Southern Germany. 
But trade expanded, supported by a growing colonial empire and protected by 
mercantilist policies (like The Navigation Act) These policies were, however, the 
seed of decline for the empire starting with the War of Independence in North 
America and the revolutionary ideas from France. 
However, Britain came out winner of the Napoleonic wars and as ruler of 
the seas. In this period the role of the Bank of England expanded largely in 
connection with the management of the national debt that increased rapidly 
as a consequence of wars. Amsterdam, on the other side, suffered numerous 
bankruptcies in the crisis of 1763 (end of the Seven Years War). Then problems 
got worse for Holland through the Anglo-Dutch war 1780-83, and finally the 
French invasion in 1795. With that the financial, mercantile and naval power of 
Amsterdam was broken. London stepped in – Paris had other business to attend 
to.
Economic developments I
Industry was growing steadily at the beginning of the 19th century, even if 
Britain was involved in war. At the centre of this growth was cotton. Imports 
and exports dominated the economy after the end of the Napoleonic wars. 
Soon the railway era began. The first railway project in Britain started in 1825, 
by 1835 there were 21 listed joint stock companies trying to raise funds for 
railway networks. Britain and Europe at large were plagued by large national 
war debts and there were financial crises - 1825 brought runs on country banks 
throughout the system with payment stoppages at many banks – over 12 months 
145 banks failed. In this situation Bank of England was successful in calming 
the financial markets by discounting government bills and bills of exchange to 
provide liquidity. Legislation strengthened the Bank of England in its role as 
central bank. A further crisis in 1839, emanating from the USA, marked the 
turbulence of the times.
It was in these tumultuous years at the beginning of the 19th century that 
merchant banking took off. Merchant families, emigrated to England from 
Prussia, France, Ireland, Russia, Italy and America, formed the core of this 
development. They started out from expertise in trade and commerce, were 
small family-owned, and managed houses with limited capital. They provided an 
essential link between commercial centres of the world. International trade was 
their business (remember Adam Smith 1776). Their reputation and connections 
with agents made them suitable as intermediaries. Since they knew both parties 
in a transaction they could accept bills of exchange. Merchant banks like Baring, 
Hambro, Brown, Kleinworth, and Schroder ran very large acceptance books, 
while others like Rothschild and Peabody and Benson were active at trading bills 
at a discount in the market. Bills for payment in London and the USA generated 
a market of currency exchange, and trusted clients could be provided with letters 
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of credit. Merchant banks, knowing their clients well, had an advantage in judging 
creditworthiness. During this century foreigners also started to issue loans in 
London (railways, sovereign debt), which needed underwriters to arrange things. 
From now on we focus on Baring, with occasional comments on the others.
Baring I
The Baring bank stems from Groningen, where Peter Baring established a wool 
importing house in the 15th century. A descendant immigrated to Exeter – a trans-
shipment point for linen from Germany to the West Indies and Mediterranean 
countries – from Bremen to start his own business in 1717. By the end of 
the Seven Years War (1763) two sons had established business in London as 
agents for the Exeter branch. Gradually, and after several reconstitutions of 
partnerships between members of the family, banking took on a more prominent 
place in the business. Baring’s strength was its ability to develop and maintain 
relationships with banking and merchant houses at key locations around the 
world. One such link was the one with Hope & Co in Holland. By 1803 Baring 
was appointed general agents for the US Government, arranging payment of 
interest, purchasing armaments etc. By the turn of the century the firm had 
gained considerably in stature. It took on a policy early on to only act as the sole 
provider of credit to a given client. In 1803 Baring participated, together with its 
partner Hope & Co in financing the Louisiana Purchase, its biggest transaction 
up till then. The firm was also involved in arranging Spain’s payment of the 
annual subsidy to Napoleon under the Treaty of Spain (1803). It was Francis 
Baring, who, during his 40 years’ rein, had transformed Baring from a merchant 
house to a first-tier bank. 
As the bank increased its operations in the next few decades often in 
competition with its rival N.M. Rotschild. Even if Baring was larger than most 
houses in London it remained well behind Rotschild by the mid 1820s. In order 
to implement its expansion plans for the US operations the firm hired Thomas 
Ward to be its resident agent, in 1830. He extended long term credits to American 
merchants with business in the Far East and West Indies. A family member 
(John) had moved to Boston in1826 to set up a partnership with Joshua Bates 
with focus on the cotton trade. This partnership was soon absorbed into Baring 
and a new office was set up in Liverpool to engage further into the cotton trade.
The Hambroe family, with roots in Hamburg and Copenhagen, established 
themselves in London during this time, in similar business but specializing in the 
Scandinavian countries. Kleinwort came from Hamburg like Schroder. Warburg 
did not set up business in London until in the 1930s, but was already an agent 
for Rotschild in Germany at this time.
Economic developments II
From 1840 onwards free trade made great progress as trade restrictions (like the 
Navigation Act and the Corn Laws) were dismantled. By 1880 Britain accounted 
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for 50 percent of the world’s shipping tonnage and British credit supported the 
gr gowth in trade. The empire generated revenue, e.g., in the form of “home 
charges” and interest payments from India. Industry grew – by the middle of 
the century Britain produced 66 percent of the world’s coal, 50 percent of its 
iron, 70 percent of its steel and 50 percent of its textile. Investment in railways 
was a driver of the financial sector, as was sovereign debt. London was the 
undisputed centre. There were crises of course, many of them stemming from 
speculative adventures (cotton, land speculation, railway securities bubble, states 
overspending) in the USA. In May 1866 (Black Friday) the leading discount house 
(discounting bills of exchange) in London, called Overend Gurney, collapsed. 
Bank of England analysed the system effects and let it fall, but provided credit 
to carry the financial sector over. 
A major technological development in the form of the telegraph – the 
Atlantic cable in operation from 1865 – changed the condition of international 
commerce drastically. The American Civil War shifted business to the North. 
The merchant banks had to adapt. While they hitherto had been used to rely on 
their personal knowledge of clients’ creditworthiness,  the growing volume now 
made this virtually impossible. Larger capital to carry risk was required. There 
were mergers and acquisitions and joint stock banks kept growing. 
Baring II
Still a traditional merchant bank Baring shifted more of its business toward 
the USA in the period 1830–1860, among other business it became a major 
participant in Federal, State and railway loans, but it also helped issue loans 
for Russia, France and Brazil. It further increased its portfolio of acceptances. 
Especially the financing of trade on the Far East was lucrative. However the 
death or retirement of leaders of the bank exposed it to considerable reductions 
of its capital as a consequence of withdrawal of funds. Approaching the 1870s 
the bank reorganized, the number of partners doubled and a merger with a 
Scottish bank was undertaken.
Economic developments III - The Glory Years
The period between 1875 and 1913 is generally considered the glory years of 
Britain. The entire world economy was built around Britain with the City as 
its centre. Bagehot (1873, p.2) wrote: “Everyone is aware that England is the 
greatest moneyed country in the world; everyone admits that it has much more 
immediately disposable and ready cash than any other country.” London dwarfed 
New York and other centres in terms of the volume of bank deposits. That 
very volume also generated a need for joint stock companies in banking. The 
“Big 5” banks emerged as the clearing banks by the First World War. Merchant 
banks saw this development with suspicion. Foreign banks in London granting 
trade credits to companies in their ‘home country’ expanded during the late 
1800s. It was now that the term “merchant bank” became widely used. And the 
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category got new members; while there were 39 such banks in the City by 1890 
the number had grown to 66 by 1897, even if they remained small. Baring had 
71 employees by 1903. Politics was important. Many partners of merchant banks 
were members of Parliament.
Baring III
During the latter half of the 19th century Baring concentrated its business on the 
Americas and the Far East, but unlike other merchant banks it also made efforts 
to finance domestic industry. Two issues brought the bank down; a syndicated 
loan to Manchester Ship Canal was only subscribed to18 percent leaving the 
banks to take up the balance and tie up capital for a long period. An ill-advised 
investment in shares and debentures of the Buenos Aires Water Supply and 
Drainage generated a liquidity shortfall in 1890. Under the leadership of the 
governor of Bank of England a successful rescue package was negotiated. In 
the aftermath Edward Baring, leader of the bank up to the crisis, was forced to 
resign, the bank was reconstructed as a limited liability company with only two 
family members holding stock in the company (20 percent). The reconstruction 
allowed the Baring family to repurchase voting share from new shareholders – 
mostly banks that had contributed to the rescue package – and within 5 years 
they held all voting shares and were again in control. The first priority now was 
to get rid of the illiquid Argentinian assets and soon it was back to its traditional 
business; acceptances, investments and new issues.
In the early 1900s Baring discussed a merger with JP Morgan, but in the end 
Baring decided to develop its own subsidiary in New York run by Hugo Baring. 
He started out disastrously and was soon replaced. In 1908 Baring decided to 
close down its New York office and work with Kidder Peabody instead. Baring 
had come through the 1890 crisis with lessons learned. As the War approached 
the bank was again in business, although more conservative than before. NM 
Rotschild had consolidated its position as the top merchant bank with Barings 
setback.
Economic developments IV – two World Wars
As tensions escalated in Europe financial markets suffered. Interest rates and 
volatility increased, gold reserves flowed out of London. With the War financial 
markets came to a halt in London and Europe. The problem for the government 
was the large amount of outstanding acceptances to foreign clients who were 
unable to remit payment. The Bank of England declared a moratorium on 
payment of bills and covered large amounts of acceptances, thereby maintaining 
liquidity. The gold standard was suspended in London and Europe, but this lead 
to liquidation of securities in New York and conversion of the proceeds to gold. 
This threatened the US reserves and the New York Stock Exchange closed. 
However, trading continued off-exchange, and as the exchange re-opened 
several months later investors had started to look upon American securities as a 
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safe haven. In this way America became the recipient of large inflows of capital 
and its gold reserves were no longer threatened. When the USA entered the war 
in 1917 it could lend money to its allies.
At the end of the war England faced the problems of re-building its economy, 
stabilizing its currency and holding the empire together, which required a 
mobilization of a large amount of public and private capital. War reparation 
was a debated issue. The economy contracted considerably, exports reached 
only 80 percent of its pre-war levels. By 1918 2/3 of the British economy was 
under direct or indirect control of the government. 90 percent of all imports 
were authorized under government directives. By the late 1920s imbalances had 
grown out of control, culminating in the crash of the New York Stock Exchange 
in 1929. Total capitalization of securities decreased by some 30 percent in ten 
days. Banks’ loans to brokers for securities purchase could not be repaid. At 
the time of the crash 4 major economies in Europe were in recession, which 
deepened and prolonged its effects. Soon Austria reported difficulties to meet 
war reparation payments and was granted a small international loan on condition 
that Austria leave the customs union with Germany. Shortly thereafter Germany 
announced that it had insufficient funds to meet obligations. There was a bank 
run in Austria that spread to neighbouring countries. Germany paid only interest 
on outstanding trade credits in 1937 and 1938, while refusing service on loans.
Merchant banking suffered during this period. Strict controls and state 
agencies building their own capacity to purchase material reduced opportunities. 
Banks were managed for survival with reduced staff. Even if trade rebound 
somewhat between the wars providing some acceptance business it did not 
reach pre-war levels. Furthermore, the number of clearing banks with deposits 
and large retail organization had solidified at the “Big 5”, which set a completely 
new stage for banking business after 1945.
Baring IV
At the start of World War I “Baring’s operations had effectively come to 
a halt” (Banks, p. 250). Core operations were limited to arranging payments 
and maintaining relationships. A new manager (Peabody, a Canadian) from the 
outside was recruited at the end of World War I and served to the end of World 
War II. The acceptance business was gradually rebuilt (tripled in 3 years), but 
Baring also focused on building a domestic issue capability (which requires a 
reach out over the whole country). Corporate finance and advisory work became 
new sources of revenue. International loans were much reduced between the 
wars.
Economic developments V (1945–1979) – Focus shift
The Second World War caused devastation for Britain as far as the basis for 
merchant banking goes. Britain had lost half of its international trade, 2/3 of 
its overseas markets, and 1/3 of its merchant fleet during the war. The position 
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of the USA had grown proportionally stronger. Coping with the large post-
war debt burden was an important task for the government. Industry needed 
restructuring. The traditional industries (textile, coal, shipbuilding) were in 
decline, other industries were fragmented, e.g., there were 11 car manufacturers 
in Britain while there were 3 in the USA. The Labour Government in power 
from the war until 1951, and again in the 1960s and 1970s, created a framework 
for solving these restructuring problems by state ownership (National Coal 
Board, British Steel, British Gas etc.). The policy was successful in the sense 
that unemployment was low (1-2 percent) as well as inflation. In 1957 Britain 
declined to join the new EEC and banded together with other outsiders to 
form EFTA. However the struggle to defend the sterling by raising the interest 
rate and adding an import surcharge (in 1964) had to be abandoned 18 months 
later as violating the EFTA agreement. The trade deficit and currency turmoil 
remained a problem exasperated by the 1973 oil crisis. Britain had for a long time 
been the world’s largest overseas investors, but the wars had forced investors to 
liquidate investments and the revenue from such activities was smaller. Industrial 
production grew, though, and the management of pension funds had been de-
regulated. This set a new strategic field for merchant banks. And there was the 
US Regulation Q and Interest Equalization Tax (IET). Regulation Q prohibited 
payment of interest on short term and set an upper limit for interest on long 
term deposits. IET taxed US domestic investors holding obligations of foreign 
issuers. This set the stage for the Euromarkets. 
The Eurodollar deposit was an off-shore short term deposit paying a rate based 
on the LIBOR. It originated in the Soviet Government worrying about the risk 
that its holdings with American banks might be frozen or restricted (late 1940s). 
It re-deposited dollar funds with the Soviet–controlled Banque Commercial 
pour l’Europe du Nord in Paris. From this further dollar transactions could be 
undertaken outside the control of US authorities. The Eurodollar was born and 
London was the entrepot at hand.
Baring V
Merchant banks had to respond to this changed circumstances after the Second 
World War. There were about 40 of them in London. The strategic options 
ranged from growth by acquisition to specialization to narrow niches. Baring’s 
choice was to expand its domestic presence and seek a more diversified base of 
revenue. It made progress in line with this (asset management, bond trading, 
M&A), but was considered a bit conservative. Managers were recruited from 
the outside. Foreign new issues declined during the 1950s but Baring took a 
leading role in bond issues for British corporations. Baring also set up an asset 
venture management team (Henderson Baring Asset Management) that was 
very successful. In 1975 it won the mandate to assist in managing a part of 
the vast petrodollar investments of Saudi Arabia. The other area was M&A, 
which offered opportunities to participate in the de-nationalization of industries 
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like British Steel. In 1960 the bank earned a reputation through its defence of 
Courtaulds against a hostile bid from ICI. Its list of clients grew after this
(Rotschild saw its capital decline after the war due to poor business conditions, 
but also due to death duties as family members died. Measures were taken to 
protect the company by setting up a holding company (Rotschild Continuation 
Holdings) and convert it from a partnership to a private company. A similar 
development happened to Kleinwort, burdened by a large portfolio of non-
performing credits. Hambro became a limited company too. All merchant banks 
started to hire professional managers from the outside).
Economic developments VI (1980–1989) – City consolidates its position 
Global financial markets were under pressure in 1980 due to the American 
difficulties. Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve had initiated monetary 
tightening to counteract inflation (16 percent), which in turn was due to the 
OPEC oil shock of 1979 (a previous oil crisis in 1973 in relatively fresh memory). 
An unforeseen effect of this high interest rate policy was the difficulties for 
less developed countries to service their much increased debt. By 1984 35 such 
countries were unable to pay. Global banking institutions faced large losses 
and began to reduce costs and rebuild reserves. The British government had 
increased borrowing to fund its restructuring of industry. In this situation de-
regulation as the solution won adherents. The conservative government started 
the stepwise process in 1980, but let it be accompanied by a strengthened 
regulation (FSA, ISB) structure - from its previous “self-regulation” approach 
- to protect investors, issuers, and intermediators from the excesses of the free 
market.
On Monday 16 October 1987 the New York Stock Exchange crashed as a 
bubble burst. Merchant banks made big losses mostly due to new equity issue 
underwriting commitments. During the 1980s British privatization of state-
owned industries gradually gained tempo, and was successful (accept during 
the 12 months following the Crash). The most spectacular deregulation act, 
however, was “the Big Bang” – deregulation of the Stock exchange – in 1986. 
The strategic field changed again.
Under the previous regulations functions on the stock market were kept 
separate; ‘brokers’ (who matched sellers and buyers without owning any shares 
in between) could not work as ‘jobbers’ (who bought and sold shares on their 
own book). These two kinds of houses now became attractive acquisitions for 
merchant banks. Clearing banks saw the Big Bang as an opportunity to enter the 
securities markets in a more forceful way, and in effect became a new kind of 
merchant bank in the process.
For merchant banks the Big Bang announced the need for a more serious 
strategic planning approach rather than the previous ad hoc/grab opportunities 
policy. After formulating their strategy these banks had to carry out their 
plans either by acquisitions of firms or by hiring specialized staff to man new 
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departments. “This contributed to the creation of very high cost bases throughout 
the City, which became difficult to justify when profit margins contracted or 
volatility generated losses.” (Banks, 1999. p. 416).
Baring VI
Baring entered the 1980s as a top-tier bank but with a somewhat conservative 
reputation. Pioneering new activities was not in its taste. It was business as usual 
for the first part of the decade, but by 1984 it bought a 30 percent stake in 
a jobber (Wilson & Watford), and later the same year it was eager to acquire 
the City’s top broker (Cazenove), but negotiations failed and Baring chose to 
hire a 15-man team from another broker. This team, headed by Heath, was 
specialized in the Asian equity markets. Since Baring itself had started trading 
in Japanese Eurobonds that same year it seemed logical to try to find more 
business there. Japanese Eurobonds with attached equity warrants had became 
increasingly popular, generating handsome profit. From a balance sheet of 276 
million GBP in 1977 it had grown to 2,7 billion GBP at the end of the 1980s. 
Baring Securities contributed 50 percent of the profit and employed 1000 staff. 
But as the Japanese market became more difficult in the early 1990s – decline in 
the Nikkei – a greater amount of Baring’s warrant business became proprietary, 
rather than client, in nature.
(All merchant banks faced challenges. Hambro entered the 1980s a full 
service merchant bank. However it failed to reach a top position in corporate 
finance. It purchased  30percent of a broker and acquired a small American 
investment bank, but as a consequence of the 1987 crash it narrowed its focus to 
commercial banking, retail investment service, M&A, exiting the equity market 
and government bonds. Rotschild retained a conservative business approach 
focusing on its traditional strength; corporate finance, bullion dealing, export 
finance and new issues, avoiding areas where they lacked expertise. Rotschild 
had difficulties with access to capital since partners did not want to dilute their 
ownership interests. Still it grew into dominance in international and domestic 
mergers and was successful in building the asset management business. It 
purchased parts of a jobber and a broker to build a securities service and set up 
office in financial centres around the world. At the end of the decade it stood 
securely as a significant niche player. Kleinwort gained prominence over the 
1980s by demonstrating its capability to manage complex deals in important 
privatizations and M&As. In October 1987 Kleinwort Benson issued new stock 
– bad timing in relation to the Crash – but managed to secure 148 million GBP 
in equity. The company still suffered from great variations in profit. Morgan 
Greenfell started the decade by severing relations with its previous shareholder 
and partner JP Morgan. In 1984 Deutsche Bank acquired a 5 percent stake 
in Morgan Greenfell. Management hesitated (due to limited capital) as to its 
approach to building a securities department and by the time they made up 
their mind most top tier brokers and jobbers were already spoken for. It bought 
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minority shares in a broker and a jobber and took full control of them after the 
Big Bang. Over the decade Morgan Greenfell won a top position in M&A, 
but also a reputation for not abiding fully to the code of conduct in M&A. 
Its involvement in the Guinness/Destillers takeover 1986/87, which turned 
into a scandal as various senior managers of Guinness were arrested for 
improprieties, was a cause for several clients to leave the bank.)
Economic developments  VII (1990–1999) 
Britain entered the 1990s with a curious mixture of prosperity and crisis. Several 
disturbances of markets happened in the early part of the decade (Irak’s invasion 
of Kuwait 1990, the ERM currency crisis, sharp rise in interest rates in 1994 
followed by the crisis for the Mexican peso, and finally the failure of Baring in 
1995). London City had prospered in its off-shore investment business. Financial 
assets had grown dramatically, not least by the new solutions in pension assets. 
Clearing banks continued to dominate most aspects of borrowing and lending 
in the financial sector even if they did not succeed fully in setting up merchant 
banking divisions, and they had to set aside reserves for the risks in loans to 
less developed economies. The number of foreign banks operating in London 
increased during the 1990s reaching 550 by the mid of the decade. London 
City continued to dominate the international cross-border bank loans sector (18 
percent of the market compared to 14 percent for Japan and 8 percent for New 
York). Two major banks collapsed in the 1990s; BCCI was closed down by the 
authorities because of reporting irregularities and internal and external fraud, 
Baring will be discussed below.
An interesting aspect of the development was that the British clearing banks 
exited the merchant banking sector during the 1990s. After trying to establish 
a viable presence in the global market of merchant banking for 10 -20 years 
Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of Scotland 
withdraw partly or entirely. Banks (1999, p 464ff) claims that it was the demands 
by shareholders for a competitive return on investment that forced the decision. 
The Big banks could not justify the high expenses connected with global 
competition in this field. The irregularities discovered in several banks (Baring 
being the most spectacular) brought further demands for better internal control 
systems, which would increase costs still more. Retail banking was simply more 
profitable.
Merchant banks had to realize that aspirations to remain a top-tier global 
actor now required vast financial resources (personal connections could no 
longer compensate), world-wide distribution capability for securities, operating 
platforms, technology and robust control systems. The strategic options were to 
merge with another actor to become part of a financial conglomerate, to narrow 
business to a specialized field, or to be satisfied with being a mid-range actor.
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Baring VII
Baring entered the 1990 with 3 business divisions; Baring Brothers (merchant 
banking/corporate finance), Baring Securities (securities sales and trading), Baring 
Asset Management (investment managing). It now started to expand into new 
areas (like asset swaps, asset repackaging, arbitrage, and derivatives trading) and 
new markets (like Latin America and Far East). Baring Securities, with its earlier 
success in Japanese warrants, began to decline in importance (losses in 1991 
and -92). In 1993 Baring restructured, integrating Baring Brothers and Baring 
Securities into Baring Investment Bank. Heath, the ‘creator’ of Baring Securities, 
left the company. The challenge now was to manage the different cultures within 
the company. In an effort to improve the American presence Baring acquired 
40 percent of the US investment bank Dillon Reed in 1990, which was increased 
to majority ownership in 1997, and finally full ownership. Baring joined with 
Abbey National – a building society that had been converted to bank – to set up 
a joint venture dedicated to derivatives trading. Abbey National brought a good 
credit rating to the venture, which had some success for a while.
Baring’s Singapore office was the place where the notorious irregularities, 
which in the end led to the collapse of the entire bank, emerged. Leeson, who 
had been a trader there since 1992, used the weak control systems to establish 
very large positions in Nikkei index futures and options, Japanese Government 
Bonds futures and options, and Euroyen futures. Leeson’s official job was to 
execute index arbitrage programmes (buying baskets of stocks that comprised 
the index and selling the equivalent index futures. A rather boring job dealing 
with negligible risk if done properly, one might think). The cheating was possible 
since Leeson could cover up trading losses by booking them to an error account 
– a so called 88888 account - that was not monitored by auditors. Leeson thus 
had effective control of back office functions, which was not in accordance with 
accepted practice. It was the Kobe earthquake of January 1995 that exposed 
Leeson. He had bet on the Nikkei remaining calm, but the earthquake caused the 
market to fall and remain volatile for some time. Losses mounted and Leeson 
fled the company. Baring had to call in Bank of England and other regulators 
to consider the consequences of the situation. Other banks negotiated a rescue 
package of 500 million GBP, but when news came that losses would be larger 
than 650 the plan failed. A final take over offer from the Sultan of Brunei also 
fell through. There were too many open-ended contracts to assess the value of 
the company properly. Baring started to unwind its positions and it turned out 
that the loss in the end was 860 million GBP. Now the different parts of Baring 
could be valued and after some turns the ING bank came out as the buyer 
of the whole operation for 1 GBP. The ‘post-mortem’ analysis of Baring was 
highly critical of merchant bank’s control infrastructure, especially the control 
of posted margin calls – in January and February of 1995 Baring had paid 570 
million GBP in margin calls; 25 percent of it one week prior to the collapse. 
ING integrated Baring with its own investment banking business, which was 
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of considerable size. By 1997 ING closed down large portions of its emerging 
markets activities (where Baring had been strong). Although the Baring name 
continued to appear in ING operations Britain’s oldest top-tier merchant bank 
had ceased to exist.
(Hambro, experiencing profitability problems in the early 1990s it called 
in consultants (fellow merchant bank Schroder) to suggest solutions. The 
recommendation was to sell the bank. Although other merchant banks like 
Warburg, Kleinwort Benson, and Morgan Greenfell were sold as whole units 
– with business intact – Hambro was dismantled and sold in pieces (after 158 
years)).
Rotschild was one of the few merchant banks that remained independent 
during the 1990s. Even if business was slow in the beginning Rotschild managed 
to maintain a revenue stream that was mainly fee-driven. By the middle of the 
decade about 20 percent came from privatizations, the bulk (50-70 percent) 
from M&A. The bank joined ABN-Amro in a joint venture (a replica of the very 
successful Smith New Court created after the Big Bang in which Rotschild held 
25 percent, and which was sold to Merrill Lynch in 1995) of new equity issue 
that could benefit form both ABN-Amros distribution capacity and Rotschilds 
origination skills. After the Baring failure the bank reviewed its organization 
and control systems. The bank was restructured on a global basis. The principal 
component was still the family’s Swiss holding company Rotschild Continuation 
Holding. Rotschild had chosen a successful niche strategy (corporate finance).)
Learning from the adventures of a merchant bank (Baring)
Baring negotiated successfully a great many changes of context over an extended 
period. This was no doubt due to the closely knit organization built on personal 
trust, and the small organization. In the end it was not possible to maintain the 
governance of intimacy while expanding globally. Most merchant banks had 
to bail out and seek protection in larger organizations. It should be noted that 
it was European universal banks that emerged as the major purchasers of the 
British merchant banks (UBS, Dresdner, Deutsche, ING). Banks (1999) claim 
that these banks had an understanding of the specific culture of merchant banks 
(personal connections, international deals, thinking in broader and more long 
term categories). These banks were better suited to operate in more regulated 
markets than were the de-regulated banks of London City.
Banks’ (1999, 513ff.) recapitulation points to the fact that the premiere 
merchant banks emerged from a gradual conversion of their mercantile business 
to banking 1800 – 1839. Their roots were mostly in Liverpool, the most 
significant port for export and import. All major houses were managed by a 
small family-based staff, although the addition of external partners or agents in 
important overseas locations became increasingly common (p. 515). The pace in 
commerce increased with steamships, railways, and telegraph. Warehousing (in 
Liverpool and other places) declined in importance as buyer and seller could get 
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in more direct contact . Financing deals with reasonable risk still presupposed a 
good knowledge of the business plus capital and a good reputation. The period 
1875 – 1913 was the pinnacle of British merchant banking under the banner of 
laissez-faire liberalism. A stable political environment, with a growing trade flow 
(not least to-and-fro the colonies), railway investments in many countries, and an 
investing public in Britain, made strategic planning feasible. The core business 
was still acceptances, advances, and loan issues (sovereign as well as railway 
companies). Mergers and amalgamation of a fragmented industry generated 
additional business. Family shareholdings and unlimited liability remained the 
norm. But this made capital variable because deaths or retirement of partners 
required payments of death duties as well as payment of partnership shares, 
which reduced equity.
The war period 1913 – 45 was very disruptive for these banks, which were 
so dependent on international trade. Most merchant banks emerged from this 
period as smaller and more conservative organizations. 
The post-war period started with an inward focus on reconstruction. 
Remaining regulation of most aspects of international business forced merchant 
banks to relate to large industrial clients, nationalizations and privatizations 
provided opportunities to build expertise in corporate finance.
Now London had lost out to New York as the global financial centre. 
The Eurodollar market saved the day for a while, as did the large volume of 
privatization projects, but the de-regulation of London (the Big Bang) put 
merchant banks (and other banks as well) in situations where they faced difficult 
strategic problems; to go for full service investment banking, specialize to 
certain niches, or accept a less prominent profile. In all cases some acquisitions 
were required or new hiring of (teams of) expertise. This increased cost levels 
and made merchant banks more defenceless against variations in profitability. 
One explanation to the conspicuous deficiencies in management and control 
was that banks engaged in activities top management did not fully understand, 
another that acquisitions generated internal differences in culture that could not 
be handled in the rapid pace that was characteristic of the two decades prior to 
the 2008 crisis. As a consequence profits varied widely, which was not liked by 
shareholders, and that made it difficult to meet the capital requirements of a full 
service operation. The obvious thing to do was to merge with a larger, global 
organization and hope for some room of manoeuvring inside it. However the 
fragmentation of cultures, lacking control instruments and the rapid pace instead 
opened up organizations for power games and promotion of clever power 
gamers. The stage was set for the 2008 crisis with many global banks being too 
big to fail. After the effects of the Big Bang had subsided and the action moved 
to New York and its predatory capitalism under the auspices of neoliberalism 
that germinated in Vienna after the First World War.
Concerning Barings we may admire its ability to meet many changes in the 
economic and institutional context with adequate strategic reorientations. Its fall 
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as a consequence of Leeson’s gambling behaviour illustrates how the “scientific” 
basis for the valuation of financial instruments was compromised by individuals 
cheating. He introduced the “operational risk” issue. Trust in gentlemanly 
behaviour in Baring had not yet been compensated by far-reaching internal 
control systems.
The case of baring Bank covers the period of mercantilism as well as that of 
laissez-faire liberalism that dominated the 1800s. It should be noted, and the 
extensive case description aims to describe this, that the strategies of Baring, 
include a great many dealings with an interventionist state, not least in the USA. 
Over the whole period of Baring the Market aspect of “corporatism” got an 
extra emphasis, while the two other aspects remained more in the background. 
The State (and academic economists) developed their skill in economic policy, 
which included participation in rescue efforts as banks ran into trouble. This 
required a forceful central bank that could muster the necessary resources.
Figure 5.
The end of “the golden years” for merchant banking also marked the establishment 
of the State as a prominent actor setting the stage for many a deal (and rescue 
operations). The entry of Community again – now in the form Finance Theory 
for valuation of assets explicitly based on expectations about the future, and the 
curious presumption that individuals will always follow the rues of the game – is 
closely linked to the new political/scientific credo that emerged in Vienna at the 
end of the 19th century, which blossomed into a dominant worldview in parallel 
to the de-regulation of banking.
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6. Neoliberalim started with the Austrian School
6.1. Modernism and crumbling empires
The action when it comes to neoliberalism and neo-classical economics started 
in Vienna, Austria. When Modernism found a new articulation in science, 
technology and industrial enterprising in the world towards the end of the 19th 
century Austria responded somewhat differently from many other major powers. 
While the western powers of France and Great Britain could embrace modernism 
and keep their (overseas) empires, landlocked and agricultural Austria saw real 
estate expansion to the south-east as its solution. Serbia represented only one 
of the nationalist movements that bothered the Emperor of this multi-national 
creation. Newly formed Germany/Prussia, also a strong state, but with more 
elaborated hierarchical/military control, embraced science and technology, but 
also made a plan of expansion. Russia with its vast tsarist empire did not bother 
too much with planning but with honour and with keeping the new socialists at 
bay. The world had prepared for the First World War for some time.
As that War approached Prussia, Austria’s natural ally, did not trust Austria 
with much information after a tsarist spy had been exposed (by Prussia) at the 
military headquarters of Austria. Italy soon dropped out of the entente. So the 
Prussian plan, to strike quickly at Paris and then deal with the tsar, as well as the 
Austrian one; to take on Serbia (note that its soldiers had recent war experience) 
and then caring for its Polish territory, did not go so well together. The failure 
was most devastating for Austria since the empire was dissolved at the end of 
the war, and Austrians had to re-invent their nation. For Russia the Bolsheviks 
took over the on-going revolution, and to manage their new nation they had to 
redesign Marx’s theory, establish the state on the basis of a new economic order 
for agriculture rather than industry and hope for industrial workers to join in as 
they grew in numbers. “Revolution in one nation” (also against Marxist thinking) 
could be managed with strong central coordination from the state. Spreading 
the revolution to other countries was not as easy as the original socialists had 
imagined, but it was the main option as soon as state coordination in the name 
of equality among all citizens had been established. 
The alternative to this coordination through state planning was to let the 
economy and its emerging industries grow through Darwinian competition. 
Factories would pop up and generate lots of jobs and prosperity would come 
even if one could not say where or when. Inefficient ones will be eliminated 
and all will benefit. Market solutions competed with dreams of equality through 
socialism. Ideological struggle was the name of the game.
Modernism carried with it a new focus on science. The controversy as to the 
nature of proper science (was Freud a proper scientist?) as well as the one on how 
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to organize a good society preoccupied intellectuals in cafés, private seminars, 
and universities in Vienna (Janik & Toulmin, 1973). Two philosophers, notable 
from a present-day perspective, were young Viennese at the time of the First 
World War; Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Karl Popper known for his work on the demarcation problem (what is scientific 
and what is not) and his thesis that science progresses by error elimination 
(falsificationism), was a young socialist who saw school friends killed by police in 
violent demonstrations in Vienna, and changed his mind about the proper basis 
for building a good society. He had difficulties in his education but managed to 
take a university degree and landed his first teaching job in New Zealand in 1937, 
where he started to write his book in defence of liberalism (“The Open Society 
and Its Enemies” published in London 1945). This book was a by-product, in 
a sense, of his work on “The poverty of historicism” a critique of the social 
sciences and the impossibility of making scientific predictions to be tested in this 
area. Given that historicism is untenable we should not place our hopes in the 
ability of a central authority to coordinate and plan the development of a good 
society. In gathering material for the book on historicism Popper also assembled 
the philosophical arguments (starting with Plato) for the idea of an elite that 
could plan for us from a centre of power. The ideas of those philosophers 
formed the structure of Popper’s “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. There 
simply is no basis for believing in central planning! From New Zealand Popper 
was recruited to London School of Economics.
Ludwig von Wittgenstein grew up in the most prominent family in Vienna. 
His grandfather was an authoritarian that refused to let his son Karl (Ludwig’s 
father) study engineering (not suitable for a person in his position). Karl rebelled, 
went to the USA and worked in menial jobs, and was later reconciled with his 
father and allowed to study. Karl became a leading industrialist through “industrial 
rationalization” and the leading art benefactor in town. His attitude toward his 
children was authoritarian, however, and Ludwig was taught at home until the age 
of 14. When he entered the technical school in Linz he got in contact with Hertz 
Principles of Mechanics. He showed an early talent for constructing things. Leaving 
school for university studies Wittgenstein had hopes to learn from Boltzmann, 
but was frustrated by Boltzmann’s suicide in 1906. Incidently, Wittgenstein 
experienced suicides by three of his brothers, two of them while in opposition 
to their father, and one facing capture at the Italian front during the war. Family 
catastrophes added to the controversies in the academic world. When Wittgenstein 
finally published “Tractatus,” after having failed to persuade several publishers of 
its merits, it was a determined effort to reconcile the language problems between 
ethical and scientific discourse in Vienna circles. Janik & Toulmin (1973) argue that 
Tractatus is an exercise in ethics and draw our attention to the last part, which was 
intended to be the climax of that book, but was looked upon as an insignificant 
addendum by contemporaries like Bertrand Russell and E.G. Moore. Wittgenstein 
was also, in time, recruited to England – Cambridge.
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6.2. The context in which the Austrian school developed
Already before the war Austrian intellectuals had been pushed into action by 
the obvious lack of tenability of the Austrian-Hungarian imperial life style. 
The “Vienna Circle”, a gathering of scientists, philosophers, humanists, artists 
and journalists (Janik & Toulmin, 1973), found reason to question most of the 
fundamental principles of social life and articulate new world views. Economists 
debated the foundations of the market economy in opposition to the failed state 
coordination of people’s life. Kaiser Franz Joseph had ruled according to the 
principles of “Ruhe und Ordnung.” He came to power in 1848 (note the Paris 
commune) at a very young age amidst the revolutionary movement, and allowed 
no change. A railroad system could not be built because it might promote 
revolution. To his death the royal palace was lit by kerosene lamps (electricity 
unreliable?). The military had to be controlled and was allocated its (meagre) 
resources, not to become too powerful, by royal decision (“Hausmacht”). 
Austrian administration had degenerated into formalism that was only a façade 
(Franz Joseph also did build a number of impressive buildings with impressive 
facades in Vienna) to cover up chaos and contradiction. Vienna, was known as 
the City of Dreams, and for its Strauss waltzes, chique cafes, and pastry. You 
could sit all day with a cup of coffee and read newspapers from all over the 
world – and discuss matters. Vienna was a very bourgeois town in a crumbling 
multinational empire. To escape dark thoughts about revolutionary developments 
the bourgeoisie attended to the upkeep of appearances. 
“Sprachkritik” and a dream of unified science
Intellectuals found it necessary to get rid of a language use that tended to obscure 
realities and prevent a more realistic building of a good society. One line of 
reasoning in this “Sprachkritik” before the war had landed in the conclusion that 
“the meaning of life” is not a matter of rational argument, it cannot be given any 
“intellectual foundation” (as argued by such giants as Schopenhauer, Kirkegaard 
and Tolstoy). It is mystical in a sense and can only be shown as Leo Tolstoy did 
in his stories (“Twenty-three Tales”). 
The alternative line of reasoning was that of Mach, further developed by 
Hertz and Boltzmann, where you base the analysis in general principles external 
to the subject at hand, i.e., keep the rigorous language of a particular science and 
depict a phenomenon in mathematical models (instead of metaphors), which, 
applied in the proper way, can yield true knowledge by analysis – this could be 
extended to all sciences. 
The problem that remained, given these two positions, was “Is there any 
method of doing for language-in-general what Hertz and Boltzmann have 
already done for the language of theoretical physics?” (Janik & Toulmin, 1973, 
p. 166). This is where Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (1921) 
comes in. It uses a language of logical propositions (or rather aphorisms) to 
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argue that ethics cannot be dealt with in the same way as the sciences. There is 
no “rational” basis for ethical statements. They can only “show” their meaning. 
By separating reason from phantasy - the mathematical representations of the 
physicist from the metaphors of the poet, descriptive language from “indirect 
communication” -  Wittgenstein thought that he had solved the problem of 
philosophy (Janik & Toulmin, 1973, p 198). He was recognized as a genius by 
Moore (Wittgenstein became the successor of Moore as professor at Cambridge) 
and Russell of Cambridge. They were on the same kind of crusade against the 
abuse of language of the Victorian age in Britain, using “analytical philosophy” 
(propositional logic) as their weapon. 
Wittgenstein felt misunderstood by Russell but failed to articulate how and 
in what sense Russell had misunderstood. He also failed to participate in a 
discussion with the Vienna circle representatives on propositional philosophy 
(that they hoped would support their work on a “unified science”) – he actually 
insisted on reading poetry to them. It seems like he could not articulate the 
meaning of ethics “showing” itself via indirect communication, which the last 
aphorism of the Tractatus (6.54) seems to encapsulate:
“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throw away the ladder after he has climbed it.) He must transcend these 
propositions and then he will see the world aright.”
Again, the ethical statements (goals and values) must “show” their meaning. They 
cannot be understood by deductive reasoning. (They cannot be “calculated” 
into utility measures a la Bentham, which already Moore and Russell had found 
inadequate and vulgar). But, Wittgenstein changed his mind, albeit late, and 
under persuasion from the Italian economist Sraffa (Andersson, 2012) and wrote 
“Philosophical Investigations” published after his death (Wittgenatein, 1953). 
Sraffa argued, obviously with some success, that different people view things 
differently (different ontologies?), so there can be no universal language to judge 
the truth of propositions. Instead Wittgenstein kept the notion of language 
making it possible to “show” things to those engaged in the same “forms of 
life” using “language games” and always applying some rule. This aspect of his 
philosophy - behaviour and communication as rule-following - is an interesting 
one and part of the “linguistic turn” in social sciences. Wittgenstein, influential 
but difficult to understand as he was, should perhaps be seen as a drop-out from 
the melting-pot of neoliberalism in the Vienna circles.
Karl Popper chose a different approach. He started out discussing the 
“demarcation problem”, the difference between scientific and non-scientific 
arguments, and produced his critique of authoritarian philosophers, which will 
be dealt with below, as a side product. His great influence on social sciences 
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has to do with his development of falsificationism, which states that science 
progresses by conjectures and refutations. Hypotheses can be generated how-
ever the scientist wants (conjectures) so long as they are rigorously tested. In this 
way the elimination of error is the key to scientific progress. 
Milton Friedman (1953/1970) took this argument one step further in “Positive 
Economics” arguing that the criterion of good science is accurate prediction. He 
claimed that you can use what-ever assumptions/hypotheses you want as long 
as they generate correct predictions. The quality of the scientific approach to 
economics (and thereby to economic policy) lies in the accuracy of the predictions 
(not in the “realism” of its assumptions). This legitimizes, to take an example, the 
assumption that the price of a financial asset varies according to “random walk”, 
that is completely randomly (as physicists did about the movement of molecules 
in a gas). Then we can use statistical methods to calculate the “market price” 
of options even when there is no market! Arguably this is part of the causes of 
the financial crisis that caused the fall of so many banks. There are, thus, good 
reasons to have a closer look on the roots and development of neoliberal ideas 
about the economy.
6.3. The Vienna circle as the birthplace of neoliberalism
It was a tradition in Vienna to set up “private” seminars, out of some of those 
arose two groupings of significance for the development of a social science 
theory; the Vienna circle and the Austrian school in economics.
The ‘Vienna circle’ (Der Wiener Kreis) went public with a manifesto in 1929 
where a group of academics with scientists Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and 
Hans Hahn as the leading names. The scientific worldview promoted in the 
manifesto is mostly known as “Logical empiricism” (or positivism), and is the 
dominating view in social sciences (incl. Finance theory) today. Its name describes 
its main tenets; there is a world separate from us that we can obtain sense data 
from (by observation or experiment). Only propositions that can be analysed 
by the tools of logic into elementary propositions that are either tautological 
or are empirically verifiable can be said to be meaningful. Logical empiricism 
therefore rejects metaphysics, theology, and sometimes ethics, as meaningless. 
The boundary between scientific and non-scientific approaches was an area of 
contention also between members of the Vienna circle. It should be noted that a 
“left wing” in the Vienna circle, lead by Neurath, argued that society itself could 
also be improved by applying scientific methods to its problems. This, obviously, 
applies particularly to the social sciences, where Wittgenstein and Popper have 
made important imprints. Both of these philosophers had traumatic experiences 
in the turbulent times after the First World War. State (imperial) or Market as the 
principles of coordination of social and economic life was on the agenda already 
before the war. 
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As for the economists who came into contact with the Vienna circle the 
following ones are most notable:
Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973)
Mises was born in the city of Lemberg (now Lviv) in current Ukraine. Entering 
the University of Vienna at the turn of the century as a leftist interventionist 
Mises was converted to the Austrian school as he discovered ”Principles of 
Economics” by Carl Menger. Menger emphasised individual action rather than 
unrealistic mechanistic equations as the unit of economics analysis, and the 
importance of a free-market economy. As post-doc at the university of Vienna 
Mises was also inspired by von Böhm-Bawerk who had disproven Marxian labour 
theory of value. During this period Mises was recognized for ”The Theory of 
Money and Credit” (1912) where he integrated the theory of money into the 
general theory of marginal utility and price, i.e., micro and macro economics. 
This was not accepted in the Austrian school, so he chose to go “in opposition” 
arguing for a neo-Austrian approach. His theory claimed that an increase in 
money supply was not beneficial for society since that increase would generate 
bank credit expansion and therefore inflation and business cycles in the form 
of overinvestment in “higher-order capital goods” rather than consumer goods. 
The credit based, inflationary boom will require a painful recession while the 
market liquidates unsound investments to re-establish a connection with “real” 
consumer demands. (Would Keynes have anything to add here?)
Mises, and his follower Hayek, developed this cycle theory during the 1920s, 
on the basis of which Mises was able to warn an unheeding world that the widely 
trumpeted “New Era” of permanent prosperity of the 1920s was a sham, and 
that its inevitable result would be bank panic and depression. When Hayek was 
invited to teach at the London School of Economics in 1931 by an influential 
former student at Mises’s private seminar, Lionel Robbins, Hayek was able 
to convert most of the younger English economists to this perspective. On a 
collision course with John Maynard Keynes and his disciples at Cambridge, Hayek 
demolished Keynes’s ”Treatise on Money”, but lost the battle and most of his 
followers to the tidal wave of the Keynesian Revolution that swept the economic 
world after the publication of Keynes’s ”General Theory” in 1936. From now 
on Mises was strictly in opposition to the new global fashion in macroeconomic 
policy. Already in 1920 Mises had published an article “Economic Calculation 
in the Socialist Commonwealth”, (1920) in which he demonstrated that it would 
be impossible for a socialist planning board to plan a modern economic system; 
furthermore, no attempt at artificial “markets” would work, since a genuine 
pricing and costing systems require an exchange of property titles, and therefore 
private property, in the means of production.
Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992)
Friedrich Hayek received doctorates in law and political science in the early 
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1920s from the University of Vienna. He soon became a protégé of Ludwig 
von Mises and was hired by him to work as a specialist on legal details of the 
Treaty of Saint-Germain (containing the Covenants of the League of Nations). 
Again with encouragement from von Mises, Hayek founded and directed the 
Austrian Institute of Business Cycle Research from the late 1920s before he 
was recruited to the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1931. At LSE he 
was recognized as a leading scholar in the development of micro economics. 
Notable is his debate with Keynes on the benefits of private investment in the 
public markets as a better policy than Keynes’ public sector deficit spending 
to improve employment. (On other matters they were in agreement). While in 
LSE he taught many economists that later reached influential status (like Coase, 
Gailbraith, Kaldor, Lange and many others). In 1950 he moved to the University 
of Chicago where he stayed until 1962, when he returned to Germany (University 
of Freiburg). He had a profound influence on Milton Friedman while in Chicago 
not least via the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) (named after the place of first 
meeting in Switzerland) initiated in 1947 at the invitation of Hayek and still 
active today as a liberal defender against the arbitrary application of power to 
impose collectivist solutions to social problems. It could be noted that at the 
first meeting of this society Ludwig von Mises was present but he left early 
angered by the conservatism of the participants, slamming the door.
As mentioned, Hayek left LSE in 1950 for the University of Chicago. However, 
he was not employed by the Economics department but at the Committee on 
Social Thought and worked on political theory, not economics. He was critical 
to the positivist approach of the Economics department.  Ideologically, however 
most of the economics faculty was in agreement with Hayek. Milton Friedman, 
a friend of Hayek’s and co-founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, was often quite 
critical of Hayek’s economics writings. Hayek focused on the constitution of 
liberal society and wrote the “Constitution of Liberty”, which was published in 
1960, but was disappointed that it did not receive the same attention as “Road to 
Serfdom” (1944). Milton Friedman had taken over as the most visible promoter 
of neoliberal economics.
Milton Friedman (1912-2006)
Milton Friedman is without doubt the most significant representative of activist, 
neoliberal design-oriented economics. From the early 1970s he was the driving 
force behind the advance of the Chicago school and its influence on policy and 
politics. Two aspects of his activities stick out; his relentless efforts to debunk 
Keynes, and his firebrand teaching of the blessings of freedom and individualism. 
He was a founding member of the MPS-movement (initiated by Hayek).
Friedman’s parents emigrated from the Hungarian part of the Austrian empire 
in the 1890s. They met in New York and settled in Rahway, New Jersey, where 
Friedman grew up. An excellent student he intended to major in mathematics, 
but was persuaded to switch to economics by no other than Arthur Burns (who 
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later served as chairman of Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers), whom 
Friedman helped by reviewing the manuscript for his PhD thesis. Friedman 
was charmed by the elegance of Marshallian economics and the analysis of 
partial equilibria. He received his PhD at Columbia in 1945 on a thesis written 
with Simon Kuznets on professional practice and the negative effects of state 
limitations of the number of entrants to professions. He had then worked for 
the government during the early years of the Second World War. His first job as 
a PhD Friedman got at the University of Minnesota where he joined Stigler in 
writing an angry attack on rent control that was published by the Foundation for 
Economic Education, a lobby organization for “free enterprise”. When Stigler 
got a job offer from the University of Chicago in 1947, and turned it down, the 
offer went to Friedman who accepted. His brother-in-law Aaron Director, had 
returned to the same university in 1946. He had studied in London and got to 
know Friedrich Hayek (at LSE), whose book, “Road to Serfdom”, the British 
best seller, he persuaded Chicago University Press to publish. He was oriented 
toward Law and Economics and taught antitrust law. 
The Volker Fund, having noticed the success of “Road to Serfdom”, wanted 
to persuade Hayek to come to the USA. Hayek, in turn, persuaded the Volker 
Fund to support a new study program called Free Market Study lead by Director 
(who was at the Law department). When Hayek finally was offered a position at 
the university it was on the university’s Committee for Social Thought (not the 
economics department). Madrick (2011, p. 36) thinks it was because of the fear 
his radicalism would be too influential.
As mentioned Friedman directed his energies in research towards showing that 
Keynes was wrong in recommending deficit spending by the state in recession 
times. His line of attack was to update a theory on the effect of the money supply 
that had been refined by Irving Fisher. The theory held that the amount of goods 
and services produced was dependent upon the size of the money supply and the 
velocity (rate of turnover) of money. Keynes was wrong because if government 
were to finance its increased spending by borrowing it would “crowd out” valuable 
private borrowing and growth would stay the same (or be reduced). To prove his 
point he embarked on a very large project, with Anna Schwartz, to reconstruct the 
money supply data since the Civil War and relate them to the ups and downs of 
the GDP. In 1963 the results were published in ”A Monetary History of United 
States 1867 – 1960”. There was a relation between money supply and GDP 
changes, but the relation was too broad based to justify any policy conclusions 
(critiques thought), for instance, one could not be sure about the direction of the 
relation between money supply and GDP growth. The concept “endogeneity of 
money” refers to the assumption that the quantity of money is a creation of the 
strength of the economy. Tobin, for one, also pointed out that it is suspicious 
to rely on data from the 1930s and 1940s as “normal” and the 1920s and the 
1950s as “abnormal” as regards money velocity. The key factor in Keynes theory 
was the multiplier effect (that government spending, in turn, will generate more 
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spending by its recipients, etc.). Friedman also gathered data to show that people 
do not spend as much as Keynes assumed. They decide on the basis of expected 
future income rather than on the basis of the one-off effect of current government 
spending. He managed to show that the multiplier effect was smaller than Keynes 
assumed (but it was still there), but he also exaggerated the ability of people to 
foresee their future income. The project established a new interest in monetary 
policies, which became the main tool for combatting inflation. The instability of 
money velocity undid monetarism in the 1980s.
Arguably, Friedman’s most important theoretical contribution was his claim 
that there is a normal (later called “natural”) rate of unemployment, below which 
inflation will be stimulated. The argument is that as unemployment goes below 
the natural level wages will go up and firms will have to compensate by raising 
prices. As government will try to stimulate the economy (Keynesianism) to push 
the unemployment level down again prices will increase again eliminating the 
purchasing power of the wage increases and reducing unemployment again (to 
the natural level). Nowadays economists argue that the “natural” level shifts 
from time to time (one might wonder in what sense it is “normal” then).
Friedman was an activist and a gifted speaker and a clear writer. In 1962 he 
published ”Capitalism and Freedom” without gaining much attention. In 1964 
he joined Barry Goldwater’s campaign for the presidency as economic advisor. 
In 1966 Newsweek offered him to write a column. He also made many TV 
appearances. He was successful in the sense that almost all his proposals in 
“Capitalism and Freedom” were taken up in policy debates by his political friends. 
The Fed adopted his monetary policy in 1979 but abandoned it a few years later 
(due to the volatility mentioned above). His 1980 book with Rose Friedman (his 
libertarian wife) will be briefly reviewed together with other activist texts below:
6.4. A brief review of some neoliberal activist texts
The success of the neoliberal doctrine does not only rest on academic research, 
but is, maybe primarily, due to successful socio-political propaganda – the kind 
of texts that the Vienna circle dismissed as meaningless. I will present the content 
of some of these pamphlets in remembrance of the time when economic policies 
were recommended by “government consultants” (Schumpeter’s words) during 
the period called “mercantilism”.
The three books chosen are Hayek (1944), Popper (1945) and Friedman & 
Friedman (1980).  They are presented in the order of publication, but could be 
seen as a summary of the neoliberal agenda as far as it social values go.
Friedrich Hayek (1944), ”The Road to Serfdom” 
This book is written as an argument for a better post war social order. It is inspired 
by the Austrian school of economics and chiefly argues against centralized 
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planning rather than for market solutions. The problem that comes back again 
and again is that a powerful state organization can be an effective instrument for 
inflicting damage on friends and foes alike since the myth of coordination for 
the common good is, precisely, a myth. There simply is no way to consider all 
the different goals and desires of individuals at the same time. The cognitive/
computational task is too large even if one were to have updated information on 
the wishes of all people (Hayek did not foresee computers). Since there will have 
to be prioritization between values and goals on an arbitrary basis the planning 
ideology will always have devastating moral effects (unless planning is done on 
the local level and among groups who are in agreement on desired outcomes).
Hayek wrote this text during the war as part of the debate on the post war 
organization of society. At that time admiration for the resilience of the Soviet 
Union was helpful in the promotion of a socialist alternative. Hayek provides an 
analysis of various aspects of the planning option in 16 relatively short chapters. 
One should remember that Hayek had a much-publicized debate with Keynes on 
the role of the state in promoting “full employment” in the 1930s where Hayek 
questioned the idea of the state using deficit spending to promote growth. This 
(business cycle) was Hayek’s area of research during his time in Vienna.
Hayek starts out by claiming that step-by-step we have allowed the ghost 
of totalitarianism to spread across Europe. Collectivism, the opposite of the 
individualism that is the hallmark of the liberty that bloomed with growth in the 
19th century, is gaining ground. “Organization” and “planning” have replaced 
the ideas of making use of the spontaneous forces of solidarity in a free society. 
German intellectuals like Hegel, Marx, Schmoller, Sombart and Mannheim laid 
the foundation for this.
This great utopia is a “new freedom” that promises to rectify the inequalities 
and injustices that uncontrolled capitalism has generated. The progressive forces 
of society will create a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. Gaining political 
power is the first step since the tool for this “new freedom” is coordination from 
the centre and planning. Nazis and communists are varieties on the same root 
- collectivism - and they confronted each other in Italy and Germany already in 
the 1920s and 1930s.
Hayek points out that it was the old socialists, oriented by class analysis and 
based in trade unions – workers against capitalists – that set the game up by 
finding it relatively easy to reach agreement with employers on conditions for 
organized trained workers. This left the untrained out and that was the ground 
for Nazism and Italian fascism. One should remember that it was the socialists 
that were the main enemy for these new socialist movements (facists and Nazis) 
that took over the power to re-distribute privileges and wealth as a small elite 
saw fit. A return, after the Second World War to a democratic socialism built on 
planning is not possible, according to Hayek, because central planning can never 
accommodate all the various values and wishes of individuals. The number 
of factory workers – the representative citizen in a collectivist worldview – 
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has decreased drastically since the War and the number of self-employed, 
professionals, service workers has increased (my comment). The world has 
changed and planning is, if anything, less useful than before.
Hayek is quite ideological throughout the book, but also refers to the current 
debate and published facts now and then. He seeks trustworthiness in his early 
claim that he has seen the same tendencies develop twice, in his two lives, in 
Austria and in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Collectivist solutions cannot work 
because of the calculative problem and because the impossibility to set goals. 
The solution is freedom and free competition. For those that are unlucky 
there should, however, be a social insurance to ensure a minimum standard. 
The problem is how to deal with the variations of the business cycle – some 
economist believe that it could be managed by monetary measures, others that 
deficit spending in public works with the right timing will work. Hayek evokes 
the image that all interference with the market system, even if the purpose is to 
stabilize, will generate insecurity.
Three arguments are presented why collectivist societies tend to promote 
their worst members into leading positions: 
• People with higher education and intelligence tend to have more 
differentiated opinions. Mobilization of political power has to turn to the 
“lower” sections of society. This majority also has lower moral scruples. 
A “strong” man with a simple recipe will promise to improve things. 
The totalitarian leader talks to them and converts non-believers to these 
simpler views.
• The dictator can appeal to people with vague and unfinished ideas.
• People find it easier to gather around negative slogans (Against capitalism, 
injustices, competitors). Division into “them” and “us” binds “us” together. 
Once in control the central planners will kill the truth in the sense that 
any expression of doubt or hesitation in executing plans may jeopardize the 
improvement projects, and hence must be looked upon as treason. In time 
people adapt and avoid “sticking out”. 
In some of the final chapters Hayek compares socialist and nationalist 
collectivists and traces the roots back to the same kind of reasoning, against 
liberalism, in both camps. Both camps also have the same attitude toward 
science claiming that their central planning approach is justified in the name of 
science. After all, this was a time of increasing respect for scientists and a time 
when scientists, not least in Germany, claimed to have knowledge that could be 
applied in the design of the good society. Hayek points to the roots of Nazism 
in socialism and to totalitarian streaks also in the British debate on society and 
how these tended to eliminate the difference between “society” and “state”. He 
also engages in the current debate with references to the debate of the day. In the 
final chapters it becomes clear that the fundamental problem Hayek is discussing 
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is how to cope with the problem of prioritising the multitude of desires, values 
and goals that people hold. His solution is the market, which will sort all this 
information out and arrive at solutions. It is not the means as much as the ends, 
that markets can coordinate. Freedom is the freedom for everyone to pursue 
happiness in ones own way. We do not know how a market works – it is his 
main point that planners and the state could never simulate it – but we should 
submit to its magic and accept our ignorance about it. Only late in the book does 
the concept of organization appear. Hayek claims that part of the dealing with 
a multitude of values and goals is to organize at the right level – the principle of 
subsidiarity applied by the European Union (my comment). Monopolies appear 
in his world of companies but not large multinational ones. A single goal for all 
in the form of “share holder value” is not present at all, even if he points to the 
capacity of money to translate between the different ends people might strive 
for.
Karl Popper (1945), ”The Open Society and Its Enemies” – vol 1 & 2
Popper is most known to social science doctoral students for his theory of science 
doctrine called “falsificationism”, which states that a proposal is scientific if and 
only if it can be falsified. Science progresses via conjectures and refutations, i.e., 
by elimination of error. If claims are not falsifiable they are not within the lines 
of demarcation that separate scientific claims from beliefs, religion, and other 
superstitions.
Popper’s ideological work, written after he escaped from Austria in the late 
1930s, first in New Zealand for a short period, and then at London School of 
Economics, was published at the end of the Second World War in London. 
He finds the enemies of the open society in some of our most prominent 
philosophers (Plato, Marx and Hegel) and shows how they went wrong. This 
is why the text could be classified as ideological. There were critics, of course. 
This is not intended to defend or accuse, just bring out a few arguments that 
Popper uses. Plato first. Popper points out that Plato reasons backwards from 
the current situation to earlier times to find his Utopia (the Golden Age); a 
society consisting of guardians (philosopher kings), armed auxiliaries, and the 
working class. The guardians, it should be noted, are communists. They are not 
driven by economic gain, but share all (including women and children), and are 
satisfied by enough wealth. They are also the prototype of latter days’ Principal 
(my comment). This class cannot be infiltrated by lower classes and is kept clean 
by breeding and education. The auxiliaries may keep arms, and the workers work. 
In a later chapter Plato defines justice as fulfilling one’s function in society and 
happiness follows from this functional view. Stabilizing society is the goal since 
change is decay. Popper points out, in several passages, that Plato wrote these 
texts as an ardent opponent to democratic Athens, and in defence of a return to 
(benevolent) tyranny.
An important prerequisite for Plato’s design of the good society is that 
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we distinguish between laws of nature and normative laws (a distinction not 
upheld by latter days’ neoliberals – my comment). Natural laws describe a strict, 
unvarying regularity that holds in nature (when it is true) or not (in which case it 
is false). If we do not know which is the case the statement is a hypothesis about 
nature, which can be tested.
Normative laws are different. They can be enforced by men and are alterable. 
They can be described as good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or not, but they 
cannot be said to be true or false, since they do not describe facts, but lay down 
directions for our behaviour. Popper argues that this distinction is necessary for 
understanding Plato’s sociology (design of the good society). Popper’s critique 
of Plato’s theory will take him from “naïve monism” (a characteristic of the 
closed society) to the “critical dualism” of the open society.
In naïve monism the distinction between natural and normative law has not 
yet been made. Unpleasant experiences are means by which man learns to adjust 
to his environment, whether sanctions are imposed by other men or suffered in 
the natural environment.
In critical dualism we uphold the distinction between facts and decisions. But 
- one might claim - a decision is a fact, once it is taken. Here one must distinguish 
between the description made by the decision and the fact that the decision has 
been made. Popper illustrates by referring to the statement “Napoleon died in 
St Helena” as compared to “Mr A stated that Napoleon died in St Helena”. We 
cannot deduce that Napoleon died in St Helena from the fact that Mr A said 
so. In sum, we cannot derive a norm, or a decision, or a policy proposal from 
a sentence stating a fact. As mentioned, the distinction between laws of nature 
and normative laws is crucial. An important point is that normative laws cannot 
be deduced from facts, they have to do with values and persuasion (rhetoric).
A critical moment in Popper’s attack on Plato is his critique of Plato mixing 
up the meanings of individualism, which are two according to the Oxford 
Dictionary:
• Individualism as opposed to collectivism
• Egoism as opposed to altruism
There is no contradiction in an individualist being altruistic. But Plato uses 
the rhetorical trick of confusing individualism with egoism in support of his 
collectivist solution for the Good Society. This confusing allows him to use 
proverbs like “friends have in common all things they possess” to arrive at 
collectivist conclusions. It also allows him to define justice from the criterion of 
the interest of the state. That which serves the interest of the collective is just. 
Those with another opinion should be banished.
In a concluding discussion Popper makes an effort to understand Plato by 
pointing to the current debate at the time of Plato, which focused on the question 
“who should rule?”. The obvious answer is “the best” or “the wisest”, or “the 
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masters of the art of ruling”, “the general will”. But even the most powerful 
tyrant, once elected, will realize that there are other political forces. The ruler 
is dependent upon his secret police. We therefore cannot allow unchecked 
sovereignty. The ‘paradox of freedom’ was first used by Plato (What if the 
democratic majority wants to be ruled by a tyrant?); that we have to give up some 
of our freedom to be really free, is taken up by Popper to discuss institutions 
that may protect us against the mistakes of a bad or incompetent tyrant. To 
understand how Plato came down on the side of a “tyranny of the wise” Popper 
reminds us of that Plato is working backwards towards some original (utopian) 
stage of society – a tribal situation with organic order, intimacy, authority. The 
initiation of decay of the City State of Athens came from its opening up to trade, 
and its expansion across the seas. This brought new forces of change and thus 
decay, since it stimulated the democratic movement.
Popper argues that Plato, who hated the decadent democracy of Athens, 
wanted to design the good society by seeking origins and take inspiration from 
there. He ended up with collectivism and justified this stabilised society by using 
rhetorical tricks (like, confusing the meaning of individualism) to define virtues 
like justice in terms of what is good for the state. Popper’s account for Plato’s 
organizational ideas should be remembered when we look at the fate of RBS 
(Royal Bank of Scotland) ahead.
Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), ”Free to choose – A Personal Statement”
The book is based on ”Capitalism and Freedom” (1962) and a TV series and is 
decidedly “popular” in its presentation of arguments against an interventionist 
state and for increased freedom of choice for individuals as the solution to most 
social and economic problems. Having been alerted to Plato’s rhetorical methods 
by Popper we can see similar patterns in the Friedman approach. 
There is frequent reference to “origins”, i.e., going back to old historical 
sources to “prove” a point about current problems. Adam Smith is used very 
often as an authority on free trade and competition, as well as “founding 
fathers” formulations. Nothing wrong with that, except that those authorities 
were dealing with current problems more than 200 years ago. The “facts” were 
different at that time even if their phrases were convincing (my comment). 
Further, the Friedmans often label things normal or “natural” when it is more like 
assumptions, on their side, that are required for their arguments to hold. This is a 
technique that is pre-modern in that social philosophers and scientists in that era 
usually referred to introspection as a source of knowledge in their reasoning (like 
Adam Smith did – even if he recommended the impartial spectator procedure 
in moral reasoning).7 
They also refer to “movements” among the people to dismantle crippling 
7 The impartial spectator procedure was discussed in Smith (1759) and tells the decision maker 
to consider how an impartial spectator would judge the contemplated act before acting.
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state bureaucracy. The ascent of Margaret Thatcher is promising and the Swedish 
welfare state is doomed now (book published in 1980) that the social democrats 
have been defeated in the election. Single cases are typically used to “show” the 
meaning of more general statements – carefully selected cases – no doubt for 
pedagogical reasons.
The book starts out in praising the strength of the market where cooperation 
through voluntary exchange makes everybody better off, and how the price 
mechanism transfers information about the value of things to people who need 
it, i.e., to the insiders. This happens because those with the information have an 
interest to transfer the information to those who have use for it, and those who 
have use for the information want to gather that information. The information 
is useful because people have an incentive to act on it. Action, i.e., voluntary 
exchange, will have an effect on the income distribution, since both parties to 
an exchange consider themselves better off after the exchange since their sales 
income is greater than the production cost of the exchange object and vice versa. 
Since both will be better off, there will be economic growth. The “invisible hand” 
metaphor is also widened to other areas of life where sophisticated structures 
emerge as unintended consequences of a large number of people cooperating 
while seeking their own benefit. 
Take language for example, or science, where spontaneous interaction leads 
to progress! Then “the state” is brought in. Adam Smith has defined the duties 
of the state (protect citizens, careful justice, promote voluntary exchange by 
introducing generally applicable rules). The third duty mentioned is the difficult 
one since there must be limits to the expansion of state intervention. The 
Friedmans present examples of such limitations in practice. Next a chapter deals 
with the tyranny of regulation and planning with arguments for free trade and 
private property rights. 
A third chapter describes the emergence of the Federal reserve system, the 
crisis of 1929 and the failure of the Fed to combat the crisis by increasing the 
volume of money in the economy, and, finally (December 1930) the closure of 
Bank of United States (its name was thought to constitute unfair competition 
for immigrant deposits) as the plan to save it by setting up a guarantee fund 
failed because New York Clearing House backed out in the last moment. The 
consequences were dire. In the same month 352 banks went bankrupt. As other 
banks called repayment of loans the economy stalled and the depression was a 
fact. That crisis generated space for a discourse on safety and welfare; the “New 
Deal” was established. 
The idea of the welfare state with extensive obligations for the state gained 
adherents, but the results are frightening. In Britain unemployment grew and 
Margaret Thatcher came in as a saviour, Sweden has fared better than Britain 
but the people were fed up and replaced the social democratic government in 
1976 (still we have not seen any real change of direction, though, the Friedmans 
claim). The most dramatic example in the USA is the failure of New York City. 
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Federal money saved the city that had invested unwisely in a large hospital, a 
university, and tuition free education. The welfare state does not work because 
it transfers money to the middle class (notably the bureaucrats), at the expense 
of the rich and the poor (Director’s Law – Director, as we have noted above, 
was Milton’s brother-in-law). The chapter concludes with recipes as to what to 
do to put a stop to the waste. A final chapter on equality argues that by putting 
emphasis on freedom we will achieve greater equality as a welcome by-product. 
We are now ready to discuss more in detail the reform requirements in different 
sectors of society. First schools; the problem with their poor performance is that 
public schools have been bureaucratized, and the solution is free choice based 
on a voucher system. Same with higher education! Consumer protection should 
be achieved by information rather than regulation (Prohibition did not stop the 
consumption of alcohol, did it!). If the government has information about the 
benefits of using safety belts or avoiding cyclamates or DDT it should let us 
know. But we should decide for ourselves what risks we are willing to take with 
our own lives. 
Who protects labour? Labour unions, one would assume. The Friedmans claim 
that unions, which do not have that many members anyway, only redistribute 
resources to those who have jobs from those who have not. The power of 
unions comes, not so much from threats to damage the employers’ equipment 
as from their ability to elicit help from the state, for instance minimum wages, or 
limit the number of workers who are allowed in a profession, like in the medical 
profession where authorities set the criteria for legitimation to practice medicine. 
Look, say the Friedmans, the headquarters of the unions are gathered around 
Capitol Hill in Washington. Undue influence peddling is going on!
All these state interventions lead to waste, which contributes to inflation, the 
process whereby people are robbed of the purchasing power of their savings. 
Of course they like the value increase of their houses and the lower value of 
the debt they have to repay, but soon the bank will compensate by increasing 
the interest rate and inflation will accelerate and spread. The cure for inflation 
is management of the volume of money in the economy. The consequences 
will be painful for a while, but the diagrams show that inflation moves in step 
with the volume of money. The consequences in terms of higher unemployment 
and slower growth are not the cure, they are the unfortunate side effects of 
the cure. The argument in this final descriptive chapter is full of illustrative 
anecdotes from many countries. The important conclusion is that inflation is 
a monetary problem. It is the government/state that decides about the money 
supply nowadays.
The final chapter indicates that the tide is turning. Change is imminent. 
The collectivist solutions are giving way to individualism and freedom of 
choice. Margret Thatcher is one sign, Proposition 13 in California another. 
The intellectuals are the Friedmans’ main target. When the opinion has started 
to change and reaches the general public there will be a quiet revolution. The 
Sten Jönsson
Banks and their world view contexts
75
Friedmans cite an article in Wall Street Journal about “the Swedish tax revolt” in 
showing how far we have come. The tide is turning, but special interest groups 
still sway power in Washington by using lobby to influence the bureaucrats of all 
these program specific agencies. The smaller the state apparatus the more limited 
the opportunities for special interests to assert their power against the general 
public interest. The book ends with suggested changes of the constitution, which 
by the way, can be integrated into one package law stating the right of the people 
to buy and sell legal goods and services at mutually satisfactory terms must not 
be infringed upon by Congress or any of the states. The free market will solve 
all and any problem. 
Three ideological/neoliberal books: The Friedman book is openly political as 
indicated by the subtitle “A Personal Statement”. So are Popper and Hayek. The 
rhetorical principles are the same as those pointed out as used by Plato in his 
frustration over the decay of Athens into a mire of democratic irresponsibility. 
Back to the origins and toward what is natural are the design principles the 
Friedmans apply. Lots of carefully chosen tales from the current debate as well as 
far away countries, like the Meiji restoration in Japan in the 1860s, give meaning 
to the arguments. All kinds of human activity can be reduced to economics, we 
all strive towards utility, which in essence equals the pursuit of happiness-clause 
of the Constitution because it is up to everybody to define what happiness is. 
Plato, who defined happiness as stemming from functional contribution to the 
state, was wrong. Hayek’s claim that we should embrace the market even if we 
do not understand how it works adds a magical touch to neoliberalism.
This was the normative/activist side of neoliberalism with many good 
arguments for freedom and individualism. Problems arise, though, when these 
ideas are put into practice via economic policy measures based on its assumptions 
about what people are like and how they seek happiness.
6.5. The practice of neoliberalism – deregulation
The Second World War and the Cold War got in the way of the liberal agenda. 
Socialism got a new hearing as people watched the heroic efforts of the people of 
the Soviet Union during the war. Only later did the general public get information 
on the abuse of power that manifested itself in the vast Gulag system exposed so 
vividly by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In media and the public conscience the Soviet 
failures were overshadowed by the horrors of the Holocaust. Rebuilding Europe 
took a massive intervention by the state, already expanded to manage the war 
economy, but now using its regulatory power to promote growth and consolidation 
of damaged economies. American aid (the Marshall plan) and the international 
expansion of American industry (Le Défi américain (1968) by Servan-Schriber 
illustrates the discomfort Europeans begun to feel about the “help”) generated 
mixed feelings. Nationalist, and regulatory regimes survived for a long time.
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The de-regulation episode started in the 1980s and Finance triumphed 
(Madrick, 2011). Again it was firebrand economists with an economic policy 
agenda that cleared the way. Milton Friedman and the Chicago school soon 
became an ideological centre and Thatcher/Reagan provided decision and 
implementation power. Madrick (2011) has chosen to describe the process in 
terms of portraits of important actors. The action had, no doubt, moved over 
the Atlantic Ocean, the academic excellence with it, but Thatcher and the British 
establishment longed to prop up London as a world centre of finance by means 
of a Big Bang.
Madrick (2011) starts out by pointing out how a slow moving revolt against 
regulation had started already in the 1960s, but it was the shrewd ideologue 
Milton Friedman (1962), who knew how to give the neoliberal movement a 
new momentum: “Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. 
When the crisis occurs the action taken depends on the ideas that are lying 
around.” (preface of the 1982 edition). He engaged in various political activities 
as mentioned above (Barry Goldwater, column, TV series) to hammer home 
the message of the MPS. The free choice of individuals must be promoted and 
regulation minimized. But action was delayed, the US government had Vietnam 
to think of, currencies and interest rates were volatile, the oil crisis of 1973 had 
great effects on all economies. Banks, lead by Citicorp, used their creativity to 
develop derivatives to hedge against fluctuations. The merger and acquisition 
bubble of the 1970 generated a need to fund the evermore daring takeovers. 
Banks’ equity was under pressure as liabilities increased.
At this time Ronald Reagan, a devoted democrat and union activist (actors’ 
guild) from the beginning, had a change of heart under the influence of the 
Hayek and Friedman books. The problems with the state’s finances were the 
result of an overgrown welfare system. Reagan took office as Governor of 
California in 1965. In his second term, 1972, he initiated a Tax Reduction Task 
Force, which was lead by Lewis Uhler, a devoted right wing constitutionalist, 
who later set up an organization (limittaxes.org) to promote constitutional limits 
to public spending and included Milton Friedman (Friedman was on the board 
of Uhler’s organization). Its report (December 1972) resulted in the famous 
Proposition 13 that proposed a binding decision to reduce the personal income 
tax of Californians from 8.3 percent to no more than 7 percent. Proposition 13 
was defeated. (See O’Reilly & Dugard, (2015) and Weisberg, (2015) for further 
information on Reagan’s presidency).
The 1970s was, politically, dominated by the fight against inflation (oil prices). 
Milton Friedman’s idea that it had to do with the money supply had taken hold 
of the thinking (even if Blinder (2013) showed that it could not explain the level 
of inflation). Things started to change when president Carter appointed Paul 
Volcker to chair the Federal Reserve System (the Fed). Volcker was a dedicated 
inflation fighter. He used money supply and interest rate changes to push inflation 
down. When the measures took effect the GDP fell sharply and Volcker had to 
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set in stimuli, which made the economy rebound, not least because of president 
Reagan’s deficit spending (and tax cuts). When Volcker handed over the Fed to 
Alan Greenspan in 1987 his defeat of inflation had provided a good cover for 
other activities to reduce government interference (by “starving the beast” as 
Friedman had argued), which caused imbalances that in turn, caused the stock 
market to crash in October 1987. Alan Greenspan, saved the financial sector by 
rapid monetary expansion, which worked, partly because Volcker had starved 
the economy. In this sense the 1980s had been geared to volatility by the use of 
strong state interventions.
Alan Greenspan, born 1926, is an interesting participant in the period leading 
up to the financial crisis. A New Yorker he started his studies at Julliard School 
of Music instead of attending a conventional college, with the aim of becoming 
a professional musician. He dropped out and joined a professional jazz band 
as a clarinettist (Madrick, 2011, chapter 14), but 1945 he entered New York 
University graduating in 1948. Then he attended Columbia University to study 
economics under Arthur Burns, but dropped out to join a consultancy firm 
oriented toward economics (Conference Board). His first wife, introduced him 
to Ayn Rand, who made a strong impression on him (she and her husband were 
the only persons Greenspan later invited to his swearing in as head of president 
Ford’s Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)). Greenspan entered politics in 
1967 by joining Nixon’s campaign as economic advisor, but refused to join the 
White House staff after the election was won. In the wake of the Watergate chaos 
Arthur Burns, his former professor, now chairman of the Fed, persuaded him 
to enter CEA. In spite of the severe recession Greenspan advised Ford to fight 
inflation generating high unemployment. He commented this on a TV-show by 
showing little understanding for unemployment (‘only a pause in the upswing’), 
which probably contributed to reduce Ford’s re-election prospects. When Ford 
lost the election Greenspan returned to business. In 1977 he got his PhD from 
NYU on a thesis consisting of a set of “business analyses” mostly published in 
“business journals” or done for clients. In the 1980s Greenspan gave advise to 
the Reagan White House, and he was called in (1981) by Reagan to head (with 
senator Moynihan) a committee to find ways to combat the rising deficit in the 
social security system. His visibility and many good relations helped him to the 
post as Chairman of the Fed to replace retiring Volcker in August 1987. The first 
years he followed his predecessor’s policy and gave priority to fighting inflation 
by raising the interest rate. There were arguments for paying more attention to 
unemployment, but he managed to keep the trust of presidents and consolidated 
his position. In late 1994, against a background of critique that he did not care 
enough about unemployment, Greenspan took action twice to fight inflation. 
This generated a crisis for Mexico, a country in deep debt, much held by US 
banks, but a rescue package (30 billion USD) saved the day and by 1995 inflation 
seemed to have been broken, staying steady at 3 percent. 
Greenspan was well liked by the finance sector now. Share prices increased 
GRI-rapport 2016:2
78
rapidly. Shiller (1989) warned about a bubble. In 1996 Greenspan commented 
on this “bubble” using the term “irrational exuberance” and saw a strong effect 
on stock markets all over the world. He might have realised the power of words 
at this time and now he started to pronounce in an opaque Oracle-like manner.
Things were looking good toward the end of the century, inflation and 
unemployment were low, the budget deficit had turned into a strong surplus. 
As LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund started by 
academics and based on the Black-Scholes model) failed, partly due to the 
Russian default on interest payments at the time, Greenspan and his friends in 
government called in investment banks to bail it out, stopping panic to spread 
quickly. A disturbing aspect of the situation was that consumers had reduced 
their savings significantly, and invested instead in derivatives (borrowing money 
to fund it). Greenspan was convinced that the rapid growth of the economy 
had to do with new technology. In 1999 he was ready to start the fight against 
inflation again and raised interest rates in several steps to 6.5 percent in May 2000. 
The effects were strong; a serious recession met George Bush as he assumed 
the role as president of the USA. It was agreed that the best way to meet the 
recession was to reduce the budget surplus (Clinton had used the surplus to 
reduce government debt rather than investing in infrastructure etc.) by tax cuts. 
Nearly 90 percent of the tax cuts benefitted the top 5 percent income earners. 
The surplus shrunk rapidly. 
As Manhattan was attacked on 11 September 2001 it was necessary to step 
up action to restart the economy. Interest rates changes did not seem to help 
much, the budget deficit grew even faster as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
turned out to be more costly. But the low interest rates fuel the housing market, 
banks selling mortgages with ARM (adjustable-rate mortgages) to generate a 
very strong dynamic. The demand (from pension funds etc.) for the derivatives 
based on these mortgages seemed without bottom. But when Greenspan raised 
the interest rate again in 2004 the bomb started to tick as mortgage holders, their 
“adjustable-rate mortgages” being based on Greenspan’s rate, started to fail to 
pay on time. The rest is history. Greenspan came to personalize the marriage 
between free market ideology and state intervention to bail out the large actors 
that failed in the race toward economic growth. Greenspan preached that markets 
would regulate themselves (and the creditors) at the same time as he endorsed 
state intervention to save the failed banks (for the sake of the system stability).
Prime minister Thatcher of Great Britain played a parallel role, with the 
“Big Bang” in London. It was based in an agreement in 1983 between the 
government and the London Stock Exchange to settle a wide-ranging anti-trust 
case initiated by the previous government. The complaint was that the London 
Stock Exchange had restrictive practices in place; like minimum commissions, 
‘single capacity’ rules, which separated actors into separate functions (brokers, 
jobbers, etc), plus excluding foreigners from doing business on the LSE. The 
Thatcher government saw that London had fallen behind New York as a global 
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centre of finance and risked falling further behind. The cause of this was over-
regulation and the reliance of “the old-boys-network” rather than free market 
competition and meritocracy. The “Big Bang” was an expression marking the 
idea that deregulation would increase the activity in London as a financial world 
centre. The lax oversight and regulation by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) that accompanied the Big Bang was strongly criticised later in the report 
on the HBOS failure. The report claimed that the FSA had focused on the 
competiveness of Great Britain rather than the stability of banks. (FCA/PRA, 
2015).
Discussion
Now, that is after the 2008 crisis, things get complicated! Complexity and 
contradiction are abundant as we have left “academic” debate and entered the 
world of economic policy making (at the same time as academic research in the 
form of Finance Theory has entered the banks in the form of risk management 
and –measurement). In such situations, Merton (1949) tells us, ideology 
production is stimulated. To depict the situation in the banking context as the 
financial crisis approached in terms of the “corporatist” triangle one would have 
to chose some middle ground with all three corners “in play”.
Figure 7:
This means that the “logics” of all three organizing logics appear at the same 
time without anyone of them clearly dominating. Market arguments, State 
arguments, and Community arguments compete for public attention. Dealing 
with complexity with a single-minded world-view stemming from a situation 
and practice a hundred years ago is not likely to work. At the same time there 
are sediments of all the foregoing world-views in current policy statements and 
actions. When facing complexity people tend to resort to power as a way to 
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simplify the road to action (as history shows us). The case of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland will illustrate how this works.
6.6. A bank under neoliberalism
I have chosen Fraser’s book (2014) on the trouble of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) to illustrate how the practice of banking can go from good to bad in 
a very short time if conditions are conducive to such a development. I could 
have chosen Grind’s book (2012) on Washington Mutual or Perman’s (2013) 
on HBOS  – the patterns are quite similar – and I am fully aware of the fact 
that these three authors are business journalists specializing in banks, and not 
scientific researchers. But in this project only description of facts on the ground 
(which can in principle be checked) and common sense interpretation of them, 
or applying a new perspective that will “show” the obvious conclusion, is 
required. There are not very many academic studies of a descriptive nature yet 
of banks and their responses to a changing environment. One could wonder 
whether the world and worldviews have become more complex these days than 
they were in the days of Fugger and Medici. Probably they are not. It is only that 
academic research – in the case of Fugger and Medici done by historians – is 
good at reducing complexity and clarifying issues of this or that specific branch 
of research. Here I am writing from a standpoint of confusion over the fact that 
so many banks, policy makers, and researchers failed to see what was coming and 
take appropriate action. This historic overview of the fate of banks in particular 
circumstances and particular world views is aiming at finding clues that could 
help us re-set bank management studies to better understand what is going on 
when banks interact with their environments. Persuasive arguments in such an 
endeavour are not likely to come from strict adherence to the theory (implicitly) 
under attack. But we will probably find that the keys to understanding in crisis 
situations – as Friedman (1982) put it – “depends on the ideas that are lying 
around”.
Inside the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)
I have read Fraser’s book carefully, noting arguments and facts that seem strange 
in the light of received wisdom in finance/banking theories, I have then pieced 
together the shortest possible account of the rise and fall of the RBS 
Actually the title of that book (“Shredded - inside RBS the bank that broke 
Britain”) is rather clever (if somewhat overblown) since the leader of the bank 
during the most dramatic period was Fred Goodwin, nicknamed “Fred the 
Shred”. When Fraser reported on RBS (1999 - 2008) its most striking feature, he 
thought, was its market value, that at times seemed detached from reality. The 
value was greater than all other listed companies in Scotland put together. How 
could that happen? 
RBS originated in the failed Company of Scotland that tried to establish a 
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colony in Panama several hundred years ago. As part of the agreement to form 
the Union with Scotland in 1707, the British government paid compensation 
to those who lost money in an effort to establish a trading colony in Panama, 
and these resources were pooled to start the Equivalent Company that, in turn, 
was instrumental in starting the RBS in 1727. The earliest goal of the new bank, 
Fraser claims, was to put the ”Old Bank” (Bank of Scotland) out of business. 
After the First World War RBS found Scotland too small and embarked on 
expansion by acquisition of four British banks. The period after the Second 
World War was good to banks, with Keynesian spending to rebuild society 
and strict regulation of the financial sector, which prevented new players from 
getting a foothold. But as heavy industries declined, like shipyards, the bank 
attempted to solve the problem by acquisition again. The National Commercial 
Bank of Scotland, a larger bank than RBS, was acquired in 1969/70, resulting 
in a market share of some 40 percent, and 700 branches. But the leadership of 
RBS saw no merit in supporting the manufacturing sector - volume of the bank 
itself rather than promoting growth of the Scottish economy had priority. In 
1981 the board accepted a take-over bid from the Standard Chartered bank, but 
there was opposition from the public and a competing offer from the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The public was unaware of the 
fact that also Lloyds Bank had been pursuing a take-over of RBS for some time 
(and other banks, including Deutsche Bank, were thinking in similar terms). 
This situation with competing bids was the reason for the board’s acceptance 
of the Standard Chartered’s offer. The battle over who should take over RBS 
generated an intense political debate. The Thatcher government (despite its 
free market ideology) referred both offers (Standard Charterd’s and HSBC’s) to 
the Monopolies and Merger Commission, which concluded that neither of the 
bidders could be allowed to take over RBS. This experience was something that 
the RBS did not want to have again.
Thatcher had come to power in the election 1979 and embarked on reforming 
the economy and “bring harmony” into it by monetarism, lower taxes, and 
privatisation. However she had included high interest rates in her policy and 
this generated decline in industrial investment and increased unemployment. 
Demands for her resignation emerged, but popularity returned with the victory 
in the Falklands War, and Thatcher embarked on further free market reforms 
and “responsible capitalism”. RBS acted upon these reforms by acquisitions 
and by starting an insurance business (Direct Line). At this stage RBS was 
underperforming due to an unwieldy structure and multiplicity of businesses 
without matching systems of management.
When Thatcher was re-elected for a third term, the shock therapy seemed 
to have worked, the economy was growing, share prices soared. In 1987 a 
fairly young (47 years) scientist (mathematics and physics, PhD in engineering), 
George Mathewson, was appointed director of RBS responsible for strategy and 
development. Even if he was not a banker, he had business experience from 
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venture capital and had worked very actively with SDA (Scottish Development 
Agency) since 1981, recruiting “sunrise industries” to Silicon Glen, Scotland’s 
technology corridor. He was also a close ally of the secretary of state for Scotland, 
George Younger. 
After announcing his resignation from SDA in March 1987 he was offered 
many jobs, but chose RBS as a good opportunity. The current CEO, Winter, who 
had started his career in RBS at 16 and soon would retire, supported Mathewson, 
and saw him as a possible successor. But Mathewson had to prove himself. He 
started his new job on October 1, and on October 17, “Black Monday”, the stock 
markets in New York and London crashed. Mathewson hardly noticed sine he 
was busy familiarising himself with the bank. “The Royal’s new strongman” (a 
headline at the time) saw his mission as “to shake things up”. The strategy for 
this was worked out in secret meetings with a small team. It stressed marketing 
(properly targeted), beside layoffs, and introduced a performance measure called 
“products per customer” (properly incentivized) – the branches must sell more. 
The changes amounted to a cultural revolution. The current CEO, Winter, who 
had accepted the plan (called Nova Reda) was disappointed and resigned “a 
broken man”. It seems like the new culture did not filter down through the ranks 
as Mathewson had expected. Communication with the “grass roots” was not in 
order.
Britain’s “Big Bang” ended in a spectacular bust as property values declined 
about 30 percent from 1990 to 1993 with attending bad debts. Mathewson 
initiated a further restructuring plan to improve management capacity and slim 
the structure further. This project, called Columbus, (‘he did not know where he 
was going’, internal comments went), included segmentation and specialization 
of staff, with the regional level dismantled. McKinsey had been brought in to 
assist. Banking had changed from service to sales and profit, Mathewson argued 
that RBS should be best in class. No more “sleepwalkers” in the management 
team. Six hundred secretaries were made redundant. Managers had to type their 
own letters. One manager, quoted by Fraser (2014, p 30), pointed out that “this 
meant that there was no longer any record of what we were doing”. Bad debts 
were transferred to a special unit “Specialized Lending Services”. Mathewson 
considered the Columbus project a success; the cost-to-income ratio came down 
from 65-70 to below 50. 
What had given him the resources to carry it out was his marketing strategy 
built on the idea of multi-branding. This included winning customers from the 
lazy big four banks by making deals with, e.g., Tesco to offer bank services 
in supermarkets under the brand Tesco Personal Finance, or developing direct 
services in car insurance (Direct Line). This provided growth, profit and a 
comfortable cash flow that made Columbus and further ventures instrumental 
as base for the bank’s ability to leverage capital. It was a design for enhanced 
control from the centre.  The stage was set for the next venture, which was 
financial engineering. RBS was now big, but was still considered a “plain vanilla 
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bank” by corporate customers, it could not deliver the financial services that 
more “sophisticated” customers needed. So Mathewson hired Iain Robertson 
(his own successor at the Scottish Development Agency) to lead a new corporate 
banking division, headquartered in London, which was assembled from existing 
business units. Still strategically oriented toward competitive advantage in special 
niches this new division soon sold its asset management and investor services 
and engaged in train and rolling-stock leasing and in helping Enron with 14 
structured finance deals – very profitable initially but with a huge loss as Enron 
went bankrupt in 2001.
The globalization of RBS took two roads; into the USA via the acquisition 
of Citizens, in 1988, and a further 19 banks over the next 12 years all integrated 
with Citizens, where CEO Graboys later was succeeded by Fish. These CEOs 
on the American side were allowed to run their business as they saw fit with little 
interference from head quarters. 
The European road, fired on by the prospects of a single European market 
from 1992, started with a strategic alliance with Spanish Santander (in 1988). 
Both moves (Citizens and Santander) were strongly criticised by bank analysts 
who did not like the declining profitability 1988 – 1992. The 1990s constituted 
a disappointing decade for ambitious Mathewson, with a number of failed 
acquisition attempts. 
Deregulation had made it possible for building societies to de-mutualize and, 
thus became targets for mergers bids. RBS courted a number of them but failed 
to offer top prices. Mathewson did not want to enter into open price bidding for 
fear that a failed offer would make RBS itself a possible target for take-over bids. 
A deal with Birmingham Midshires building society went to the public stage 
however, but its members refused the offer and chose a higher bid instead. The 
plan had been to continue to run Birmingham Midshires as a separate brand (a 
policy that was to continue). Instead of growing in the building society sector the 
consequence of this “failure” was that RBS itself became an interesting target! 
In late 1998 Martin Taylor, CEO of Barclays, suddenly resigned in a strategy 
dispute with his board. Barclays warned that profits for the year would be lower 
than expected. Now Barclays also was “in play”. The investment advisor Terry 
Eccles of JPMorgan encouraged - “and probably egged on by the new recruit 
Fred Goodwin” (p. 55) as well - Mathewson to offer a “reverse takeover” (i.e. 
the smaller partner takes over the larger one), but with a new CEO appointed at 
Barclays this deal was turned down as well. Now RBS really had caught attention! 
Its actions seemed somewhat desperate.
Mathewson had met Fred Goodwin in meetings of the CSCB (Committee 
of the Scottish Clearing Bankers) and was impressed by his “intellect, grasp of 
detail and no nonsense approach” (Fraser, p. 62). He asked Goodwin whether 
he would accept the job as finance director of RBS (indicating a further step to 
CEO). After some negotiation Goodwin had started at RBS in August 1998. 
After 15 months at his previous job as CEO of Clydesdale Bank he was deeply 
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disliked at that bank for his autocratic style. Several of the members of its 
management team had left. (A proper check on Goodwin’s merits would have 
discovered this.)
Goodwin had studied law but was chartered as accountant at Touche Ross 
(later Deloitte) where his greatest achievement was ‘leading the worldwide 
liquidation of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)’. In fact he 
was a member of the liquidation team and charged with back office chores. 
A Touche Ross colleague from that time said to Fraser: “Either you were a 
solvency partner or you were not. Fred was not.” Still in 2012 newspapers wrote 
that Goodwin had single-handedly lead that liquidation. Commenting on his 
“autocratic style” at Clydesdale Goodwin claimed that he wanted to be judged 
on his results. A control freak and micro manager Goodwin was obsessed with 
décor, appearance and tidiness (Fraser, 2014, p. 69). However, when Goodwin 
was touring RBS to get acquainted with the organization, people were surprised 
by his lack of interest in credit scoring or anything that had to do with his role 
as finance director. On his new job Goodwin soon developed a habit of “tearing 
people apart” at morning meetings. He was called “Fred the Shred” and some 
called the morning meetings (every day at 9:30 to 10:00) “morning beatings”.
Bagging NatWest
The most significant event in the rise of RBS was the hostile take over of 
NatWest, a London bank formed in 1970 by a merger between Westminster 
Bank and National Provincial Bank. The affair was dramatic and drawn out. 
From 1999 NatWest was in trouble. It had opened itself to “be in play” by 
announcing plans to buy the fund management group Legal & General investors, 
but met resistance there. Rival Bank of Scotland (BoS) saw an opportunity and 
announced a hostile take over bid in September 1999. RBS prepared a counter 
offer, but preferred a friendly approach. Negotiations turned sour as NatWest 
wanted to be the dominating part. The RBS, offer was well prepared by analyses 
top-down as well as bottom-up. Bidding ensued and RBS came out as victor 
after many turns (Fraser, chapter 9). Due to the good preparations the merging 
process went smoothly and was declared a success (to be used as an argument 
by Goodwin in the coming years – a Harvard Business School case study 
was made under the title “Royal Bank of Scotland: Masters of Integration”). 
Two aspects of the integration of NatWest should be noted; due to internal 
conflicts and lack of organization RBS decided to get rid of many managers of 
NatWest in the London office but to let the American part continue relatively 
intact as Greenwich Capital, the other notable observation is that RBS decided 
to keep its “spreadsheet approach” to group financial reporting (NatWest had 
a more advanced system), which meant that there was no “audit trail” to the 
underlying financial and operational information. This made RBS accounting 
more susceptible to cheating with the numbers.
Soon after the NatWest deal was settled Mathewson moved up to chair the 
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board. Goodwin took over as CEO and was given a free hand. RBS showed very 
good results for 2000, but the auditors refused to sign off on an issue related to 
the NatWest acquisition and Goodwin dismissed the auditors, PwC, and hired 
Deloitte, Goodwin’s former employer, without tender. Tensions soon developed 
between Mathewson and Goodwin resulting in Mathewson’s withdrawal from 
active participation. Increasingly Mathewson participated in board meetings via 
the video conferencing facility installed in his home. Goodwin pursued growth, 
especially in the investment bank business, but also through continued acquisition 
of other banks in northeast USA for Citizen Financial. All the time using the 
RBS retail bank as a cash cow and increasing leverage. Goodwin wanted RBS 
to be one of the largest banks in the world, like Citigroup, often talking about 
rankings. He stressed the use of “metrics”, not least return on equity (RoE), in 
managing the bank.
“Discipline and punish”
Fraser claims (2014, Chapter 12) that a culture of fear emerged as a result 
of people who wanted to be open and honest about a situation risked being 
“shredded” in Goodwin’s Monday meetings. Goodwin adopted Welch’s (former 
CEO of General Electric) method of ranking employees on performance. The 
problem with this was that moving a well performing subordinate up to the 
“top performance” category required another to be moved down since each 
unit had to comply with the “Bell curve”. Very ambitious budget targets, often 
considered unrealistic by those who had to live up to them, set the stage for 
internal competition rather than co-operation. You had to allocate all your time 
to meet your own targets. Employees were disciplined under the yoke of PEF 
(Performance Evaluation Framework) and LEP (Leadership Excellence Profile), 
which were quite open to subjective abuse (Kerr & Robinson, 2012). To further 
extend control over information Goodwin and communications director Howard 
Moody initiated stronger control over contacts with external stakeholders, even 
consultants could not be used without Goodwin’s authorisation. Goodwin also 
engaged in litigation concerning defamation as journalists criticized aspects of 
RBS. One particular event is the effort to “slap” an injunction on a building 
company erecting a department store building on St. Andrew Square. The 
reason: it left specks of dust on Goodwin’s Mercedes parked nearby.
Expansion
Now, early 2000s, Goodwin turned his attention to Ireland. Its economy 
had grown rapidly over the last few years as a result of tax incentives and de-
regulation that went a bit further than other nations’. RBS had acquired Ulster 
Bank in 2000, a well-run bank ranking as number three in the country. The 
new owner centralised the credit process to free staff to devote more time to 
selling. But Goodwin wanted a still larger share of the growing economy (BoS 
had entered the race in 1999). He found the solution in Cormac McCarthy, the 
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young CEO of First Active (an Irish mortgage bank). The timing was right since 
First Active had been made a limited company (former mutual building society) 
5 years earlier and the ban on concentration of ownership was about to be lifted. 
McCarthy was offered good terms (to become CEO of Ulster Bank after the 
merger), his finance officer would follow him to the same position in Ulster 
Bank and a number of non-executive board members would be given a place in 
the new entity. Analysts were concerned that the offered price was three times 
the book value of First Active’s assets, but the deal went through. 
Now Ulster Bank embarked on a journey to become the number one bank 
in Ireland (J21, “journey-two-first”, for short). The pressure to sell increased. 
Soon Ulster Bank was the first to offer mortgages at 100 percent of the value. 
An illustration of the atmosphere at the time is the Dunne affair: Sensing the 
overheated market the owners of a large site including two premium hotels in 
Ballsbridge, an up-market suburb to Dublin, had set it up for auction. Dunne, a 
rich property developer, arranged funding with his usual banks, Bank of Ireland 
and Irish Nationwide (275 million EURO) to enter the bidding. Ulster Bank 
approached Dunne with a better offer to take over the financing; credit for the 
whole sum of purchase, and a further 130 million EURO to buy an adjacent 
office building. This was the most expansive commercial property site in the 
world for a while. Before Dunne could obtain planning permission the financial 
crisis struck and Dunne went bust. Before the crash the Ulster Bank had managed 
to syndicate some of the loans to Rabobank and Kaupthing (among others). The 
credit loss seems to have been absorbed; on the surface the figures of Ulster 
Bank looked good for 2007.
In 2002 Goodwin was named the Forbes “Global Businessman of the Year”. 
His position was very strong. Fraser has a chapter named “Royal Bank of Fred” 
with tales about extravagant expenditure on activities only remotely related to 
the business of the bank, like involvement in Formula 1 racing (the Williams 
team) and in golf (Jackie Stewart and Arnold Palmer appointed “ambassadors of 
the RBS at a handsome salary), seven limousines on duty 24 hours a day all days 
of the week for Goodwin, the corporate jet. By now the new regulator (FSA) 
had found its proper role was that of a quite lax regulator.
The American build-up
Goodwin now considered growth in the USA the best option, the Labour 
government had stopped Lloyds attempt to take over Abbey National in 2001, 
acquisitions in Europe were unattractive because of the cost of laying off people 
there. In the USA take-overs as well as lay-offs were less regulated. The RBS 
American arm, Citizen Financial had a smooth operator in Larry Fish, who had 
acquired smaller banks, seemingly successfully, at a rate of two a year for some 
time. However those acquisitions were usually paid in cash using RBS cash, but 
when pushed towards larger deals Fish’s tendency to overpay for acquisitions 
came under scrutiny. A triangular drama between Charter One (that was also 
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courted by KeyCorp) and RBS  (intending to bid on KeyCorp) ended in RBS 
acquiring Charter One after only three days of due diligence at a quite high 
price (10,5 billion USD cash, the largest cash transaction in the history of US 
banking). The deal was considered a bad one by Mathewson and by analysts, 
RBS shares fell five percent on the day of announcement in May 2004. Charter 
One had pointed out how well they were doing in HELOC (granting consumer 
credit with homes as collateral – not subprime mortgages).
In this situation a non-executive board member of RBS, Sutherland, 
commissioned an opinion poll of how investors saw the bank, its strategy, 
management team etc. The report, ready by May 2005, was devastating to 
Goodwin (does not listen, arrogant, treats share holders like idiots, etc). Sutherland 
read out parts of the report at a board meeting. Hostilities with analysts came to 
the fore at an analysts’ conference in August 2005 where there were questions 
about a “management discount” on the share due to Goodwin’s deal-making. 
After the board meeting and the critique in August Goodwin seemed a different 
person stating that he saw no need for further acquisitions - but before long it 
was announced that RBS would form an alliance with Bank of China (11.307 
branches in mainland China), which meant acquiring 10 percent of that bank. 
A solution had been found whereby two other (passive) partners would acquire 
about half of this. Goodwin tried to calm analysts by pointing out that that the 
deal would be funded chiefly by the sale of RBS’s stake in Santander (at 900 
million GBP). The summer of 2005 also included the sudden resignation of the 
RBS director of finance (with “be more with the family” reasons given), and the 
appointment of a successor recruited from Citibank, but without experience as 
director of finance. The new CFO had, however, participated in the installation 
of an IT-system for credit derivatives at Citibank, a system that was rumoured to 
focus on hiding toxic assets rather than accurate reporting (Fraser, 2014, p. 212). 
By now the production of toxic assets via very high leverage was at its height. 
These activities created a system of interlinked traders that did a lot of trading 
between themselves, keeping the market “liquid”. These volumes of trading 
required a large balance sheet. The fastest way to increase the balance sheet was 
by acquisitions (including the goodwill that came with overpriced acquisitions).
ABN AMRO - Goodwin’s biggest mistake
ABN AMRO had sought growth over the first part of the 2000s and was 
underperforming. Goodwin was interested in ABN because of its Chicago-based 
subsidiary LaSalle Bank that could be merged with Citizen Financial to hide 
the fiasco with Charter One. Contacts with Santander showed that they were 
primarily interested in the Brazilian subsidiary of ABN AMRO, Banco Real, and 
the Italian one, Banca Antonventa. Another possible partner, Fortis, saw the 
taking over of ABN’s Benelux operations as their target. While this consortium 
was forming Groenink (the boss of ABN AMRO), who judged the RBS interest 
as hostile, had initiated negotiations about a merger with Dutch rival ING. This 
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came to nothing since ING would not pay enough for the shares of ABN. The 
low performance of ABN had drawn the attention of several hedge funds that 
were pressuring Groenink to achieve a turn-around, or else. On March 1 2006 
RBS reported pre-tax profit that was 17 percent above the previous year. A 
couple of weeks later it was announced that Barclays was about to bid on ABN 
AMRO. Goodwin seemed to have panicked – he thought Barclays was likely to 
be targeted for a take-over – now, should their bid succeed, they would become 
“bid proof”, and focus might be directed toward RBS instead. 
Fortis, RBS and Santander met in early April (2006) to work out a deal 
between themselves as the basis for their offer. The agreement was that ABN 
AMRO would be divided between the three, with RBS getting LaSalle, the 
Asian operations, and investment banking in the USA, while Santander would 
get the Brazilian and Italian subsidiaries, and Fortis the BeNeLux-operations. 
The agreement was legally binding for the rest of the acquisition process. The 
problem was that in the next few days Groenink sold the LaSalle Bank to Bank 
of America (price: 21 billion USD). This was described in the press as a “poison 
pill” to avert RBS interest in ABN AMRO. Goodwin was furious and took 
this as a personal insult. Things were hurried up, due diligence was insufficient, 
the consortium justified the acquisition with a claim that they could achieve 
considerable cost savings – this in spite of a US court having confirmed that 
ABN AMRO had the right to sell LaSalle (the chief reason for the RBS interest) 
at the stage it did. 
Now ABN AMRO had two competing bids and the board refused to 
recommend either of them to share holders. By now the risks in the sub-prime 
market had been noticed and Moody’s started to down grade mortgage-backed 
securities in July. Northern Rock issued a profit warning at the end of July. BNP 
Parisbas suspended three funds exposed to that market on August 9. The next 
day the European Central Bank pumped 94.8 billion EURO of liquidity into the 
market. The same day RBS held its shareholders’ meeting, which voted to affirm 
the offer to take over ABN AMRO. By September Barclays shares started to 
decline – their offer was based in shares – which improved RBS’ prospects to win 
the battle. When the Dutch authorities accepted that the RBS consortium could 
buy ABN AMRO they appended very strict conditions, including that RBS must 
take responsibility for the whole of ABN AMRO as the bank was dismantled and 
obtain regulatory clearance every step of the way. Investor discontent with the 
deal grew after Bloomberg had publicized it on October 8. When speaking to the 
Treasury select committee on February 10, 2009, Goodwin admitted that it was 
a “bad decision” to acquire ABN AMRO. RBS had to borrow the majority of 
the payment for the deal on short terms (payable within a year), several surprises 
were discovered at ABN AMRO  - 725 million USD invested in Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, ABN had shouldered 840 million of USD risk in one of Goldman’s 
synthetic CDO’s, and it had lent tens of billions to Russian oligarchs. Furthermore, 
the integration process got stuck in cultural clashes. A “bad decision” indeed.
Sten Jönsson
Banks and their world view contexts
89
On the RBS side Killop (now chairman of RBS) and Goodwin (CEO) claimed 
2005 to 2007 that RBS was not doing “subprime” in spite of the fact that RBS 
was the third largest underwriter and bundler of US housing debt. In February 
2008 RBS announced record profits (10.3 billion GBP for 2007) and a raise 
of dividends, but were also pressured by authorities to undertake a 12 billion 
GBP rights issue due to its leverage. Suspicions about the quality of its assets 
and liabilities grew. Time was running out. By October 11, 2008, in a meeting 
at the Treasury, the RBS leaders were told that RBS had to sell 20 billion GBP 
of equity to the government as part of the bailout (almost double the current 
capitalization (10,9) of RBS at the time), and that it had to abstain from paying 
any dividends until the 5 billion GBP preference shares that were part of the 
equity issue had been redeemed). Goodwin and McKillop had to go.
Learning from RBS
As mentioned this case is similar to the Washington Mutual (Grind 2012) and 
several others (cf. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011), so even if it is a single 
case it may be considered representative of the managerial activities in many 
banks destroyed by too fast de-regulation, the predatory atmosphere, and the 
following financial crisis. By focusing on rapid growth of the balance sheet to 
gain financial power via ever-increasing leverage top managers saw acquisition 
as the best strategy. They got used to deal-making as a normal part of business. 
Once acquired the “integrated” new parts of the growing bank were pressured 
to increase sales and cut costs at the same time. Investment in systems to back 
up well formed corporate governance documents were not popular because they 
were costly and time consuming. Centralization of decision power to decisive 
leaders with the talent to spot opportunities, and exploit them before others, was 
necessary for such a strategy to be executable.
The rhetoric in vogue at the time was neoliberal. The State is clumsy, 
bureaucratic and inefficient, while the Market is innovative and finds the solution, 
and therefore also the right price, much quicker. The only requirement is to 
allow the creative market actors to get on with it without unnecessary obstacles. 
Part of the innovative character of the Market is that individual, well informed, 
and competent actors in the market may be allowed to outsmart other actors. 
This was the game Mathewson and Goodwin were in. But it seems like they were 
also driven by a fear of being taken over, be “in play” as it were. 
In the upsurge toward the financial crisis the market liked what they saw – the 
deal making caught the attention of the financial press as well as the investors – 
but the price of a take over bid tended to drift upwards – it was often too high to 
be attractive. Cost reductions were required to save the deal. Goodwill as part of 
the asset side of the balance sheet - the difference between the paid price and the 
book value of the acquired company - tended to grow, which required annual 
depreciation. Clearly the financial reporting was misleading over the last few 
years of RBS as an independent bank. But it had also been demonstrated that 
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auditors with doubts about the valuations will be replaced by more friendly ones.
Mathewson, and especially Goodwin, upset the delicate control balance 
(celebrated by the revered Agency theory (a product of the Chicago School)) 
by reserving the role of principal for themselves with the investing public (the 
owners) as supportive audience. This is in line with what already Chandler 
(1977) had described for the USA as happening in the 1930s. (Agency theory 
cannot survive without the assumption of a Principal constituted by the owners). 
Goodwin achieved his self-governance mandate by taking strict control of the 
information flow to the environment. The transition was gradual but quite 
discernable.
Mathewson was recruited from the outside. He was different than the existing 
managers in the sense that he had analytic training, but he was keen on the 
development of Scotland and thought that the key to success was firmness in the 
pursuit of efficient banking. He disciplined the RBS to make it ready to welcome 
Goodwin. Mathewson embraced the multi-brand strategy that allowed control 
by metrics and fast expansion. Goodwin took command in that structure by 
using temper and abuse to get his way. This stimulated power games, which are 
not part of agency theory, as the standard way to sort out the candidates for 
promotion. Predatory behaviour seems to have been rewarded inside as well 
as outside the bank. Like Medici, Fugger, and Baring, but in a different manner 
RBS failed to see the danger ahead and continued in the direction of its tangent.
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7. Instead of a conclusion
7.1. The relevance of worldviews
When trying to get an overview of the material presented above – and almost all 
of that material are summary reports on summary accounts of chains of events – 
the first impression is that Banking in context really is a matter of complexity and 
contradiction. This, according to Merton (1949/1968), will stimulate ideology 
production (to simplify judgement). Consequently, this observation in itself, is 
an argument for the relevance of providing maps of world-views as backgrounds 
for accounts of the history of prominent banks that failed. They seemed to 
have failed because they tended to be caught up in value and action patterns 
that prevented them from seeing fundamental changes coming upon them. One 
is reminded of the claim by Friedman (posted up front of this essay): “Only a 
crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When the crisis occurs the 
action taken depends on the ideas that are lying around.” (preface of the 1982 
edition). The problem is that due to sedimentation it seems like the wrong ideas 
are lying around. Sediments are entrenched parts of worldviews that remain 
practice long after their use-before-date. The new situation does not match the 
standard situation imagined by the current worldview. Consequently action will 
be constructed to be out of step with what the new situation requires. Success 
will generate strong beliefs in current practices and worldviews will provide 
good arguments for those beliefs. It should come as no surprise that successful 
banks go under in times of change. At such times newly established practices 
will be subject to critique, like the one on the title page: “Fairness demands the 
end of a system that privatises gains but socialises losses” (Mark Carney, Bank 
of England, 2013).
One could see the help to failed banks Carney talks about as alms to 
the poor that would clear the way to heaven for state agencies in charge of 
rescue operations, but the scholastics would probably object to that kind of 
moral; as a matter of fact the state agencies as well as top managers of banks 
are managing other people’s money. For whom, one might ask? Certainly not 
for the shareholders, who are the first to lose, but probably for the creditors 
(usually other banks), and certainly for “the system”, which under neoliberalism 
is the market. The markets are infused with new liquidity in order to uphold the 
function of the markets (which have already failed to value assets properly). The 
“Market” corner of the corporatist triangle has been held in high regard lately, 
which means that arguments based in this “paradigm” have come to good use in 
understanding as well as solving problems.
Nobody saved the smaller banks that were prominent in the old days 
(well Barings was saved once more than a hundred years ago by fellow banks 
orchestrated by Bank of England). Part of the explanation for this is, of course, 
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that there was no State to mobilize the necessary resources, and saving banks 
was not a worthy cause. Also one could not blame “the market” (in the case of 
Baring it was miss-management of “operational risk”). In the cases of Medici 
and Fugger it was a matter of lack of adaption to the emerging proto-state in 
the form of princes making war on credit (plus miss-management). We see that 
up to the last century there was no State to save banks in the worldviews. The 
task of the emerging  “pre-modern” state under Mercantilism was to cater for 
the nation and its balance of trade (through regulation). To the extent that banks 
had any role to play here it was as suspects for conspiracy and illicit export of 
money and precious metals.
From the 18th century international trade blossomed under the protection of 
the State in the form of the navy. Trade houses expanded business and developed 
merchant banks, which in turn were granted privileges in the colonies in return 
for helping the State to a more steady flow of credits. Deal making with the state 
as a partner became the core business of banks under the Liberal era. Mutual 
support was the winning formula.
As Liberalism was challenged by socialism in different forms at the turn of the 
century the need for ideological struggle came to the forefront as “strong leaders” 
cast their nations into war (twice). The idea of allocation of resources according 
to need and the dream of equality was a formidable challenge that seemed only 
to be averted by channelling/focusing value statements toward external enemies 
and the ultimate sacrifice for the nation. Banks assumed a mere service role as 
the State took over the coordination of resources for the joint effort. Under such 
conditions it is good advice for banks to identify their mission with the State’s 
(as the representative of the nation), and orient their rhetoric accordingly (Burke, 
1950/1969). Baring bank prospered during Liberalism, hibernated during war-
time, and was not quick enough to acquire fully equipped complementing firms 
with the needed competences. Adding a team of traders specialized in the Far 
East did not bring with it the adequate control mechanisms. The traditional “old 
boys” control does not work, at a distance, among young, frantic “day traders”.
Dismantling regulation after the War, first to restore civil society, and later 
to enhance investment in industry, took its time since mercantile conceptions 
remained in the form of Balance of Payment, currency values, and competition 
among nations. Supported by a growing common view among academic 
economists Neoliberalism provided arguments for step-by-step deregulation 
(the welfare states staying on for a little longer) up to the burst of the “Big 
Bang” that left everything in banking “up for grabs”. The financial sector gained 
in prominence. Now competition had gone global and ensued between “full-
service” banks with a global reach even if it centred on trading rooms in New 
York with flickering screens  showing instant price changes for all to forecast 
and react to. To build itself into a recognized member of “Big Five” (or whatever 
the national number was) a bank had to add the lacking services by acquisition 
in a hurry. Otherwise it would itself be “in play”, i.e., a target for possible take 
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over. Thus a new form of capitalism – a predatory one – emerged. A proper 
bank, a bank attractive enough for heroic leaders, would live in a constant fear 
of becoming the prey, while pursuing conquest. When this kind of approach to 
banking becomes the fashion financial systems grow inherently unstable. The 
story of the Royal Bank of Scotland illustrates how this comes about. Several 
other big banks could have been used to the same purpose.
It seems justified to draw the conclusion that the ideologies (world views) 
dominant at the time played a role in the definition of what a bank should be 
doing. But at the same time it seems obvious that such worldviews are quite 
stable (they have de facto served the prominent banks well!), which will have the 
side effect of delaying a bank’s adaption to societal change. It seems like it was the 
failure of seeing the implications of change in relations to princes, proto-states, 
pre-modern states, globalization of markets that brought the banks in decline. 
The decline was quicker, the faster the technology used. (Expect future banks 
to fall super-quick as relations have digital form rather than intimate relation 
between “men of character” – it is not a very daring proposition to claim that the 
next financial crisis will stem from world wide fraud by network). 
From this follows that it is of great interest to study how world views penetrate 
into the organizations of banks to have an effect on management decisions. This 
will have to be studied as close to “real time” as possible, by recording how 
bank managers argue in meetings to make sense (or give sense) to contradictory 
information reaching them, or with a somewhat less reliable method by analysing 
interviews with bank managers giving accounts of their decisions during, e.g., 
the recent crisis. This way one could assess the “collective worldview” of that 
bank, as a microcosm of societal worldviews, as well as the weight that should 
be given to Friedman’s statement about “ideas laying around”.
7.2. The issue of the nature of banks
There is no doubt that the nature of banking, and of banks, has changed 
dramatically over recent times. This development is dramatic and too recent 
to be properly assessed yet. In the old days, up to the 1970s, banks were rather 
small in number of employees. Control could be upheld by personal trust and 
face-to-face communication – then the old fashioned reliance on your “good 
name” could work well. Always honour contracts was the rule to live by, and 
the rational incentive was to do due diligence in pursuit of arbitrage. With the 
“de-personalisation” of the market (no longer business between individuals 
in the form of one buyer and one seller, but the business of abstract forces 
called supply and demand), and the recognition that actors in the market may 
have different negotiation skills, the market became a system. Its self-regulation 
would reward the smart ones and punish the dumb, but always uphold the 
equilibrium, indicating the fair value of assets. This liberated market actors from 
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any moral scruples, if there were any complaints the State would supply the 
proper jurisprudence to settle conflicts, which in turn would generate a market 
for good lawyers. Practical men, like bankers, did not realize the implications of 
this de-personalized world of economics but continued with trade as the basis 
of operations. But the new prominence of the State as a power centre to relate 
to and trust (now that bureaucratic rules made it more predictable) made it more 
desirable to move headquarters to a closer proximity to the regulatory power of 
the state. England having become the dominant international trade partner it was 
London that attracted the growing merchant banks seeking protection under the 
state umbrella for trade agreements of mutual benefit. Banks participated actively 
in the dissemination of large loans by the state for all kinds of infrastructure 
investment. War times when everybody must contribute to the national interest 
are not good for banks.
For the emerging big banks after the War the market was, initially, strictly 
regulated as the State took a firm grip of most processes in society, either to 
mobilise all resources for the post war effort or to achieve a welfare state (or 
both). Routine management under the rule of regulation assured a secure steady 
growth and central place for banks in society. Competition was limited by the 
rules and by a limited supply of deposits. Monetarism could work then as well as 
Keynesianism. Business cycle changes were the thing to observe if you wanted 
to be prepared.
With the right ideas “laying around” and the right politicians in office a 
neoliberal world-view could be promoted via deregulation of financial markets 
(and the fall of the Berlin Wall). Top managers were, if not taken by surprise, 
overwhelmed by all the strategic opportunities that offered themselves. Banks 
seem to have found it necessary to have a full assortment of financial activities, 
which could be accomplished quickly by acquisitions, and they needed to make 
use of the new possibilities to use leverage, which required new, scientific ways of 
managing risk. The number of definitions of risk (and the appended models for 
measuring them) multiplied. Regulations and, in some jurisdictions, supervision 
also multiplied (in the name of de-regulation). Compliance, new professions, 
deal-making, new technologies etc. complicated management and provided a 
hearing for “ideas laying around”. The investor (or share-holder) seemed to give 
up trying to understand, by themselves, what kind of financial instruments were 
offered by advisors (sales people, including traders with clients). It seemed to be 
enough to determine your “risk appetite” by answering a number of questions 
and then follow the advice of the advisor. “Screw the investor” is a term Michael 
Lewis (2015) used repeatedly in his recent book, “Flash Boys”, about the new 
ways of putting technology to use in algorithmic trading on stock markets. We 
have come a long way and it is seems too early to say what banking is going to 
be tomorrow. But it has always been too early to tell – also for bank managers 
– and then we will have to fall back on the Darwinian attitude of looking upon 
banking through the eyes of survival of the fit. It is quite natural then that banks 
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fail and we should accept that we need to divide our financial resources between 
a portfolio of banks. Behave as risk managers rather than loyal customers! What 
role does rhetoric (understood in a negative sense) play in dealing with all the 
contradictory interests banks claim that they cater for?
7.3. Arbitrage in space and time
In the time of Medici, when scholasticism ruled and family (and its good name) 
was synonymous with the business, arbitrage was fairly simple. There were price 
differences between goods at different places to exploit via trade. There were 
also price differences between currencies at different places, which could be 
exploited while you were at it. The vehicle for transporting payment (and avoid 
robbery as well as loss at sea) was the promissory note (Bill of exchange), which 
worked on the family’s good name, in Florence, as well as Venice, Antwerp, and 
London. Furthermore, when other banks/families were present in the proximity 
an interbank market could emerge where this family’s Bill could be cashed in 
another family’s house (at a price). Banking was “grafted” on trade via Bills of 
Exchange, taking advantage of two price differences at the same time, provided 
trade was international.
Both Medici and Fugger ran into trouble when lending to princes took an 
unreasonable part of the loan book. Princes base their creditworthiness in 
power. They command resources that can be posted as collateral, but they also 
command the right to postpone or even dismiss payment altogether. Arbitrage 
was present in a different form when Fugger used its good name to borrow in 
Antwerp and lend to the Habsburg king in Spain. At the end of the 16th century 
scholasticism lost its grip on the norms of people (bankers as well as princes) as 
the personal relations catered for by “Natural Law” were “de-personalized” and 
replaced by markets with their abstract “market prices” and interest understood 
as income foregone by tying up money in a particular loan. Arbitrage in the form 
of lending to the most powerful prince had turned out to be risky. The world 
of finance had been opened to economists discussing money flows and balance 
of trade. 
In mercantilism the troublesome prince was (gradually) replaced by the state. 
The articulation of the problem came as a response to the failure of the wool 
trade as the basis for British prosperity. Money was flowing out of the nation at a 
faster rate than the inflow, pamphlets said. Stabilizing the nation meant replacing 
the prince with the permanent structure of the State. The mechanism was war 
(on credit) and the tool of establishing jurisdictions of states was peace treaties 
(contracts), like the ones of Westphalia in 1648, which, by the way, confirmed 
that religion was no longer a political issue. The Rule of Law was laid down in 
a bureaucracy predictable enough to be included in the plans of actors in the 
markets, banks among them. The concern of the state under mercantilism was to 
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see to it that a balance of trade was maintained, which legitimized interventions 
in trade practices (like the Navigation Act of 1620). The effects on banking 
were probably limited, but arbitrage became more complicated to manage. You 
needed to be present both in trade centres, like ports, but also in power centres 
– now in the form of administrative centres – like London. Baring centred on 
London as global trade with colonies required state support, not least protection 
by a growing navy, and negotiations on terms as the state focused its interest 
on promoting low priced imports and high priced exports. Arbitrage could be 
negotiated, and shielded by contract.
As the State was established liberalism came to concern itself with limiting 
the space of its intervention. There were many areas where free trade and 
competition could accomplish more than the clumsy state bureaucracy. The 
main argument was that the market is a self-regulating mechanism – Darwinism 
helped produce compelling ones – not to be interfered with. Economists 
appeared, most prominently Adam Smith, dealing with “political economy” 
and as a consequence how the good society should be organized. The search 
for arbitrage now included the discovery of system improvement opportunities 
through technology applications, like the railroads, telegraph, and large scale 
industrial production. 
Banking now faced an overflow of opportunities of putting together large 
scale financing - via creative new forms of financial instruments - of infrastructure 
investment, which required strategies of specialization (structures following 
strategies, according to Chandler, 1962) to keep track of arbitrage. Provided the 
strategy was adequate banks, like Baring, prospered. Still, banks were relatively 
small. Baring had about 90 employees by 1903. As mentioned, banking came to 
a virtual halt as all European nations mobilized all their resources for the First 
World War. The experiment to return to the earlier laissez-faire economy failed 
in the depression, and in the emergence of nationalist and socialist ideologies. 
Economies were thrown into another period of strict regulation – of banking as 
well as most other areas. The Second World War brought a divided world, and 
the cold war. A sense of belligerence justified continued regulation at the same 
time as technological progress, and welfare state solutions stimulated a steady 
economic growth in the west, with the American economy as the engine. When 
the Berlin Wall fell in the late 1980s, the end of history was declared, capitalism 
had won, and a neoliberal world-view could take over. This set the stage for a 
complete reformation of banking and the domination of the finance sector that 
we experience today. Arbitrage can now be created by influencing policy makers 
as well as investors. Arbitrage has become a discursive phenomenon. Now the 
vocabulary of finance is full of “magic” descriptive terms, for what goes on 
“out there” in the world that finance is increasingly isolated from, like in “Black 
Swans”, White Knights”, while words used to describe financial markets include 
“sentiments”, “mood”, and “exuberance”. “Risk” has become a word of many 
uses.
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Traditionally risk is a measure of the variation in a variable. When we know 
nothing about the causes of the variation – it is completely stochastic and varies 
around a mean - we have a measure of risk. In this case of ignorance of causes 
we talk about “random walk”, and after specifying the expected shape of the 
curve describing the distribution (e.g., normal distribution) of outcomes, we can 
calculate values. Black & Scholes (1973) used an assumption about random walk 
in their development of a model for option prices in their seminal article that 
set the modern development of financial instruments in motion. Now we could 
price risk, if you take a higher risk you can earn more money (-and lose). Your 
personal banker will ask you about your “risk appetite” (is it a “5” or a “6”?) 
before advising you on buying shares or bonds. Risk is everywhere and we do 
pretend to know what it is.
Let us take the subprime case
The originator of a mortgage cooperates with a developer and helps the 
prospective buyers of a newly built house to the loan. It is a young couple, he 
graduated recently as an engineer and has his first job (not permanent but in a 
booming industry), she has a year to go in law school and they have a baby. They 
might be seen as a risk to the lender at the moment but prospects are good. They 
hesitate to take on large loans at this stage, but the originator sweetens the deal 
by offering 2 years without amortization and a lower interest rate. The couple 
expects to be up and running in 2 years and signs the deal. The originator has 
reduced the risk for them with this loan considerably. But he also has a way to 
reduce his own risk because he expects to pass the mortgage on to somebody 
else within 2 years. The couple still carries the risk and it is going to get much 
greater in two years when repayment as well as interest increases. Anyway both 
originator and creditors are quite safe because house prices are on their way up 
and the young couple could easily get out if they should run into problems.
The originator soon sells the mortgage (standard forms filled in to allow 
classification of the couple into risk classes) to an investment bank that will 
take a thousand mortgages to form a package with a nice risk profile (individual 
mortgages classified and described in a appended document). This package can 
now be given the rating AAA by a rating institute (at the going rate paid by 
the bank) using “scientific” methods. In the package good and bad risks even 
out and nobody can have any complaint. The decision to buy a “tranche” of 
the package fitting the portfolio of the buyer can be taken on purely scientific 
grounds. 
When selling the package to investors the investment bank will cut it up in 
“tranches”, some with very low risk, others with higher risk (according to the 
risk classification forms), but with higher return. In this way a “product” can be 
adapted to the individual buyer’s risk appetite and portfolio composition. Most 
buyers at the time thought they were buying AAA rated papers. In the aftermath 
of the financial crisis (2008) it was found that failed banks had astonishingly 
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much high-risk tranches left in their own books. One might assume that they 
were more difficult to sell, but they could still be accounted for as AAA in their 
own balance sheets.
The investors, typically institutional investors, e.g., fund managers, included 
the subprime tranches in their portfolios, hopefully as part a separate risk strategy 
for that particular fund. Their concern was to persuade investors (individuals) 
to deposit their savings (for pension purposes) in their funds by indicating how 
much the capital of the fund has increased during the last few years. No risk as 
indicated by the continued successful management of the fund.
The investor – a person – in that fund will be asked by her personal banker 
“What is your risk appetite?” Indeed, what is the underlying risk to be taken by 
this investor as part of her savings for a secure pension? Can anyone explain? 
Still, the advisor will say “in today’s market you cannot get any decent earnings 
unless you take risks!” When asked to describe what risk is the advisor will start 
with a risk-free investment in State bonds and compare its interest rate with 
the rate at which you can buy a “junior” bank bond and call the difference “the 
spread”. Then we understand! The market has spoken. If it has a price it must 
exist. Risk has been reified!
This little story about how risks taken by different actors in “the market” 
are layered upon each other and “managed” on a scientific basis of a “random 
walk” assumption illustrates how far we have come. From Medici’s trading on 
his “good name” (meaning the family’s good character of always to honour 
contracts, earned over time) to today’s traders in abstract “tranches” at the click 
of their computers. Risk differences in time and space are now the turf for 
arbitrage seekers. A very large part of the financial instruments we meet, when 
we see our financial advisors, are constructions for arbitrage.
7.4. Can the corporatist view help?
When trying to locate the world-view and related bank management principles 
in the corporatist triangle map (Community-State-Market) I found it easy and 
natural to place banking in the scholastic era close to the “community” corner. 
This because it is so obvious from the texts that the primary asset here is your 
“good name” – the Medici bank was equal to the respect for Cosimo. Normally 
we would assume that there are courts to appeal to if one feels betrayed, but we 
can see that they did the Medicis little good at the time, infested as they were 
by political factions. There were markets but those were actively manipulated 
by different parties, including the guilds (and Medici). Better rely on personal 
relations! (Except princes where you were liable to be trapped in spiralling bad 
debts). Personal relations, and spontaneous solidarity, are at the core of attitude 
of “community”. This colours the business of banking as well.
Under mercantilism, from the middle of the 1600s, the formation of a State, 
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stable and efficient enough to provide a predictable basis for planning ahead, 
changes the game. Now good relations in markets have to be complemented 
with good positions to negotiate deals with the state, not least in colonial 
trade. This moves the locus of arguments for managerial principles toward the “state” 
corner. Moving headquarters to London, did not only provide proximity to the 
administration (and to Parliament – many bankers were members), but also 
access to the local money market. Baring Bank organized several international 
loans to states, often with syndicated banks, but also with investors other 
participating. An investing public was emerging even if they were comparatively 
few yet. The State was consolidated as the dominating “corner” by the wars and 
the necessary regulation, but also welfare state ideas justified strict regulation 
by the state. Some professions - notably the auditors - managed to negotiate a 
measure of self-regulation, but the state was at the centre. Good arguments were 
the ones that appealed to the state.
Liberalism won the day when the state (notably Britain) was established to 
“rule the waves”. The world was awash with investment and trade opportunities. 
The state could not do it all but was persuaded to transfer as much of the work 
of sorting out the best opportunities to private entrepreneurship. Some will be 
very rich but we will all be better off. This was proven true in the 19th century 
and also banks prospered closer to the Market corner.
When we had accepted the Fall of the Wall as proof of the superiority of 
the market economy de-regulation followed in a massive way. The market 
jargon related mostly to the sale of financial instruments produced en masse 
through “securitization”. But for bank management the acquisitions aiming 
at complementing lines of business (brokers, insurance etc.) were as much a 
protection against being taken over by a “bigger fish” as gaining a full assortment 
of services. The complexity of finding oneself at risk of coming “in play” in a 
predatory context, at the same time as you negotiated competition issues with the 
State, and accommodated new professions coming into your organization with 
the new technology, must have been overwhelming. It seems like all three corners 
of the corporatist triangle are now in play in the sense that arguments will have to 
be found to accommodate all three perspectives. This will make contradictions 
as well as complexity manifest. 
Under such conditions bank managers as well as the public will demand 
ideologies (Merton 1949/1968, Geertz, 1973) that can help simplify things. 
This is manifested in the conspicuous increase in corporate communication 
professionals and lawyers in banking, which is matched by a shift toward 
opinion formation rather than fact-finding among journalists. The demand for 
ideology generates metaphors that exhibit values (“toxic assets” is one example). 
The worrying aspect of this is that too many actors may lose contact with 
economic reality and with its management. On the other hand the “sentiments” 
of the market are also real, in the sense that they manifest themselves in price 
movements of financial instruments (even if the real engine behind volatility 
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we observe is algorithmic trading by computers programmed to act on price 
movements only).
Figure 8:
The answer to the question in the heading of this section seems to be that it 
helps in the sense that it warns us against judging history on the basis of current 
world-views. We will be wiser if we look upon banking in context. We will also 
discover sediments of abandoned world-views in some current banking practices 
and vocabularies. It seems like the corporatist view could be used to classify 
the arguments in use at given times to better understand related managerial 
dispositions.
7.5. Recapitulation
I believe there is a benefit in looking long term at the relations between banks 
and their contexts, pragmatic and ideological ones alike, and that this essay has 
contributed to “show” the connections. First it should be noted the world in all 
probability did not appear less complex and contradictory to those who lived it 
2000 years ago as compared to today. It is only that the source material, when 
looking back, is less extensive and less accessible. A reasonable attitude when 
interpreting the material presented is a belief that human creativity will generate 
evermore complexity and contradiction with time under any worldview. This 
complexity will make situations susceptible to shocks or crises as even relatively 
modest external changes require reorientations of strategies of actors in a 
given context. Such reorientations will in turn engender changes in worldviews 
through debate and ideological struggle (which replace or reconfigure values). 
Refusal to look at history from a different perspective is likely to be ideologically 
motivated. In transition periods people are likely to harbour contradictory views, 
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like when Adam Smith argues for the Navigation Act as well as for free trade. 
The question of whether world views change by people changing their mind 
about how the world is constituted (ontology), or whether new beliefs take over 
as the old believers die out, like Thomas Kuhn (1962) showed is the structure of 
scientific revolutions, remains unresolved for banks. But maybe bank managers, 
like scientists, are true believers who are not easily convinced that the world has 
changed, requiring banks to enter into severe crises before views are changed 
(often by replacing managers). Then Friedman’s “ideas lying around” come into 
play.
I have chosen prominent banks to be put in their contexts and I find that they 
all failed because of management failure. Risks have always plagued banking, 
be it pirates robbing trade shipments, princes failing to honour their debts, 
rouge traders, or predatory capitalism. What is important when it comes to 
understanding the nature of banking is to see how risks were managed in context. 
The common factor of Medici, Fugger, Baring, and RBS was that they finally 
met with conditions they could not adapt to. Part of the failure to adapt may 
have been the world-views in vogue at the time, which helped (or not) managers 
make sense of the situation they faced. I have noticed, en passant, that all four 
banks were actively involved in politics in different ways; Medici in Florence 
leading to assassination, Fugger in intimate relations to the Habsburgs, Baring 
brothers being members of Parliament, and RBS cultivating special relations 
to the minister for Scotland. Politics being an interesting side show for banks, 
the main occupation for bank managers is always the issues of competence, 
attention, and organization/control, but even these factors are influenced by 
the current world-view (ontology = what the world consists of and how its 
parts interact). This will influence how banking is shaped by its practitioners in 
context, and how important events are understood and dealt with (managed). As 
events are made sense of (or rather “given sense” under a certain world-view) 
the pragmatics of banking drifts. A successful deal gives reason to try to design 
an even more successful one. Frontiers are tested, risks accumulate, and, in time, 
something breaks (e.g., depositors’ trust in Northern Rock, (Liff & Wahlström, 
2016)). The “world” has changed in the eyes of bankers, and new avenues for 
banking practice need to be developed. Take the meaning of arbitrage as an 
example!
7.6. With such increasing complexity and contradiction – what kind 
of banking do we need for the future?
Today we live in a credit society - in the world of banks! Equity is minimized 
while regulation sees to it that it does not go too low, and leverage is maximized. 
(One should note that the core of the capitalist idea is the striving to increase your 
equity!) National and super-national authorities pump out money in “easing” 
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operations to promote growth in economies that are already over-consuming. 
This should provide a wonderful market for banking and it seemingly does. But 
“securitization” (the construction of financial instruments to generate arbitrage) 
is increasingly pre-occupied with a kind of gambling where one party’s gain is 
another party’s loss – a zero-sum game. Furthermore computers do more of the 
trading than we generally are aware of. 
When we look back at the arguments against ursury provided by scholastics 
we should note that they point to the sterility of money. Money in itself does not 
provide any service to the borrower beside the lender’s exploitation of his need 
– a kind of bullying not condoned by the church. The need should be alleviated 
by charity. We might harbour the same feelings toward the “front running” 
described by Lewis (2015).
Contemplating the role of power and politics (capacity to manipulate) we 
might associate back to the Jewish scribe from 180 BC who advised against 
lending to anybody “mightier than thou”. We are then reminded of the 
devastating influence of princes on the fate of banks 500 years ago (with their 
wars on credit). The modern state was built out of the ruins of war and since 
then we have had a constant debate on the proper role of the State in relation 
to banking with mercantilists, liberals, socialists and neoliberals providing the 
inputs. We should remember that it was the States that carried out de-regulation. 
The relation between State and Bank is tighter than ever now in the era of 
globalization and super-national authorities. For some time the market solutions 
have been the first choice among state bureaucracies. What was previously core 
state operations in advanced welfare states are “outsourced” at a blinding pace. 
At the same time complexity and contradiction characterize markets – the smart 
operators, who know how to manipulate it to their advantage, are having a field 
day. It is time to stop and reflect – go back to the question what it is that justifies 
the prominent position of banks in our society.
Not so long ago I noticed a sign on the door of a branch office of a bank 
growing out of its insurance origins saying: “We have no money!” in order to 
avoid robberies. (The robbers are now located in distant places raiding (hacking) 
accounts by internet. Banks have dedicated departments constantly on the watch 
for “strange” transactions that might indicate foul play. These departments 
are growing rapidly. Their problem is that the risks they are dealing with can 
never be assumed to be generated by “random walk”, because they are the 
result of the creativity of intelligent actors “Phishing for Phools” (Akerlof & 
Shiller 2015)). Inside the bank branch with “no money” there were sales people 
calling themselves advisors. The money was elsewhere. Still, it is now common 
knowledge (Torfason, 2014) that banks are able to create money out of thin 
air. So monetarism is not what it used to be. We live in a world of below zero 
interest rates and vast sums of money flowing fro and to in the world.
Hardly any of the initially stated pre-conditions for then emergence of banking 
(stable economic relations, monetary economy, record-keeping, and structure) 
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are there any more. One might wonder if we need banks at all. There should be 
better reasons to have them than the more or less permanent service as “pumps” 
of wealth from the poor and middle class to rich friends (family, princes, states, 
cronies, bonus takers). There is the ultimate challenge for research! Why do we 
need banks in the future? Everybody his own banker?
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